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With the ever increasing number of Internet-connected devices, the importance of
cyber security also increases. Exploding over the past decade, the number of Internet
of Things (IoT) devices connected to the Internet jumped from 3.8 billion in 2015 to
17.8 billion in 2018. A major concern with many IoT devices is that they contain
vulnerabilities that are often left unpatched. To make matters worse, many of these
IoT devices lack modern security measures found on traditional computing devices,
due to their inherent hardware limitations and vendors focusing on functionality and
time to market over security.
Honeypots are devices not part of routine network usage that are meant to alert
of an attacker’s presence, capture an attacker’s tools, and record their Tactics, Tech-
niques, and Procedures (TTPs). Honeyd is a framework capable of rapidly creating
low-interaction honeypots by simulating the network stack.
HoneyHive is a framework that uses distributed IoT honeypots as Network Intru-
sion Detection System (NIDS) sensors that beacon back to a centralized Command
and Control (C2) server. This research uses the three Honeyd IoT honeypots devel-
oped by Stafira, but HoneyHive is flexible enough to support any device capable of
running the Python HoneyB Agent script. HoneyHive offers a method for network
intrusion detection using the lure of vulnerable IoT devices as distributed honeypot
intrusion detection sensors.
The HoneyHive framework consists of the C2 server, transfer server, Snort log
parser, Database (DB), and the HoneyB Agent script. The C2 server interacts with
all other components and displays honeypot interactions and Snort alerts to network
operators in real time. The transfer server receives PCAPs and other Binary Large
iv
Object (BLOB) from the HoneyB Agent. Upon receiving a PCAP, it is passed to
Snort and analyzed for matching signatures. Immediately after this, the Snort log
parser reads the log file and then sends any alert information back to the C2 server.
The DB stores alerts, alert metadata, and PCAPs received from the HoneyB Agent.
The HoneyB Agent script captures and reports any traffic interactions with Stafira’s
honeypots. Captured traffic is sent to the transfer server and honeypot interactions
are sent to the C2 server.
The tests in this experiment involve four types of scans and four levels of active
honeypots against the HoneyHive framework and a traditional NIDS on the simulated
test network. The scan types include No Scan (Control Group), TCP Connect scan,
Aggressive scan, and NIDS Avoidance scan. The levels for honeypots are 0, 3, 6, and
9 honeypots. Each of these was run in different combinations with one another for a
full factorial experiment resulting in 16 different combinations.
This research successfully created a framework of distributed network intrusion
detection IoT honeypot sensors that capture traffic, create alerts, and beacon back to
a central C2 server. The HoneyHive framework operated correctly by not alerting on
routine network traffic and alerting on non-routine network traffic. Additionally, the
HoneyHive framework successfully detected intrusions that traditional NIDSs cannot
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With the ever increasing number of Internet-connected devices, the importance
of cyber security similarly increases. Exploding over the past decade, the number of
Internet of Things (IoT) devices connected to the Internet jumped from 3.8 billion
in 2015 to 17.8 billion in 2018 [1]. A major concern with many IoT devices is that
they contain vulnerabilities that are often left unpatched [2][3]. To make matters
worse, many of these IoT devices lack modern security measures found on traditional
computing devices, due their inherent hardware limitations and vendors focusing on
functionality and time to market over security [2]. While an insecure IoT device
connected to a consumer’s probably-already insecure home network does not cause
much worry, insecure IoT devices connected to previously-secure networks do. An
attacker now has a vector into a previously locked down network and can use the
device as a pivot to gain access into the internal network [4]. If these devices were
to become connected to Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) networks,
the results could be catastrophic.
Honeypots are devices not part of routine network usage that are meant to alert of
an attacker’s presence, capture tools, and record Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(TTPs) [5]. Honeypots come in varying levels of sophistication and are available in
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multitudes of frameworks. Honeyd is one such framework that is capable of rapidly
creating low-interaction honeypots by simulating the network stack. Lukas Stafira
used Honeyd to develop three convincing web-based IoT honeypots which are used
in this research. Stafira created IoT honeypots for the TITAThink camera, Proliphix
thermostat, and an ezOutlet2 power outlet [6].
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) are devices that analyze network
traffic and create alerts if they see traffic of malicious nature and or anomalous traf-
fic. Intrusion detection is split into two categories, signature matching and anomaly
detection. Signature matching uses known patterns of malicious traffic and creates
alerts upon seeing the pattern. Anomaly detection on the other hand uses baselining
and heuristics to create alerts when network traffic deviates from the network base-
line. Signature matching is faster and easier to setup than anomaly detection but
only alerts on traffic matching installed signatures. This means that signatures must
be kept up to date and any previously unknown exploit (zero-day) will not generate
an alert. Anomaly detection can detect zero-day exploits but requires much more
setup and can create many false positives, or false negatives, if the heuristics are not
fine-tuned. Modern NIDS often are a hybrid of the two detection techniques.
1.2 Motivation
Even networks with security measures in place are not immune to compromise;
an example is the cyber attack against Ukarine in 2016 where attackers successfully
gained internal network access through a phishing campaign. After initial access, at-
tackers then conducted internal network scans and credential harvesting over a period
of several months. Using gathered credentials, attackers gained access to Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks and took approximately 30 power
stations offline, sending the country and more than 230,000 residents into darkness for
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several hours [7]. If the network had contained convincing SCADA honeypots then
it is possible that network administrators would have detected the attackers’ pres-
ence and been able to respond in time before the real SCADA systems were taken
offline. While honeypots do not guarantee network security nor are they the solution
to securing every network, their use is another viable tool for network defense.
Due to IoT devices’ lack of sophisticated hardware and vendor support for security
updates, other methods must be implemented to secure the network. Because so
many IoT devices remain unpatched, unmonitored, and left on, they have become a
tantalizing target for attackers to gain network access or add another device to their
botnet [8]. Due to IoT device popularity with attackers HoneyHive was developed.
HoneyHive is a framework that uses distributed IoT honeypots as NIDSs sensors
that beacon back to a centralized Command and Control (C2) server. This research
uses the IoT honeypots developed by Stafira, but HoneyHive is flexible enough to
support any device capable of running the Python 2.7 HoneyB Agent script. Providing
security for all IoT devices with their heterogeneous nature is a monumental task.
HoneyHive instead offers another method for network intrusion detection using the
lure of vulnerable IoT devices as distributed honeypot intrusion detection sensors.
Because traditional NIDSs typically only monitor Switch Port Analyzer (SPAN)
traffic from the switch they are located on, they can miss attacks located on other
parts of the network. Typical placement of a NIDS is just inside a network’s external
firewall in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) [9]. If an attacker manages to to infiltrate
an internal network without tripping the NIDS, then internal attacks and or scans
can be performed without raising an alert, as was the case with the Ukraine power
network. The HoneyHive framework addresses this shortcoming of the traditional
NIDS construct by using distributed IoT Honeypot NIDS sensors.
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1.3 Research Goals
The goal of this research is to first develop the HoneyHive framework and then
test its effectiveness in network intrusion detection compared to that of a traditional
NIDS.
The hypotheses for this research are:
1. The HoneyHive framework operates correctly by not alerting on routine network
traffic and alerting on non-routine network traffic.
2. The HoneyHive framework detects intrusions that traditional NIDSs cannot
through the use of distributed IoT honeypot sensors and packet capture aggre-
gation.
1.4 Approach
In order to determine HoneyHive’s effectiveness at network intrusion detection,
several steps must be taken. These include the development of the HoneyHive frame-
work, setting up the simulated network for experimentation, and then designing and
running the experiment.
1.4.1 HoneyHive Framework
To develop the HoneyHive framework, Honeyd and Stafira’s IoT honeypots are
first setup. Then the individual components of the framework are developed, including
the C2 server, transfer server, Snort log parser, Database (DB), and HoneyB Agent
script. Snort is also integrated into the framework for increased signature matching.
The HoneyHive framework is explained in more depth in Chapter 3.
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1.4.2 Simulated Network
A simulated network also needs to be setup in order to run the experiment. The
network is composed of IoT devices, Stafira’s honeypots (duplicated several times),
Windows 10 devices running Ubuntu Virtual Machines (VMs), Ubuntu VMs running
the Honeyd honeypots and HoneyB Agent script, the HoneyHive C2 server, Suricata,
an Ubuntu attacker machine, and networking devices. The network layout is described
in Chapter 3, and the actual devices used on it and in the experiment are described
in Chapter 4.
1.4.3 Experiment
After development, HoneyHive’s effectiveness at network intrusion detection is
tested in a simulation where an attacker has gained access to the internal network,
has narrowed down their list of targets through previous reconnaissance, and now is
performing internal nmap network scans against the specific Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses before launching exploits against them. The attacker launching exploits on
scanned devices is not tested in this experiment. The exploitation and propagation
stage would hopefully be prevented by network administrators through the use of
alerts from the HoneyHive framework. The tests in this experiment involve four
types of scans and four levels of active honeypots. The scan types include No Scan
(Control Group), TCP Connect scan, Aggressive scan, and NIDS Avoidance scan.
The levels for honeypots are 0, 3, 6, and 9 honeypots. Each of these are run in different
combinations with one another for a full factorial experiment resulting in 16 different
combinations. Each test is performed 30 times for a total of 480 runs. Because of
the timing and coordination required to run the experiment, gather results, and reset
devices to their initial state after each run, the runExperiment.py script automates
this process. This script is discussed further in Chapter 4 and is found in Appendix
5
D.
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
1.5.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions are made in this research:
1. Routine network traffic on the simulated network does not contain any traffic a
NIDS would treat as malicious.
2. Given the same set rules, NIDS create the same number of distinct alerts and




Several limitations currently exist in the HoneyHive framework. The HoneyB
Agent script is written in Python 2.7 which is near the end of its life. Additionally,
HoneyHive relies on a NIDS (Snort) to perform signature matching instead of being
self-contained and possessing its own sophisticated intrusion detection system.
1.5.2.2 Honeypots
While the honeypots in this experiment are useful for testing hypotheses, imple-
menting modern and more sophisticated honeypots would improve the HoneyHive
framework. Honeyd is outdated and no longer regularly maintained [10][11]. Also,
Stafira’s honeypots are low-interaction and are only convincing with web traffic.
6
1.6 Research Contributions
The HoneyHive framework offers increased network intrusion detection to all net-
works its deployed to. It can be used for integration in CIKR-based networks since
IoT devices share some similarities with Industrial Control System (ICS). In addition,
government organizations or commercial companies that work in cyber security could
integrate HoneyHive into their existing network security architecture. The impact of
this framework is a cross-platform, standalone, NIDS / Network Monitoring solution
capable of improving the rate at which network intrusions are detected. While Hon-
eyHive may not be the solution for every network, it is a viable tool for increasing
network security through intrusion detection.
1.7 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 provides background information and related research on the state of
IoT devices, IoT and Computer Network Security, NIDS and Network Monitoring,
and honeypots and honeytokens. It also provides details about software and program-
ming languages used in this thesis. Chapter 3 describes the HoneyHive framework
design and components in depth and explains the rationale behind design decisions.
Chapter 4 describes the methodology for running the experiment and the research
questions posed for this thesis. The methodology includes all parameters, factors,
metrics, and a step-by-step procedure to replicate the experiment. Chapter 5 presents
the experiment results and provides analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary
and conclusion for this thesis as well as future work to improve the HoneyHive frame-
work, and hopefully, IoT and Computer Network Security.
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II. Background and Related Research
2.1 Overview
This chapter provides background information on IoT, IoT and Computer Network
Security, NIDS, and Network Monitoring, honeypots and honeytokens in Section 2.2.
It also covers Honeyd 1.5c, Cyber Deception, and programming languages and tools
used in this research. Section 2.3 explores related research and emerging technologies
in the field of IoT and honeypots.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Internet of Things (IoT)
The term IoT covers a myriad of devices and appliances with capabilities to sense
the world around them, process information, and share this information with other
devices on an internal network or the Internet at large [12]. Simple sensors and
appliances now have the computing power for making intelligent decisions, as well
as communication abilities for sharing perceived data and being remotely interacted
with [13]. Suo et al. break IoT device functionality into four layers: the application
layer, support layer, network layer, and perceptual layer. The application layer is the
actual service displayed to the user such as a web page, application, or screen. The
support layer acts as the intermediary between the application and network layers
and involves cloud computing to bring increased performance. The network layer
deals with transmitting data between devices through numerous different commu-
nication protocols. Finally, the perceptual layer is responsible for collecting data
in the physical world and converting it to digital data through the use of sensors,
cameras, Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID), Global Positioning System (GPS),
transducers, thermostats, etc. [12].
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The majority of IoT devices communicate on a Wireless Personal Network (WPAN)
with a 10 meter range using one of several different Institute of Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers (IEEE) protocols. These protocols mainly include Bluetooth (IEEE
802.15.1), Ultra-Wideband (UWB) (IEEE 802.15.3), and Zigbee (IEEE 802.15.4)
[13][14][15][16][17]. Some devices utilize Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) (IEEE 802.11) in-
stead for communication over a Wireless LAN (WLAN) with a range up to 100 meters.
However, the devices used in this research, and that would be found as honeypots,
communicate over Ethernet (IEEE 802.3), which is the focus of this research.
The added functionality of smart devices makes them very appealing and has
caused the IoT market to explode over the past decade. As shown in Figure 1, the
total number of devices connected to the Internet in 2018 was 17.8 billion, 7 billion
of which were IoT devices. By 2025, the total number of devices connected to the
Internet is expected to grow to 34.2 billion with IoT devices comprising 21.5 billion
of the total devices. The IoT market is anticipated to grow to reach $1.6 trillion by
2025, making it a lucrative and competitive market [1].
With such a competitive market, vendors are scrambling to be the first to re-
lease the latest and greatest product, often cutting corners in areas like security to
reduce cost and production time. IoT devices are often slapped together with inex-
pensive, outdated, and insecure third party components that are no longer supported
or patchable [2]. Insecure IoT devices are an alarming problem in network security
for consumers, corporations, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the
Department of Defense (DoD).
2.2.2 IoT and Computer Network Security
IoT creates new possibilities for technologies never before imagined but also opens
up new vulnerabilities and attack vectors for malicious hackers [4]. These new attack
9
Figure 1. Growth of IoT Devices from 2015-2025 [1]
vectors arise from a lack of security in devices. Unfortunately, some vendors in this
market are not primarily concerned with the security of their devices. Their main
focus is to rapidly develop innovative and easy to use technology before competitors
and turn a profit. This mindset often leaves many IoT devices ripe for exploitation.
Many IoT devices are riddled with vulnerabilities due to vendors focusing on cheap
solutions and rapid development in a competitive market. HP performed a study and
found that 70 percent of IoT devices contain vulnerabilities. When researching 10
of the most popular IoT devices, they found an average of 25 security vulnerabilities
per device, with over 250 vulnerabilities in total [3]. Outdated software is loaded on
devices that are then often never updated or very cumbersome to do so for the average
user. This results in millions of IoT devices with known unpatched vulnerabilities
connected to the Internet, just waiting for attackers to exploit them. Attackers can
quickly discover devices with known vulnerabilities using websites such as Shodan
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[4][18][19][20].
While being able to lock a house, switch on or off lights, or adjust a thermostat
remotely can be desirable, the inclusion of these IoT devices opens up significant
vulnerabilities in networks. A once-secure network can now be accessed by exploiting
a vulnerable IoT device and using it as a pivot into the otherwise unreachable network.
Because these devices are not intended to be accessed by just anyone, unlike web
servers, they are not placed inside DMZs, but are instead placed deeper within the
network. Attackers are still able to reach these vulnerable IoT devices if they first
compromise a DMZ or a different internal device and utilize that device as a pivot to
the IoT device. Traffic is already allowed to DMZ devices, but a misconfigured router
or router with port forwarding can allow internal devices to be compromised.
The threat of IoT devices being hacked is not just theoretical; in 2014, smart me-
ters were hacked allowing attackers to spoof messages between nodes. With spoofed
messages attackers could avoid paying their monthly utility bill or shut down en-
ergy from the utility company altogether, without the use of any kinetic effects. The
attacker’s ability to shut down energy demonstrates the threat of cyber to CIKR
networks; they are susceptible and can be disabled as well [21].
Many IoT devices have been found that allow logins with empty, default, or weak
passwords. IoT devices are becoming increasingly common targets for use in botnets.
While IoT devices may have limited computational power, their sheer number and
ease of exploitation have made them an enticing target for attackers. In addition,
these devices are not often updated and have limited user interaction allowing at-
tackers to go unnoticed on a network for a prolonged period of time [22]. Take the
Mirai (Japanese for “the future”) worm for example, hundreds of thousands of IoT
devices have been compromised and assimilated as part of botnets since its release in
2016. Mutations of the Mirai worm are even prevalent today because of the lack of
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security implemented in IoT devices [8]. These botnets, consisting of up to 400,000
devices, are available for purchase and have been used to execute a Distributed Denial
of Service (DDOS) attack on a number of web servers successfully [23].
Because IoT devices lack sophisticated hardware and are so diverse, traditional
methods for securing them like installing antivirus software or automatic updates
are not possible typically. Kolias et al. argue that the vendor is responsible for
implementing automatic updates and better security in device [8]. IoT devices rarely
receive updates to fix vulnerabilities, and on the off chance they do, there is even a
smaller percentage of users that take the time to manually install the updates [2].
The average user plugs the IoT device into their network without changing default
passwords, and never manually checks or installs updates [20].
2.2.3 Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)
One common device to increase computer network security is a NIDS. A NIDS
can be deployed on networks to detect malicious traffic and intrusions. They can
be placed either inline, which can affect network latency as all traffic now passes
through the NIDS and is then forwarded to its destination, or mirrored where copies
of all traffic are sent to the NIDS as well as the original destination. NIDS can
use multiple techniques for intrusion detection which include signature / pattern
matching, and or baselining / anomaly detection. Signature-based detection searches
network traffic for patterns defined in rule-sets and creates an alert if there is a match.
Baselining involves taking a snapshot of normal traffic on a network, and then using
heuristics; any behavior that is abnormal (an anomaly), generates an alert. Modern
NIDS employ a combination of the techniques as they both have advantages and
disadvantages. Signature-based detection is great at alerting on known exploits, but is
unable to alert on zero-day exploits, which results in false negatives. Baselining on the
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other hand requires creating a network traffic standard that if deviated from causes an
alert. If the network changes or routine traffic changes, then a new baseline has to be
performed. Anomaly detection can create numerous false alerts (false positives) and
require significant setup time for learning the network baseline. However, anomaly
detection is capable of detecting previously unknown vulnerabilities.
This research proposes the use of honeypots as NIDS. Using honeypots as a NIDS
is not a novel idea. Spitzner argued that they make more effective NIDS than tra-
ditional ones since they reduce false positives because any traffic sent to them is
suspicious [24].
2.2.4 Networking Monitoring
Network monitoring software works closely with intrusion detection sensors but
is focused on overall network traffic patterns and determining whether or not devices
are reachable. While NIDS inspect the content of traffic, network monitors record
the volume and types of traffic on the network. Network monitoring quickly helps
network operators identify overloaded network links and devices. Network monitoring
is useful for bringing devices back online and can detect spikes in traffic, indicative of
a Denial of Service (DOS) attack. Furthermore, if a device does go down, it can signal
that an attacker launched an exploit that resulted in a crashed service. NIDS and
network monitoring used together provide a better picture of network health while
still closely investigating traffic for malintent. The HoneyHive framework developed
in this research provides both network monitoring and network intrusion detection
for networks it is deployed to.
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2.2.5 Honeypots
One way to mitigate or detect exploited devices is the use of honeypots. Honeypots
are used to increase the security of computer networks by emulating real devices
attackers might be interested in compromising. A honeypot being interacted with can
be one of the first signs of compromise in a network or of an impending attack, and
can therefore act as a NIDS. By using honeypots, previously unknown vulnerabilities
(zero-day vulnerabilities) may be discovered when an adversary targets and gains
access to the device. In addition, honeypots leave known vulnerabilities unpatched
so that TTPs of an adversary can be learned and or later used to fingerprint an actor
that employs the specific TTPs.
Honeypots come in all kinds of shapes, sizes, and implementations. They range
from simple scripts, virtual devices, to physical devices and support low to high-
interaction.
Low-Interaction Honeypots Low-Interaction honeypots can simulate com-
mon network services and the network stack. However, upon receiving a known ex-
ploit, the attacker does not receive full control of the device because the command
terminal spawned is simulated. This also means that zero-day exploits are not cap-
tured since they are outside what the honeypot knows how to react to. Because the
attacker cannot gain full control of the honeypot, this does make them safer for de-
ployment in a network, but at the expense of being easier to detect as a honeypot by
attackers.
High-Interaction Honeypots High-Interaction honeypots in contrast do
not emulate network services or the network stack but do allow the attacker to gain
full control of the device. This not only allows for a more believable honeypot, but
also supports gathering more information about the attack such as zero-day exploits,
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tools and TTPs used by the hacker. Although there are many benefits to high-
interaction honeypots, they also have disadvantages. While the honeypot looks more
convincing to the attacker because of the full control allowed, it now presents an
increased security risk to the network. In addition, high-interaction honeypots are
costly to develop in both time and resources; they require more maintenance and
oversight than low-interaction honeypots [24][25][26][27][28].
2.2.6 Honeytokens
Cymmetria breaks honeytokens into several sub categories: breadcrumbs, “bea-
cons”, and tokens [29]. Breadcrumbs are data left intentionally for a hacker to find
and use to allow them to move throughout the network. However, by using bread-
crumbs an attacker only moves through a controlled path of devices monitored by
network defenders. All the while, an attacker’s TTPs, which include commands,
tools, and exploits are being recorded. Cymmetria’s “beacons” create alerts when-
ever they are interacted with. They are not part of routine usage (like honeypots)
by the organization so any interaction is considered malicious and can even help to
identify insider threats. Examples of “beacons” include decoy shares, documents with
embedded macros, and websites that all beacon back to a C2 server when touched.
The “beacons” defined by Cymmetria are essentially various types of intrusion de-
tection sensors. Cymmetria’s last category, tokens, are Honeydocs (fake documents)
that act as a beacon to alert that a file was exfiltrated out of the network. The main
difference between beacons and tokens, as defined by Cymmetria, is that “beacons”
reside on the organization’s internal network and tokens are meant to detect data
leaving the network [30].
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2.2.7 Honeyd 1.5c
One common framework to create virtual honeypots is Honeyd. The version of
Honeyd used and described is 1.5c and was last updated in May of 2007. Honeyd
1.6d is available on Github with a last commit of December 2013, but as noted by
Stafira, contains program stability issues [6].
Honeyd simulates the network stack to allow one physical device to act as numer-
ous honeypots. All traffic for the honeypots is sent to Honeyd which makes it look
like the devices are running independently on separate IPs. Honeypots can also be
customized by using Nmap DB files to deceive scanning and fingerprinting software.
The Nmap DB file defines how different Operating Systems (OSs) and their respec-
tive versions respond to messages as well as ports and services that are running by
default [25][31]. While not identical, the Nmap DB file can be used to closely match
network fingerprints of IoT devices. One deficiency Stafira noted about Honeyd was
the outdated Nmap DB files [6].
Within the Honeyd configuration file, low-interaction honeypots can be quickly
created. Each honeypot can be assigned a personality defined by the Nmap DB
file, customize ports to open, filter, and close, and run custom shell scripts on open
ports. Running customized scripts is one of the selling features of Honeyd; with
sophisticated enough scripts, entire services can be mimicked. In theory, creating
scripts to match every service would yield a convincing and very interactive honeypot,
but the operating system itself, as well as Inter-Process Communication (IPC) would
be painstakingly time consuming and better alternatives such as VMs exist for high-
interaction honeypots. Honeyd is designed and better suited for quickly creating
numerous honeypots and simulating a handful of services to provide a low-interaction
honeypot framework.
The IP and Media Access Control (MAC) addresses of the honeypot are also
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configurable, but the IP must be on the same network as Honeyd. MAC addresses
can be used to identify the type of device and manufacturer, so allowing customization
leads to more convincing honeypots. However, with these customization options, it
is imperative that both the IP and MAC addresses be unique on a network in order
to prevent collisions [31].
The Honeyd documentation states that with the flag “l” it logs packets and con-
nections to a specified file. However, this logging option contains only time stamps,
IP addresses, ports, protocols, and transmission byte counts; the actual packet con-
tents captured by Honeyd are not included. While advanced methods did exist to
receive the contents of the packet capture from Honeyd, none are viable now due to
the out-of-date libraries and compilation errors. Furthermore, Provos stated that he
expected a NIDS or other scripts to be run in tandem with Honeyd [31]. Implement-
ing a full packet capture whose contents are accessible is one of the deficiencies this
research plans to address in the Honeyd framework.
Honeyd can be compiled with internal Python services that allow interacting with
Honeyd through either honeydctl (Honeyd Control) or Python scripts while it is still
running. This allows for the creation of dynamic honeypots. Honeydctl connects to
Honeyd and presents the user with a console for issuing commands. These commands
allow listing running honeypots, modifying, or deleting them. One noteworthy com-
mand is “!” which allows sending Python commands directly to Honeyd. By simply
importing the honeyd module in honeydctl (after issuing !) or a Python script, the
user now has access to all the data received and transmitted by Honeyd. Having
access to this data would allow creating packet captures and signatures for received
data. Unfortunately, Honeyd has compilation issues because of out-of-date library
dependencies and the version of Honeyd 1.5c that can be installed from the Ubuntu
packages list is not built with internal Python services. Therefore, this research per-
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forms its own packet capture for signature creation and forensic analysis [31].
Honeydstats and Honeyview Honeydstats and Honeyview are plugins
that allow analyzing the log that Honeyd generates from received traffic. Honeydstats
is a text-based representation of packet level data received (very similar to Honeyd’s
’l’ option), while Honeyview is a web-based GUI representation. Both Honeydstats
and Honeyview focus on the OS versions, destination ports, country codes, and IP
addresses from attackers [31]. Although statistics can be aggregated from across the
network, they both still rely on log files. The information they provide is not in depth
enough for forensic analysis nor fast enough for today’s cyber attacks. This research
hopes to provide a framework with real time alerts while capturing detailed evidence
for forensic analysis.
2.2.8 Cyber Deception
In their 2017 Cyberthreat Defense Report, the CyberEdge Group recommended
that cyber deception technology should include coverage for IoT devices [32]. While
not IoT specific, Cymmetria is leading the way on Deception Campaigns. They define
cyber deception as “baiting, studying, investigating, fingerprinting, and/or smoking
out” attackers. Through the use of cyber deception, organizations can prevent at-
tackers from moving freely throughout their network and impose an increased cost
to attack the defended network. Cymmetria explains that cyber deception is more
than just implementing everything honey (honeypots, honeynets, and honeytokens),
as traditional honey technology is difficult to integrate into a network, expensive to
develop and maintain, and easy for attackers to detect. It is the creation, manage-
ment, and monitoring of these false devices in order to manipulate attackers through
a predefined and monitored path of the network (or as Cymmetria defines, “orches-
tration and virtualization”). Even if the attacker realizes there are fake devices and
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documents, the speed of their attack and propagation is hindered because now they
have to spend extra time verifying if a target is real or a honeypot. All the while,
the attacker’s tools and exploits are at risk of being captured. If they are captured,
then a signature or patch can be created and propagated throughout the networks,
or even worse for the attacker, reported to vendors and antiviruses and distributed
throughout the world. This renders the attacker’s tools worthless and requires them
to spend more time and money to create new ones. While traditional honeypots could
still pose this threat to attackers, alerts and all collected information on the attacker
are not available in real time [30].
2.2.9 Programming and Languages
JavaScript JavaScript is one of the staples for web development today. It is
an interpreted language and allows interacting and modifying the HyperText Markup
Language (HTML) Document Object Model (DOM), which enables creating dynamic
web pages without requiring a user to reload it. Through the use of Node.js and
Electron, applications such as HoneyHive can be created with dynamic Graphical
User Interfaces (GUIs) [33].
Node.js Node.js is a standalone runtime environment for JavaScript built
and maintained by Google. It utilizes Chrome’s V8 engine and possess the func-
tionality to interact with the OS that JavaScript normally does not have since it is
sandboxed in the browser. This extra functionality ranges from interacting with local
files to networking modules for creating a full fledged server. The OS can be queried
for information and concurrency can be implemented through the use of child pro-
cesses. These are just a handful of built in modules, but using the Node.js Package
Manager (NPM), modules can quickly be downloaded and installed for use in an ap-
plication. Node.js is so versatile because it runs exactly the same across all platforms
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[34].
Electron Electron is a module for Node.js that allows creating cross-platform
GUIs. It utilizes HTML, Cascading Style Sheets (CSS), and JavaScript to render the
GUI and is essentially the same as coding a standalone web page for the applica-
tion. This makes creating a GUI that works on any platform relatively fast and easy
because of all the CSS frameworks available. Many applications have already been
written in Electron, such as Atom, Visual Studio Code, Discord, and Slack, to name
a few. Electron applications can even be bundled into executable files for ease of
distribution using the Electron Packager module [35].
Python Python is an interpreted language and currently supports two ver-
sions 2.7.X and 3.7.X [36]. The Python code written in this research uses 2.7.X
because of the greater community support for Python modules available and because
Lukas Stafira, whose work is built upon in this study, created his IoT honeypots
with version 2.7.X. Modules can be quickly installed in Python by using its package
manager, pip [37].
2.2.10 Tools
This section covers the essential tools used in this research for testing and results.
These tools include Nmap, packet capturing software (Wireshark and TCPDump) and
VMware Workstation. Docker is also discussed because several related researchers
utilize it, and future work on this research references it.
Nmap Nmap is an open source port scanning tool used by attackers and
security professionals alike for reconnaissance and vulnerability analysis on networks
and their devices [38]. It provides information on a device’s ports, the services running
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on the ports, and the suspected OS. All gathered information from ports, running
services, and the Time to Live (TTL) in packet responses are compared against the
Nmap DB to make a best guess about the target’s OS. Nmap scans are customizable
in the type of host discovery performed, to the way it scans ports for services, all
the way to firewall and NIDS evasion. Using firewall and evasion flags, an attacker
is able to spoof their MAC, port, checksum, TTL, and even modify their Maximum
Transmission Unit (MTU), which results in smaller fragmented packets. The timing
and performance flags allow adjusting timeouts and data transmission for faster or
slower scans. If used in combination, these flags can result in scanning a network over
a long period of time, without ever alerting a firweall or NIDS [38]. Varying the scan
types and parameters of the scan and testing how effectively and quickly a scan is
detected is one measure of performance for the HoneyHive framework.
Wireshark and TCPDump Packet capturing software is used to sniff traf-
fic on a network and inspect it in further detail later. Both Wireshark [39] and TCP-
Dump [40] utilize the libpcap library to capture network traffic, but Wireshark is
GUI-based, while TCPDump is Command Line Interface (CLI)-based. Filters can
be used to eliminate unwanted traffic either before or after capture to narrow in on
specific hosts or protocols. Although both Wireshark and TCPDump allow quick
filtering of data by specifying source / destination hosts and ports, TCPDump allows
filtering on specific bytes in frames, packets, datagrams, and applications using the
Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) syntax [41]. Although Wireshark has a command line
equivalent (tshark), TCPDump is used to collect traffic in finer granularity and then
analyzed in Wireshark for this research [39][40][42].
VMware Workstation VMware Workstation is a hypervisor software solu-
tion that allows creating and running VMs [43]. Virtual Machines contain a separate
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emulated CPU, OS, memory, and disk space. Hardware from the host system is shared
between it and all running VMs and the amount of resources allocated to a VM is
highly configurable, see Figure 2. Users can select the amount of memory and disk
space a VM has access to, as well as the number of processor cores and peripherals
it can use. Not only does VMware allow running multiple OSs on a single computer
without having to reboot, as is the case with multi-booting, but it also provides a
more secure, sandboxed environment to run applications. If an application becomes
compromised in a VM, only that VM’s OS is affected; other VMs as well as the host
OS are not affected, see Figure 3. An attacker would have to break out of the VM
OS, and VMware hypervisor to get at the host OS, a lengthier and more complicated
process than escaping docker containers [43] [44].
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Figure 2. VMware Workstation Hardware Settings
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Docker Docker is a program that allows running container images. A con-
tainer image is packaged software with all the dependencies included, i.e., libraries,
code, and other tools needed for execution. Because the containerized software in-
cludes all dependencies, execution is the same across different infrastructures. This
greatly increases the portability and stability of software across different devices. At
runtime, container images become containers, which results in isolating the running
software from other processes and giving it only user-level privileges. This improves
the security of the applications because now if the application is compromised by an
attacker, the attacker is limited to access of that container only, essentially a sandbox.
Whereas VMs run a guest operating system on top of the hypervisor to sandbox each
application, the docker engine runs right on the host operating system. With the
elimination of the guest operating system layer from Figure 3, containers utilize less
resources (memory, disk, CPU), which allows running more containerized applications
than virtual machines, as shown in Figure 4 [44].
Docker claims to increase application and device security, however, Sever and
Kǐsasondi demonstrate that if container images are misconfigured then attackers can
compromise other containers, possibly escape the container and compromise the host
operating system [45]. While there are configurations and security measures that can
be put into place to prevent this, the prepared Dockerfiles and many GitHub images
do not use them [45]. Any system that is improperly configured becomes susceptible
to exploitation and therefore users of Docker should not assume their systems are
secure just because they are running containers. In fact, there are known exploits to
escape docker containers as listed in the Exploit Database website [46]. Users should
properly configure their containers with security in mind, and then lock down the
security of the host operating system as well.
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Figure 3. Virtual Machine Structure [44]
Figure 4. Container Structure [44]
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2.3 Related Research
Many different frameworks for building honeypots have been developed and are
explored in this section. They range from generic honeypots, ICS / SCADA and IoT
honeypots. There are numerous honeypots that serve one purpose such as a specific
exploit or service, but the focus of this section is honeypot frameworks that allow the
creation of many convincing IoT honeypots.
2.3.1 Conpot
Conpot is developed and maintained by the Honeynet Project and is used to create
ICS honeypots. Because IoT devices are used to control things like thermostats,
electrical components, and appliances, they bare an ever-increasing resemblance to
ICS. Conpot provides a suite of protocols found on ICS networks and throttles their
responses to mimic real system response time [47].
2.3.2 IoT Web-Based Honeypots by Lukas Stafira
Using the Honeyd framework and Python, Stafira emulated the web services for
three IoT devices to create realistic and interactive web-based honeypots [6]. These
devices included the TITAThink Camera, Proliphix Thermostat, and ezOutlet2 Power
Outlet. In order to make the devices appear dynamic, Stafira accessed local data,
such as time and weather, and used them to generate web pages when responding to
HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) requests. Stafira tested whether Honeyd could
be used to create near duplicate honeypots that simulate the web traffic of several IoT
devices. The honeypots Stafira created successfully mimicked the HTML data of web
transmissions for the real devices. He also tested the Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP)/IP and HTML header similarity, response time, and Nmap completion time
for SYN, UDP, and FIN scans. Stafira compared his results to the physical IoT devices
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using Wireshark, Nmap, and custom Python scripts. His test network configuration
is shown in Figure 5. Honeyd is shown being able to run all three IoT honeypots on
a single VM. Overall, Stafira’s results showed that it is possible to create convincing
IoT honeypots, and the honeypots he created are used in this research as convincing
IoT sensors for network intrusion detection [6].
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Figure 5. Stafira’s Network Configuration [6]
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2.3.3 Honeycomb by Christian Kreibich
Honeycomb is a tool for automatic signature generation from malicious network
traffic captured with honeypots, specifically those part of the Honeyd framework [48].
Kreibich treats all traffic captured by honeypots as malicious because interaction with
them is suspicious and not routine. The signatures generated are formatted for both
the Zeek (formerly Bro) and the Snort NIDS [49] [50]. Honeycomb hooks into Honeyd
and keeps track of network connections (IP and port combinations), while filtering out
traffic received from being scanned, and generates signatures using the Longest Com-
mon Substring (LCS) algorithm. Using Honeycomb, Kreibich successfully generated
signatures for both the Slammer Worm and the CodeRed II Worm [48].
2.3.4 Honeyd Syslog Solutions
Kiwi Syslog Server Kloet demonstrated how using Kiwi, it is possible to
filter Syslog messages generated by Honeyd. The Syslog messages were sent from the
host machine running Honeyd to the machine running the Kiwi NIDS [51]. The Kiwi
program then filtered Syslog messages and generated Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(SMTP) email alerts based on predefined rules, such as a connection being established
to a honeypot. Kloet also mentioned remedies for false positives which include fine
tuning the Kiwi alert threshold, creating a static route to null, and excluding the
address that the Honeyd daemon listens on [51]. Kloet’s solution of forwarding the
Honeyd generated Syslog to a program more capable of parsing and displaying the
alerts in a readable format is useful for small networks. However, in larger networks,
network administrators could easily be flooded by emails, whether the emails are
actual alerts or false positives, and it could be difficult to piece together and visualize
what is happening. While Kiwi can filter out the noise of false positives, it has
no graphical overview of the network for easy real time interpretation by network
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operators and administrators [52].
Honeycomb by Lavenya and Kaur Honeycomb by Lavenya and Kaur is
a Honeypot log management tool. It gathers all log files generated by the Honeyd
framework, emails them in one file for download, and then allows importing and
inspecting them in the web-based GUI [53]. Much like the Kiwi syslog server solution,
it is a step towards making the Honeyd log files more manageable and collection of
them automated. However, the alerts are still not conveyed to network operators fast
enough and the data in the log files is not in-depth enough to capture exploits, tools,
or an attacker’s TTPs [53].
2.3.5 IoTCandyJar
Ramirez et al. discuss the need for their framework since building custom IoT
honeypots or buying the actual physical device to create honeypots are too costly
[54]. The vast heterogeneity of IoT devices makes creating custom IoT honeypots
time consuming and they often are not high-functioning enough. To combat this, their
framework uses machine learning to replicate the behavior of IoT devices, dynamically
creating realistic honeypots, and presenting them as convincing devices to attackers
[54]. Figure 6 displays the IoTCandyJar framework. This framework consists of three
dynamic honeypots that attackers interact with (left), a DB that records responses
from scanned IoT devices on the Internet (middle), the IoTScanner which conducts
the scanning of IoT devices on the Internet (top right), and the IoTLearner which
uses heuristics and training to predict correct responses to attackers (bottom right).
Requests from attackers are first sent to IoTCandyJar’s dynamic honeypots. These
honeypots then query the DB for responses that could be correct. The result of
the query is in-turn passed to the IoTLearner which uses heuristics to select what it
believes to be the correct response. This response is finally forwarded to the attacker.
30
The IoTScanner constantly adds to the DB by using attacker requests to scan IoT
devices on the Internet [54].
While the framework can quickly imitate any IoT device connected to the Internet,
the methodology cannot precisely match responses for exploits without sending actual
IoT devices the exploits, which is illegal. IoTCandyJar does use some extent of exploit
filtering, but this only works for known exploits. For the known exploits, they either
have to manually create the response or drop the connection altogether which means
they are back to creating custom low-interaction honeypots. While for unknown
exploits, their own system may very well become an attacker itself. In addition, IoT
devices have specific ports open and services running on them, which would preclude
a single device from responding to a Nmap scan with the exact IoT profile the attacker
is targeting [54].
2.3.6 HoneyLab
HoneyLab is a distributed framework for deploying and sharing honeypots between
cyber-security researchers that seeks to address the shortcomings Chin et al. described
as infrastructure fragmentation, flexibility for deploying devices, and the limited IP
address space [55]. HoneyLab runs honeypots in a virtualized environment for high
level interaction and attack containment. The framework, shown in Figure 7, is
composed of a web interface to register / login and control honeypots, the C2 node
called HoneyLab Central, and sensor nodes distributed worldwide that run on Xen
servers. The Xen servers deploy honeypot VMs alongside VMs with sensing software.
Users can upload custom VM images which allows for maximum flexibility and custom
honeypot support. Commands can be issued to honeypots through HoneyLab’s web
interface but users also have the option of interacting with their honeypots through
Virtual Network Computing (VNC) or a remote shell after establishing a Virtual
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Figure 6. IoTCandyJar Design [54]
Private Network (VPN) connection to the network. All sensor nodes run the Honeylab
daemon software to communicate with the C2 HoneyLab Central device to report
alerts and receive commands [55].
Limitations with the framework include IP-only level traffic (no Ethernet), all traf-
fic must go through the HoneyLab Central device which could become overburdened,
and all outgoing connections (reverse connections) are blocked. These limitations
affect the convincingness of the actual honeypots and may not fool attackers. Also,
once an attacker is in the target’s internal network, they can see that the honeypot
is not part of the network and all traffic is forwarded to it. Additionally, it is not
apparent how propagation throughout the HoneyLab honeynet from a compromised
honeypot is prevented. Finally, the research appears to be discontinued because the
website was not found to be up and operational [55]. Like HoneyLab, the IoT hon-
eypot sensors in this research beacon back to a central command and control server
for real time alerts.
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Figure 7. HoneyLab Design [55]
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2.3.7 SIPHON
Like HoneyLab, SIPHON is a globally distributed honeynet intended to be a
“Scalable, high-Interaction Physical HONeypot” framework [28]. As shown in Figure
8, the framework uses IP addresses distributed around the world from servers rented
from cloud providers (Amazon, Digital Ocean, and Linode) that act as “wormholes”
– interconnecting the honeynet through SSH tunnels. By using this design, certain
geographically located devices that are more desirable to attackers can be simulated.
As Figure 9 illustrates, the wormholes send the attacker’s traffic to SIPHON’s “for-
warder” devices that change IP address and perform man-in-the-middle attacks before
finally sending the traffic to actual physical IoT devices. This setup is very similar to
IoTCandyJar’s method of sending traffic to physical devices, but instead of merely
recording the devices’ responses for replay, SIPHON’s network owns the IoT devices
and, can, therefore, allow high-interaction and record advanced attacker methodology
[28].
2.3.8 HoneyIo4
HoneyIo4 by Alejandro Guerra Manzanares is a low-interaction honeypot with
four Python scripts to match the expected Nmap DB scan responses for the following
IoT devices: GoPro Hero3 camera, Casio QT6600 cash register, Nintendo Wii video
game console, and Oki B4545 printer [23]. HoneyIo4 also includes a web-based GUI
that allows starting or stopping each honeypot by simply executing the associated
Python script. While HoneyIo4 successfully matched target Nmap DB OS profiles, it
appears to be trying to re-invent the wheel as the Python scripts attempt to do what
Honeyd does already. Honeyd allows for quickly customizing ports, responses, and
specifying an OS profile from a Nmap DB for response traffic to match. Manzanares
claims that Honeyd cannot match IoT OS fingerprints, but as long as the OS is in
34
Figure 8. SIPHON Overview [28]
Figure 9. Attacker’s Interaction with SIPHON [28]
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the supplied Nmap DB file to Honeyd, the traffic can be matched.
Honeyd also has more advanced capabilities than HoneyIo4 such as running mul-
tiple honeypots at once on the same physical device, routing of network traffic, and
keeping state for each honeypot [23].
2.3.9 IoTPOT and IoTBOX
IoTPOT and IoTBOX is a two-part honeypot system consisting of a Telnet service
“frontend” (IoTPOT) and sandboxed “backend” (IoTBOX) [22]. IoTPOT changes its
responses to match different IoT devices that an attacker is targeting based on their
initial Telnet requests as illustrated in Figure 10. By using this method, IoTPOT can
appear to be a vast number of different IoT devices. IoTPOT also logs all traffic which
includes login attempts and credentials. Login settings can also be customized to allow
authentication on the first attempt, a specific username and password combination,
or authenticate only after a set number of attempts. After an attacker successfully
authenticates, IoTPOT checks if the command issued has a known, stored response.
If it is a known command, IoTPOT responds to the attacker directly. If the command
is not known, IoTPOT forwards the command to IoTBOX, stores IoTBOX’s response
so it can quickly respond to the same command in the future, and then forwards it
to the attacker [22].
The design of IoTBOX is shown in Figure 11. Because some commands can be to
download malware, IoTBOX is ran in a controlled environment with frequent image
resets. IotBOX uses QEMU to emulate eight different Central Processing Unit (CPU)
architectures which are then run on the OS OpenWRT. The benefit of this is that
malware executables are compiled to run on a specific CPU architecture, and through
CPU emulation, the captured malware can be run and analyzed in depth [22].
It is not apparent how IoTPOT would know the correct banner response an at-
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tacker is looking for from a specific IoT device. Also, because IoTPOT uses one IP
address, an attacker or scanning tool that documents device analysis would notice
this single IP responds like multiple different devices and may become suspicious of
it being a honeypot.
2.3.10 Multi-Purpose IoT Honeypot
Inspired by IoTPOT, Krishnaprasad created the “Multi-Purpose IoT Honeypot”
to handle four protocols commonly used by IoT devices: Secure Shell (SSH), Telnet,
HTTP, and CPE WAN Management Protocol (CWMP) [56]. Multi-Purpose IoT
Honeypot utilizes a “frontend” proxy that is running a Python script for each of the
supported protocols. The frontend logs data about the attack and then forwards it
to the corresponding service “backend” which are only two docker machines running
the services. While Multi-Purpose IoT Honeypot is running common services for IoT
devices, it does not tailor its responses to deceive Nmap scans performed by attackers
that it is in fact an IoT device and not a honeypot. Furthermore, if an attacker does
connect to a service, they realize it is not an IoT device and not connected to any
real network. Krishnaprasad’s use of docker to containerize honeypot machines is
a concept also used by Cymmetria’s Honeycomb framework. This technique allows
for high-interaction honeypots that are easier to develop, deploy, and maintain than
physical devices or traditional virtual machines [56].
2.3.11 ThingPot
Like IoTPOT and Multi-Purpose IoT Honeypot, ThingPot also has a frontend and
backend design [57]. ThingPot classifies itself as a “Medium Interaction Honeypot”
simulating Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) and Message Queue
Telemetry Transport (MQTT) and low interaction for HTTP REST traffic. Each of
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Figure 10. IoTPOT Overview [22]
Figure 11. IoTBOX Overview [22]
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these services is also run in a virtual environment using docker. An overview of
ThingPot’s design is shown in Figure 12. The XMPP and REST nodes implement
that respective protocol while the controller node logs and stores data. Using this
design, ThingPot imitated a Phillips Hue smart light and had an actual attacker try
and take control of it [57].
2.3.12 IoTSec
One proposed solution for securing IoT devices is the use of interceding devices
called µmboxes as an intermediary between IoT devices, that dynamically configure
firewall rules to allow for the specific traffic of IoT devices on the network, essentially
acting as a personal firewall or blue coat proxy for the IoT devices [20]. µmboxes work
together and alert the centralized IoTSec Control Platform (C2) if an intrusion or
anomaly is detected. They utilize several different methods for detecting intrusions:
signature matching, network baseline generation, and cross-device policies. Signature
matching and network baselining are not new concepts, but cross-device policies are
interesting because using the functionality of other IoT devices, a safety check can
be performed. The example Yu et al. give is an IoT camera checking that a person
is home before a smart oven is allowed to be issued the “on” command [20].
2.3.13 Honeycomb and MazeRunner by Cymmetria
Cymmetria is a cyber-security solutions company based out of Tel Aviv, Israel
and was founded in 2014 by Gadi Evron [58]. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO),
Gadi Evron, has over 15 years of experience in cyber security and was the former vice
president of cyber security strategy at Kaspersky Lab. Cymmetria’s flagship product
is MazeRunner which utilizes their Honeycomb framework [59].
Honeycomb by Cymmetria, not to be confused with Honeycomb by Kreibich (a
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Figure 12. ThingPot Overview [57]
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plugin for Honeyd), or Honeycomb by Lavenya and Kaur (a Honeyd log manager),
allows for rapid and customized honeypot creation using containers and Python plu-
gins. Honeypots are spawned off through the use of these containers [60].
MazeRunner allows users to create honeypots, add services, and change configu-
rations all rapidly and with a GUI. MazeRunner is the container that manages all
the honeypots and acts as the command and control for intrusion detection. It pro-
vides an overview of real time alerts of interaction with the honeypots. It implements
packet capture, memory dump, shows what commands an attacker ran and allows
downloading the tools an attacker used. The tool’s hash can then be propagated as a
signature to flag on throughout the network. Custom scripts such as Stafira’s can be
run with the Enterprise edition for even more customized honeypots. The backend
uses their Honeycomb framework [61] [62] [63].
MazeRunner contains a component called ActiveSOC which automatically investi-
gates an incident using rules and heuristics to determine if the incident needs further
investigation by an analyst. Using ActiveSOC, false positives can be reduced and
analysts can focus on investigating actual intrusions [64].
MazeRunner has been successful in catching red teams in NATO exercises [29] as
well as APTs such as APT3 (pirpi - a Chinese Threat Actor) in European govern-
ment networks, defense contractor networks, and several other customer’s networks
[65]. Additionally, MazeRunner successfully captured the tools and TTPs of the
cyberespionage group Patchwork, as Patchwork moved throughout the MazeRunner
network. Patchwork, aptly named from the copy-paste code used from online forums,
is a targeted attack against government agencies and has infected several thousand
machines since 2015 [66].
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2.3.14 Comparison of Related Frameworks
This research builds off of the IoT honeypots created by Lukas Stafira. The clos-
est research to the HoneyHive framework is MazeRunner by Cymmetria. However,
MazeRunner does not use nor allow creating custom IoT honeypots as network in-
trusion detection sensors. Table 1 provides a summary and comparison of all the
frameworks mentioned. The specific categories compared include the honeypot level
of interaction (Honeypot Level), whether or not the framework focuses on IoT hon-
eypots (IoT), whether or not the framework implements full packet capture (PCAP),
whether or not the framework is distributed (Distributed), whether or not the frame-
work was developed with the intent for it to be used as a NIDS (NIDS), whether or
not the framework reports alerts and receives commands from a C2 server (C2), and
the year of the last update on the framework (Last Update). The various levels of
honeypot interaction include low, medium, and high. An “X” in a category denotes
the framework possess that trait. Neither Conpot nor Honeyd were made to create
IoT honeypots specifically, perform full packet capture, have a distributed framework,
be implemented as a NIDs, or have a Command and Control structure.
Framework Honeypot Level IoT PCAP Distributed NIDS C2 Last Update
Conpot Medium 2019
Honeyd Low 2013
HoneyHive Low X X X X X 2020
HoneyIo4 Low X 2017
HoneyLab High X X 2009
IoTCandyJar Low X 2017
IoTPOT & IoTBOX High X 2015
MazeRunner High X X X X 2020
Multi-Purpose IoT Honeypot High X 2017
SIPHON High X X X 2017
ThingPot Medium X 2017
Table 1. Comparison of Honeypot Frameworks adapted from [19]
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2.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter discusses the exponential growth of IoT devices and the need for
improved IoT and computer network security. Several methods for improving net-
work security include the use of a NIDS, network monitoring, and honeypots. The
HoneyHive framework utilizes a combination of all these aspects for increased net-
work security. Languages and tools for the development of the HoneyHive framework
are also covered in detail. Finally, related research in the field of IoT honeypots is
explored to understand existing solutions, their shortcomings, and their inspiration




This chapter describes the design decisions involved in the creation of the Honey-
Hive framework. The HoneyHive framework is comprised of IoT honeypots simulated
by Honeyd, a C2 server, and a HoneyB Agent script that beacons back to the C2
server. Using the IoT honeypots as NIDS Sensors, the system can recognize scanning
patterns and known IoT exploits to create real time alerts. Full packet capture of all
network traffic received by the honeypots is also a feature. Additionally, Snort, Suri-
cata, Nmap, VMware, and Wireshark are tools used for augmentation in the testing
of this framework.
3.2 Motivation
While there are numerous NIDS and network monitoring solutions available, none
meet all the objectives of this research. For one, most NIDS and network monitoring
software are not tailored to honeypots or IoT. Without a convincing, high-interaction
honeypot, an attacker will not launch advanced exploits (zero-days), deploy tools, or
employ their TTPs [28]. Additionally, many NIDS log to files or send an email to an
administrator when alerts are generated. This is neither real time nor manageable
for large-scale networks. The closest solution found to this proposed research is
MazeRunner by Cymmetria as discussed in Chapter 2. However, the honeypots used
in MazeRunner are not IoT devices, and MazeRunner does not currently support
running custom scripts for honeypot emulation.
NIDS may also only offer a limited view of the entire network they are defending.
On network switches, traffic is sent only to the port of the intended recipient. Some
switches contain mirror ports that send a copy of all traffic received out another port
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typically for analysis by a NIDS. In addition, for every switch another mirror port
and NIDS would be needed, and then only a specific segment of the network would
be analyzed individually by each NIDS. This would not provide a global picture of all
network traffic across all switches for analysis. The proposed solution in this research
scatters IoT honeypot sensors across the network and has them beacon back to a
C2 server, where traffic is then combined for analysis. Packets are captured using
Scapy on the honeypots, sent to the C2 server, and then analyzed by Snort IDS.
In this experiment, Nmap is used to conduct various scans against the HoneyHive
framework to test how effective it is at detecting network scans.
One question focused on in the design of the HoneyHive framework was, “What
are the qualities of an effective NIDS?” Roesch describes some of the qualities of
the Snort NIDS that have made it so effective, even still today. It is lightweight,
cross-platform, has a small network footprint, and can be easily configured by an
administrator in a short amount of time. Cross-platform means the NIDS should
run on a variety of different enterprise systems and OSs. A small network footprint
means a device does not generate large amounts of network traffic [67]. Furthermore,
an ideal NIDS should have a low rate of false positives and virtually no false negatives
(for known exploits), provide meaningful alerts in real time, and not introduce further
vulnerabilities into the network.
3.3 Third-Party Software
This section describes the rationale behind software solutions used in the Honey-
Hive framework that were developed by other individuals. These solutions includes




This section describes the design decision of using Honeyd 1.5c. Because Lukas
Stafira reported stability issues with Honeyd 1.6d and built IoT honeypots using 1.5c,
the latter is used in this research [6]. Honeyd 1.5c is installed using apt-get install
because compiling the source code generates errors even after following guides and
downloading and installing older versions of library dependencies. Unfortunately,
the version of Honeyd installed with command “sudo apt-get install honeyd 1.5c”
was compiled without Python support. The inability to compile Honeyd prevented
compiling it with the Python support as well as the Honeycomb plugin, which requires
Honeyd being recompiled with its source files included. This severely impacts the level
of control and interaction with the Honeyd program, prevents use of the Honeycomb
automatic signature generation plugin, and influenced other HoneyHive framework
design decisions.
3.3.2 Stafira’s Honeypots
The three honeypots used in the HoneyHive framework are the TITAThink Cam-
era, Proliphix Thermostat, and ezOutlet2 Power Outlet. They simulate the web
interface of real IoT devices and were created by Lukas Stafira using Honeyd 1.5c,
bash, and Python 2.7. These honeypots were selected because of the high level of
web-based authenticity they shared with their real counterparts and the in-depth
analysis already performed on them [6].
3.3.3 Ubuntu 12
Ubuntu version 12 was used for two reasons. First, it was used by Lukas Stafira
in his research with Honeyd, and second, newer versions of Ubuntu did not have
Honeyd available in repositories for installation. Because of the previously mentioned
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compilation problems, this ruled out the newer versions of Ubuntu.
3.3.4 Snort
Rather than create a NIDS when there are many solutions already available, Snort
was selected because it is lightweight and open source. It is also widely used and has
a vast community of support. Community Snort signature rules, that are periodically
updated, are readily available for download [50] [67]. Snort is used in the HoneyHive
framework to parse PCAPs and create alerts, but was not used as a NIDS in the
DMZ. Suricata would have been used as the NIDS to perform signature matching in
the HoneyHive framework instead of Snort, but there were issues with getting it to
run on Windows 10.
3.3.5 Suricata
Suricata is used in the test network of this experiment but is not part of the
HoneyHive framework. In the simulated network, Suricata was selected as the NIDS
to monitor SPAN traffic in the DMZ. Suricata was selected as the DMZ NIDS in
this experiment because it uses the same rule structure as Snort which allowed the
exact same rule-set to be shared between the two. In addition, Suricata employs
modern NIDS features such as multi-threading and is regularly updated [68]. In this
experiment, it was important to have highly capable NIDS to compare results against,
otherwise results would not be as meaningful.
3.3.6 Wireshark
Wireshark itself was used primarily for troubleshooting in pilot studies. However,
several tools included in the Wireshark package were used in the actual experiment,
Mergecap and Capinfos. Mergecap was used to combine multiple PCAPs into a single
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PCAP. Capinfos was used to count the number of packets in the PCAP.
3.4 Programming Languages
This section describes the design decisions behind chosen languages in the devel-
opment of this framework. Node.js was used for coding the C2 server whereas Python
2.7 was used for the HoneyB Agent that communicates with the C2 server. SQLite
was the language selected to create the DB.
3.4.1 Node.js
Node.js was selected over other languages such as C++, Go, and Java for several
reasons. Node.js uses Chrome’s V8 JavaScript engine to achieve a standalone runtime
environment. Any computer with Chrome will be able to run the program with the
same execution and output [34]. Another selling feature of Node.js is the Electron
package, which allows rapidly creating GUIs using HTML, CSS, and JavaScript [35].
3.4.2 Python 2.7
Python 2.7 was selected instead of 3.X because the IoT honeypots selected were
written in 2.7. Originally, the design was to modify the IoT honeypots to beacon
back to a server. However, without Python support in Honeyd, there was very little
interaction and control provided for the honeypots. Additionally, Ubuntu 12 allowed
installation of Python 2.7 but for Python 3.X, only 3.2.X could be installed and the
current version is 3.7.X. Python 3.2 also lacked support for modules available in 2.7
and 3.7, such as pyshark and Scapy [69].
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3.4.3 SQLite
Because the DB is stored on the same file system as the C2 server, there was no
need to authenticate to it over the network like in some languages such as MySQL.
This allows for much faster querying and DB modification since the limiting factor is
now disk read / write speed and not network latency [70].
3.5 HoneyHive Framework Design
This section describes the individual components that make up the HoneyHive
framework. Shown in Figure 13, these components include the C2 server, the Hon-
eyB Agent script, and the DB. After these components are described, the network
layout for experimentation and testing is explained. The network layout includes the
HoneyHive framework, Honeyd, Stafira’s honeypots, Snort, Suricata, the simulated
test network, and an attacker machine.
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Figure 13. HoneyHive Framework
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In Figure 14, the Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagram displays the inter-
action of all the components that make up the HoneyHive framework. The HoneyB
Agent script monitors the Honeyd honeypots for traffic, captures any traffic, alerts the
C2 Server, and transfers captured traffic to the C2 server. Credentials, commands,
and attempted binary uploads are all captured in network traffic. The HoneyB Agent
also periodically reaches out to the C2 server to report it is still functioning, known
as a heartbeat.
The C2 server receives alerts and captured traffic from the HoneyB Agent script
and then relays all of this to the DB, GUI, and Snort. Although the GUI development
is for future work, the overall system was designed with it in mind for ease of use
by network operators. The HoneyHive framework functions fully without a GUI
and displays relevant information via command line. Additionally, the C2 server
provides a kill switch capability to terminate the HoneyB Agent script, Honeyd and
the honeypots, and the rest of the framework.
The DB stores alert information and captured traffic. The DB also supports
exporting all data, and clearing parts or all data in the DB.
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Figure 14. UML Program Design
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3.5.1 C2 Server, Transfer Server, and Snort Log Parser
After setting up Honeyd and Stafira’s honeypots, the C2 server was the first com-
ponent developed because every other component interacts with it. The networking
features were among the first to be developed. For handling higher loads and lower
network latency, the server uses both multithreading and IPC. The C2 server scripts
(main.js) are located in Appendix A.
Originally designed with a single server (the main server) that accepted alerts and
heartbeats from honeypots, a secondary server (the transfer server) became necessary
for handling the transfer of PCAPs. Without a separate transfer server, binary-
encoded data would have to be converted to base64 and then back again to send
over a channel expecting JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data. This decreased
the server’s robustness because additional checks would need to determine if the data
was in JSON format or binary data. The conversion to base64 also created a large
overhead in transferring files because it increased the number of bytes that needed
to be sent in addition to the CPU cycles required for the conversion. These factors
ultimately led to the separate transfer server, which listens on a different port for
receiving large files.
C2 Server Messages are sent in JSON format from the HoneyB Agent
script to the C2 server with one of the following four commands: AUTHENTICATE,
ALERT, HEARTBEAT, and PCAP. The AUTHENTICATE command allows Hon-
eyd machines and their respective honeypots to be authenticated and then added to
the list of IPs that are tracked by the C2 server. The ALERT command notifies
the server of suspicious activity, which is then displayed to the network operator via
command line and sent to the DB to store the incident. This allows for real time
intrusion alerts and notification of honeypot interaction. HEARTBEAT is the pulse
53
function used by the HoneyB Agent script to periodically report that Honeyd and
the honeypots are all functioning correctly. If the HoneyB Agent misses too many
heartbeats, then an alert is generated, displayed, and stored in the DB. This heart-
beat alert threshold is a user configurable parameter. Finally, the PCAP signals that
the HoneyB Agent script is ready to transfer captured network traffic. To facilitate
this, the transfer server is spun up and listens on the port number specified by the
HoneyB Agent to download the PCAP. After a PCAP is successfully downloaded, it
is stored on disk and in the DB. It is then sent to Snort for analysis, which supports
the objective of full packet capture for later forensic investigation.
Additionally, several commands are added to the C2 server for the purpose of run-
ning the experiment. These include SNORT, SURICATA, REBOOT, and RESET.
While packets were originally processed by Snort immediately after being received,
Snort processing on packets was changed on the C2 server to wait until after the
SNORT command was received from the runExperiment.py script. This made it so
that Mergecap only ran once to merge all PCAPs together, and Snort only ran once
on the final merged PCAP, as opposed to subsets of the merged PCAP and creating
an incorrect number of alerts in the log file. Capinfos is run immediately after Merge-
cap in order to gather the number of packets captured. For network deployment, this
entire process would be replaced with a user-defined parameter to run Mergecap and
Snort on captured traffic after a set amount of time. However, in this experiment,
when the SNORT command is received, the C2 server creates a merged PCAP and
calls the Snort log parser on each of the individual PCAPs and on the merged PCAP.
The alerts from PCAPs individually processed are stored in one log file (“alert.ids”),
and the alerts from the merged PCAP are stored in a separate log file. These log files
are then parsed and the results are reported back to the C2 server.
SURICATA is a command sent from the suricataConnect.py script to the C2
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server and is used to record all transferred metrics from the Suricata machine - Suri-
cata’s number of alerts (SuA), Suricata’s number of distinct alerts (SuT), and the
number of packets Suricata captured (SuP). Upon receiving the REBOOT command
from runExperiment.py, the C2 server reboots the Windows VM it is running on to
reset everything to the initial state. When the RESET command is received from
runExperiment.py, the C2 server transfers all metrics to the runExperiment.py script
and then resets all metrics to zero.
Transfer Server When the C2 server receives the PCAP command from
the HoneyB Agent, the transfer server is launched as a child process and listens on
the port specified by the HoneyB Agent. The transfer server then downloads the
PCAP sent to it by the HoneyB Agent. After the download is complete, the transfer
server notifies the C2 server through IPC, and then the transfer server shuts down.
The transfer server’s code is shown in Appendix A.
Snort Log Parser The Snort log parser is invoked as a child process after
the C2 server receives the SNORT command. The Snort log parser executes Snort on
a PCAP specified by the C2 server. After Snort finishes processing the PCAP, the
alert information in the log file (“alert.ids”) is parsed and then reported back to the
C2 server through IPC. The Snort log parser code is shown in Appendix A.
3.5.2 HoneyB Agent
Originally, each honeypot was modified to beacon back to the C2 server itself, but
this caused the honeypots and Honeyd to slow down. Additionally, with this design
the honeypots beaconed back to the C2 server with every request to the honeypot,
instead of once for an entire session. This structure also did not afford a level of
control that the HoneyB Agent script does, which is found in Appendix A.
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The HoneyB Agent script is multithreaded, performing network packet capture
with Scapy, periodically sending a heartbeat, alerts, and packet captures to the C2.
The plugin maintains a list of honeypot IP addresses with ongoing network traffic.
After a set amount of time without additional traffic to or from an IP address, it ages
out; the address is removed from the connections list and its corresponding PCAP
file is transferred to the C2 server. The age out time and time between heartbeats
are user-defined parameters. In this experiment they are set to a 9000 seconds, a
time that exceeded all but two outlier runs in this experiment. This was done so that
each honeypot produced a single PCAP to make the test between Snort parsing the
PCAP individually versus a merged PCAP fair.
The HoneyB Agent only sends an alert message for honeypots without tracked
network activity. Examples of this are honeypots receiving traffic for the first time, or
receiving traffic again after it previously aged out. There is a separate thread whose
sole function is to monitor the honeypot connection list and detect and remove any
IP addresses that have aged out. The traffic for that IP address is then transferred
to the C2 server. If a honeypot receives traffic after the age out time, but before it
is detected by the watcher thread, then this causes a transfer of the packet capture
as well. The capture files are named with the format of “IP Y-m-d HM.pcap.” IP
is the honeypot’s IP address, Y is the current year, m is the current month, d is the
current day, H is the current hour, and M is the current minute.
After trial and error with other packet capturing software, Scapy was the clear
winner. Scapy allowed capturing, analyzing, and running custom functions on pack-
ets received. Honeyd.py would have been the ideal solution since Honeyd already
performs packet capture and would have also allowed for dynamic control of Hon-
eyd. However, Honeyd on Ubuntu 12 was not compiled with the Python plugin, and
re-compiling it generated errors.
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The TCPDump and tshark programs supported capturing packets but did not
allow processing and running functions on those packets. Although these programs
could still have been used, the capture files would need to be manually parsed while
still being modified. tshark did have a Python module called pyshark, but only the
legacy version could be installed for Python 2.7, which did not work correctly and
said to upgrade to the newer version.
The HoneyB Agent also had several commands added for the purpose of testing
which include TRANSFER, RESET, KILL, START, STOP, and REBOOT. TRANS-
FER signals the HoneyB Agent to transfer and then remove all PCAP files and to
remove all tracked IP addresses from the connections list. RESET only removes all
the IP addresses from the connection list. KILL terminates Honeyd and then the
HoneyB Agent script. START launches Honeyd and registers the honeypots by au-
thenticating to the C2 server. STOP kills only Honeyd. Finally, upon receiving the
REBOOT command, the HoneyB Agent script reboots the Ubuntu VM that Hon-
eyd and itself are running on. Originally, this was the chosen method of returning
the machine to its initial state between each experimental run. However, Stafira’s
honeypots did not run correctly when Honeyd was launched on startup from rc.local.
3.5.3 Database Design
The DB schema is shown in Figure 15. The main table that connects all the other
tables is the Alert table. Each alert has a unique ID, which serves as the primary key
of this table, a timestamp, mandatory layer 3 information (source and destination
IP addresses), and associated honeypot (HoneyID which is used as foreign key for
the Honeypot table). Optional information includes layer 4 information (source and
destination ports), and hashes for the PCAPs and memory dump files. The hashes
are used as foreign keys to look up the entries in their respective tables and down-
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load their Binary Large Objects (BLOBs). Each alert will only have one associated
honeypot, PCAP, and memory dump. However, multiple commands, credentials, and
binaries, can be found across multiple alerts and an alert can have multiple of them,
creating a many-to-many relationship. To support this design, an intermediary table
is used to break the table into a one-to-many relationship for both sides. AlertID
is used to lookup all the associated commands, credentials, and binaries for a sin-
gle alert, whereas the SHA256 is used to lookup all the alerts a specific signature is
found in. Additionally, the SHA256 can be used to look up the plain-text command,
credentials, and binary BLOB. Note that these tables have MD5 hashes as well to
support looking up and distributing signatures generated in this format. The final
table is the Honeypot table, which stores information of honeypots that have suc-
cessfully authenticated. It includes a unique ID (HoneyID), their host name, MAC
and IP addresses, OS, and an optional description detailing the type of honeypot and
other relevant information.
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Figure 15. Database Schema
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3.5.4 Network Design
Figure 16 shows the overall network design with devices on separate networked
hosts to ensure all traffic is not seen by all hosts, which is unrealistic. Each Ubuntu
VM housing Honeyd, Stafira’s honeypots, and the HoneyB Agent script reside on
separate physical machines from that of the attacker. Each Honeyd daemon runs all
three of Stafira’s honeypots, with only the IP addresses and MAC addresses modified
in the Honeyd configuration file and the HoneyB Agent script. Stafira’s modified
Honeyd configuration file can be found in Appendix B. The IP address scheme for
the Honey devices is:
1. TitaThink Camera honeypot 192.168.1.1[5-7]0
2. Prolophix Thermostat honeypot 192.168.1.1[5-7]1
3. ezOutlet2 Power Outlet honeypot 192.168.1.1[5-7]2
4. Ubuntu VM / HoneyB Agent 192.168.1.1[5-7]4
Because of the constant reboots from running the experiment, the C2 server was
moved to a Windows 10 VM with an IP address of 192.168.1.233. The Desktop
Windows 10 machine, addressed with 192.168.1.235, runs this Windows 10 VM and
one of the Ubuntu VMs. The attacker machine (Desktop Ubuntu Machine), was
moved from inside a VM to running natively on a physical machine and has an IP
address of 192.168.1.230.
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Figure 16. Simulated Test Network - Network Layout
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With physical separation of test components complete, the network was designed
and developed. Each set of honeypots was placed on separate switches to distribute
them throughout the simulated test network. In addition, the IoT devices were spread
out over all switches. The IoT devices match their honeypot counterparts IP address-
ing scheme in the last digit. The TitaThink Camera is 192.168.1.190, the Prolophix
Thermostat is 192.168.1.191, and the ezOutlet2 Power Outlet is 192.168.1.192. A
NIDS (Suricata), running on the Raspberry Pi with the IP address of 192.168.1.231,
was placed in the DMZ on the Netgear ProSafe switch’s SPAN port to match their
traditional network deployment location [9]. This allowed it to receive a copy of all
traffic that traverses the switch. Additionally, the Raspberry Pi was retrofitted with
the suricataConnect.py script in order for it receive commands and report results in
the experiment. This script is found in Appendix C.
To simulate a real world attack like that of the cyber attack against Ukraine in
2016, the attacker machine was placed in the internal network on the EdgeRouter
X switch [7]. The assumption is that the attacker gained internal access through a
phishing attack without tripping the NIDS (Suricata) and without alerting network
administrators. They are now using the compromised box as a pivot to scan the rest
of the internal network. The attacker is using an encrypted channel (SSH) to commu-
nicate with the compromised box. Through preliminary scanning and reconnaissance,
the attacker has narrowed down their target list to the IP addresses 192.168.1.150-
192.168.192 and is now conducting further scanning prior to launching exploits. With




In this chapter, the design and justification of decisions for the HoneyHive frame-
work are explained as well as the motivation behind its development. Design decisions
explored include the third-party software used, the programming languages selected
for the framework’s development, the C2 server, the HoneyB Agent script, the DB,




In this research the HoneyHive framework’s effectiveness of network intrusion
detection is tested and compared against that of traditional NIDS (Snort and Suri-
cata). These tests are conducted using Stafira’s IoT honeypots, their physical device
counterparts, the HoneyHive framework, Snort, and Suricata. The results from this
experiment address the research hypotheses:
1. The HoneyHive framework operates correctly by not alerting on routine network
traffic and alerting on non-routine network traffic.
2. The HoneyHive framework detects intrusions that traditional NIDS’s cannot
through the use of distributed IoT honeypot sensors and packet capture aggre-
gation.
4.2 Approach
In this experiment, the total number of alerts as well as the number of distinct
alert types is compared across three categories in order to determine network intrusion
detection effectiveness: PCAPs captured by the HoneyB Agent are parsed by Snort
individually, PCAPS captured by the HoneyB Agent merged into a single PCAP and
parsed by Snort, and Suricata running on a SPAN port. Additionally the number of
packets captured to and from the attacking machine by the HoneyHive framework
and Suricata are also compared. These metrics are further explained in Sections 4.3
and 4.4.
Different types of scans are conducted against the internal network with varying
levels of active honeypots. The type of scans include no scan (control group), TCP
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Connect scan to simulate an attacker attempting to connect to devices, an Aggressive
scan which portrays an attacker attempting to gather as much device information as
possible, and a NIDS Avoidance scan to emulate an attacker who wishes to remain
undetected on the network while gathering information. Scans are conducted using
Nmap, and PCAPs from the scans are created using Scapy. These PCAPs are then
ultimately transferred to the C2 server and analyzed by Snort. The number of Snort
alerts and types generated by the captured traffic (both individually and merged)
and total packet count are then compared to the number of Suricata alerts and types
and total packet count.
After initial setup of the physical devices and network, the HoneyB Agent Python
script is started on each of the Ubuntu VMs. After the HoneyB Agent scripts are
launched, the experiment is conducted by launching the runExperiment.py script on
Desktop Ubuntu (Attacker’s machine). This script handles running all scan types and
honeypot test combinations, device orchestration (starting HoneyB Agents, transfer-
ring PCAPs and metrics, analyzing PCAPs via Snort, and resetting devices / HoneyB
Agents) between each run, and recording results for later analysis. The runExperi-
ment.py is located in Appendix D.
This experiment simulates an attacker compromising an internal device, unbe-
knownst to network administrators and the NIDS. The attacker then uses an en-
crypted channel to the compromised device and uses it as a pivot point to conduct
an internal network scan. This is similar to the 2016 cyber attack against Ukraine
mentioned in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 [7].
4.3 System Boundaries
In Figure 17, the System Under Test (SUT), the HoneyHive framework, is shown
compromised of the HoneyB Agent, C2 server, and Snort. The specific part under
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test, the Component Under Test (CUT), is the C2 server. The C2 server aggregates
all captured traffic from the HoneyB Agents, run PCAPs through Snort, and displays
alerts.
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Figure 17. HoneyHive Framework
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4.4 Parameters, Factors, and Metrics
4.4.1 Assumptions
During this experiment, several assumptions are made which are as follows:
1. The attacker has already compromised a machine in the internal network and
through an encrypted channel, is using it as a pivot to scan the internal network
2. The attacker has performed rudimentary investigation already to narrow down
the IP range to those scanned in the experiment
3. The honeypots are convincing enough for the attacker to perform further inves-
tigation, i.e., scanning
4.4.2 System Parameters
This section describes all the system parameters used to conduct the experiment.
This includes the computing parameters, the programs and languages with their
respective versions, and the configurations Honeyd, Snort, and Suricata.
Computing Parameters The following is a list of physical devices and their
hardware specifications used in this experiment:
• Desktop Windows 10 64 bit
– ASUS ATX DDR4 LGA 1151 Motherboard Z170-E
– Intel Core i7 6700K 4.00 GHz Unlocked Quad Core Skylake Desktop Pro-
cessor, Socket LGA 1151 [BX80662I76700K]
– 4 X Crucial Ballistix Sport LT 2400 MHz DDR4 DRAM Desktop Gaming
Memory Single 16 GB CL16 BLS16G4D240FSE (Red) - Total 64 GB
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– ASUS GeForce GTX 1080 8 GB Turbo Graphic Card TURBO-GTX1080-
8G
– Samsung 850 EVO 500 GB 2.5-Inch SATA III Internal SSD (MZ-75E500B/AM)
– Seagate Barracuda ST2000DM001 2 TB 3.5 Internal Hard Drive (ST2000DM008)
– Seagate BarraCuda 4 TB Internal Hard Drive HDD – 3.5 Inch Sata 6 Gb/s
5400 RPM 256 MB Cache for Computer Desktop PC Laptop (ST4000DM004)
– Cooler Master GeminII S524 Version 2 CPU Air Cooler with 5 Direct
Contact Heat Pipes (RR-G5V2-20PK-R1)
– NZXT Phantom 410 Mid Tower Computer Case , White/Blue (CA-PH410-
W2)
– Corsair CX Series 750 Watt 80 Plus Bronze Certified Modular Power Sup-
ply
• Desktop Ubuntu 18.04.2 64 bit
– ASUS ROG Crosshair V Formula-Z AM3+ AMD 990FX + SB950 SATA
6 Gb/s USB 3.0 ATX AMD Gaming Motherboard with 3-Way SLI/Cross-
FireX Support and UEFI BIOS
– AMD FX-8350 Black Edition Vishera 8-Core 4.0 GHz (4.2 GHz Turbo)
Socket AM3+ 125W FD8350FRHKBOX Desktop Processor
– Crucial BX500 240 GB 3D NAND SATA 2.5-Inch Internal SSD - CT240BX500SSD1Z
– G.SKILL Ripjaws X Series 16 GB (4 x 4 GB) 240-Pin DDR3 SDRAM
DDR3 1866 (PC3 14900) Desktop Memory Model F3-14900CL9Q-16GBXL
– XFX Radeon RS RX 480 DirectX 12 RX-480P836BM 8 GB 256-Bit GDDR5
PCI Express 3.0 CrossFireX Support Video Card
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– CORSAIR HX Series HX850 850W ATX12V 2.3 / EPS12V 2.91 SLI Ready
CrossFire Ready 80 PLUS GOLD Certified Modular Active PFC Power
Supply New 4th Gen CPU Certified Haswell Ready
– Cooler Master Hyper 212 Plus - CPU Cooler with 4 Direct Contact Heat-
pipes
– Cooler Master HAF 922 - High Air Flow Mid Tower Computer Case with
USB 3.0 and All-Black Interior
• Lenovo Laptop Windows 10 64 bit- Lenovo Thinkpad W541 Intel i7-
4910MQ processor 2.9 GHz running Windows 10 and 32 GB of RAM. HITACHI
HTS725050A7E635 Travelstar Z7K500 Opal 500 GB Hard drive
• ASUS Laptop Windows 10 64 bit- ASUS VivoBook F556UA-AB32 Laptop
(Windows 10, Intel i3-6100U 2.3 GHz, 15.6” LED-Lit Screen, Storage: 1000
GB, RAM: 4 GB) Black/Silver * Upgraded to 8 GB memory (added
second Crucial 4 GB Single DDR4 2133 MT/s (PC4-17000) SR x8
SODIMM 260-Pin Laptop Memory - CT4G4SFS8213) and replaced
HDD with Samsung 850 EVO 500 GB 2.5-Inch SATA III Internal
SSD (MZ-75E500B/AM)
• Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ Rev 1.3 - Raspbian 4.19.75-v7. Broadcom
BCM2837B0, Cortex-A53 (ARMv8) 64-bit SoC @ 1.4GHz, 1 GB LPDDR2
SDRAM, 16 GB Class 4 SanDisk Edge microSDHC memory card, running Suri-
cata Version 4.1.2
• R7500-200NAS Nighthawk AC2350 4X4 MU-MIMO Dual Band WiFi
Gigabit Router - Router Firmware Version V1.0.3.16
• Netgear ProSafe GS108Ev2 Switch - Firmaware version v1.00.12
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• Ubiquiti EdgeRouter X Model ER-X - Firmware version v1.9.0
• TitaThink Camera TT520PW - Firmware Version 6.10
• Prolophix Thermostat NT130h - SW 3.0.3 / HW H.03
• ezOutlet2 Power Outlet EZ-22b - Version EZT.8824 (04)
Virtual Machines Two virtual machine images are used in the experiment.
The Windows 10 VM is used as the C2 server, and the Ubuntu VM is used to run
Stafira’s HTTP IoT Honeyd Framework and the HoneyB Agent script. The Ubuntu
VM is cloned and then distributed to the Windows Desktop, Lenovo Laptop, and
ASUS Laptop in order add physical separation and network distribution between
honeypots. Only IP and MAC addresses are modified in settings, scripts, and configs
for the cloned VMs. The VMware specifications and versions of installed software are
as follows:
• Ubuntu 12.04 VMs (Honeyd Machines) - 2 processors, 4.3 GB memory,
20 GB disk space. Honeyd 1.5c installed, bash version 4.2.25, Python version
2.7.3
• Windows 10 64 bit VM (C2 Server) - 4 logical processors, 8 GB memory, 40
GB disk space. Git, TortoiseGit, Node.js Version v12.13.0, V8 Engine Version
7.7.299.13-node.12, Snort Version 2.9.15-WIN32 GRE (Build 7), and Wireshark
Version 3.0.6 are all installed
Program and Language Versions This section documents the combined
programs and programming languages across all devices:
• VMware Workstation 15 Pro Version 15.5.0
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• Node.js Version v12.13.0
• V8 Engine Version 7.7.299.13-node.12
• Python 2.7.15+ on Ubuntu Desktop, Python 2.7.3 on Ubuntu VMs, Python
2.7.16 on Raspberry Pi
• Bash 4.4.20 on Ubuntu Desktop, 4.2.25 on Ubuntu VMs, and 5.0.3 on Raspberry
Pi
• Honeyd 1.5c
• Nmap version 7.60
• Wireshark Windows Version 3.0.6
• Snort Version 2.9.15-WIN32 GRE (Build 7)
• Suricata Version 4.1.2
Honeyd Configuration The configuration file from Stafira’s HTTP IoT
Honeyd framework is used as the configuration file for Honeyd 1.5c in this experiment
and is shown in Appendix B. Only IP and MAC addresses are modified in this
configuration file.
Snort and Suricata Configuration Snort Version 2.9.15-WIN32 GRE
(Build 7) is installed on the C2 server and the default snort.conf file is used with
some modifications in order to run it on windows with only the emerging-scan.rules
rule set. Additionally, Suricata Version 4.1.2 is installed on the Raspberry Pi and
the default configuration file, suricata.yaml, is modified to only use the emerging-
scan.rules rule set. The snort.conf, suricat.yaml, and emerging-scan.rules are devel-
oped and vetted by the Snort community and available for download on their website
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[71]. Suricata was built to use the same rule syntax and can successfully implement
these community rules as well.
4.4.3 Factors
The following factors were used in this experiment:
• Scan Type (ST) - The type of scan performed in the test. These include
the control group (no scan), TCP Connect scan, Aggressive scan (OS detec-
tion, version detection, script scanning, and traceroute), and NIDS Avoidance
scan (scan delay, host randomization, and packet fragmentation). The Nmap
parameters of these commands are:
1. No Scan (Control Group) - Wait 1321 seconds
2. TCP Connect scan - “sudo nmap -iL ipLst.txt -sT -Pn -oX runNum.xml”
3. Aggressive scan - “sudo nmap -iL ipLst.txt -A -Pn -oX runNum.xml”
4. NIDS Avoidance scan - “sudo nmap -iL ipLst.txt –scan-delay 1075ms –
randomize-hosts -f 8 -Pn -oX runNum.xml”
• Number of Honeypots (HP) - The total number of honeypots spun up in
the test. Honeypots are launched in multiples of three with each of the following
types: TitaThink Camera, Prolophix Thermostat, and ez-Outlet2 Power Outlet.
The level of honeypots are 0, 3, 6, and 9 honeypots.
Factors with their corresponding levels are shown in Table 2.
Factors Levels
Scan Type (ST) No scan (Control Group) TCP Connect Aggressive NIDS Avoidance
Honeypots (HP) 0 3 6 9
Table 2. Factors and Levels
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4.4.4 Metrics
The metrics from the experiment include:
• Number of Snort Alerts Individually (SAI) - Numeric value representing
the total number of Snort alerts generated by parsing each PCAP file transferred
to the C2 server, individually, and resetting Snort after each run
• Number of Distinct Types of Snort Alerts Individually (STI) - Numeric
value representing the number of distinct types of Snort rules triggered by pars-
ing each PCAP file transferred to the C2 server, individually, and resetting
Snort after each PCAP is parsed
• Number of Snort Alerts Merged (SAM) - Numeric value representing the
total number of Snort alerts generated by parsing each PCAP file transferred
to the C2 server as a merged PCAP file
• Number of Distinct Types of Snort Alerts Merged (STM) - Numeric
value representing the number of distinct types of Snort rules triggered by pars-
ing each PCAP file transferred to the C2 server as a merged PCAP file
• Number of Suricata Alerts (SuA) - Numeric value representing the total
number Suricata alerts generated receiving from SPAN traffic
• Number of Distinct Types of Suricata Alerts (SuT) - Numeric value
representing the number of distinct types of Suricata rules triggered from SPAN
traffic
• Percentage of Packets HoneyHive Captured (% HHP) - The percentage
of packets the HoneyHive framework captured to and from the attacker, mea-
sured by the combined total packet count of all transferred PCAPs to the C2
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server and then divided by the number of received and transferred packets on
the attacker’s machine
• Percentage of Packets Suricata Captured (% SuP) - The percentage
of packets the Raspberry Pi captured to and from the attacker, measured by
counting the number of packets sent and received to and from the attacker,
divided by the number of received and transferred packets on the attacker’s
machine
The number of HoneyHive Interactions (HHI) is a numeric value that represents
the number of times HoneyB Agents collectively reported an interaction with one of
their monitored honeypots. Each honeypot should only create one interaction per
test in this experiment for a total of three interactions per HoneyB Agent. For this
reason, it was not used in statistical analysis against Snort and Suricata but is instead
a verification that the honeypots and HoneyHive framework are operating correctly.
Additionally, the attacker’s total number of packets sent and received during each test
(AP) and the Elapsed Time of the test in seconds (ET) are useful for understanding
each trial, but not used in analysis. Metrics are bolded in Appendix E.
4.5 Methodology
The procedural steps taken to run the experiment are as follows:
1. Ensure all devices are connected to the network with the correct static IP and
that the network setup matches the network diagram.
2. Ensure that all program code/scripts are up to date and current with the current
Git repository. Perform a Git pull for scripts that are not.
3. Ensure the C2 server launches on startup - Windows+R and then type shell:startup.
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4. Ensure the suricataConnect.py script launches on startup in rc.local.
5. Ensure no remnants remain from previous experimental runs.
(a) Remove experiment.txt and all .csv and .xml files from the attacker ma-
chine.
(b) Remove /var/log/suricata/fast.log from the Suricata machine.
6. Ensure emerging-scan.rules is located in “C:\Snort\rules” and that it is the
only active rule in the snort.conf file “C:\Snort\etc\snort.conf”.
7. Ensure emerging-scan.rules is located in “/etc/suricata/rules” and that it is the
only active rule in the suricata.yamnl file “/etc/suricata/suricata.yaml”.
8. Reboot all physical machines and virtual machines.
9. On each Honeyd VM, cd to honeyhive/scripts and then run “sudo python con-
nectToServer.py”.
10. Ensure the Windows 10 VM is up and the C2 server is running.
11. On the attacker machine, run “sudo python runExperiment.py”.
12. Wait for experiment to complete (about 10 to 12 days).
13. Download nmap.csv file and perform analysis on results.
4.5.1 runExperiment.py
This section describes the functions the runExperiment.py executes.
1. Check if experiment.txt exists and is not empty.
(a) Read in each line as a separate test run (Test type, Number of Honeyd
Machines, and Test Type Level) and append it to an array for execution.
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2. If experiment.txt does not exist.
(a) Create an array with all combinations of user-specified test types (nmap-
Scan), number of Honeyd machines (0-3), and Test Type Level (0-3) for
each user-specif iced test. Each Honeyd machine controls 3 honeypots,
creating the honeypot levels of 0, 3, 6, and 9. This is all then multiplied
by the number of user-specified replicants (30).
The nmapScan Test Type Levels:
i. Level 0 - No Scan (Control Group): Wait 1321 seconds for routine net-
work traffic (median amount of time required by the median nmapScan
test in pilot studies). The mean was 1341 seconds.
ii. Level 1 - Nmap TCP Connect scan (“sudo nmap -iL ipLst.txt -sT -Pn
-oX runNum.xml”).
iii. Level 2 - Nmap TCP Syn scan with OS detection, version detection,
script scanning, and traceroute. (Aggressive scan) (“sudo nmap -iL
ipLst.txt -A -Pn -oX runNum.xml”).
iv. Level 3 - Nmap TCP Syn scan with scan delay, host randomiza-
tion, and packet fragmentation (NIDS Avoidance scan) (“sudo nmap
-iL ipLst.txt –scan-delay 1075ms –randomize-hosts -f 8 -Pn -oX run-
Num.xml”). These parameters were used because Nmap’s website
listed them as ways to avoid a NIDS [38].
(b) Randomize the order of the array.
(c) Create experiment.txt and write contents of the recently created array to
the file.
3. Execute all test runs in the array (loop).
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(a) Send UDP “START” command to corresponding number of Honeyd ma-
chines and to Suricata over command and control port 9830, three times.
The following devices are sent “START” based on the number of Honeyd
Machines:
i. 0 - no Honeyd machines are started.
ii. 1 - 192.168.1.150-154 Honeyd machines are started.
iii. 2 - 192.168.1.150-154 and 192.168.1.170-174 Honeyd machines are started.
iv. 3 - 192.168.1.150-154, 192.168.1.160-164, and 192.168.1.170-174 Hon-
eyd machines are started.
Suricata is always started.
(b) Wait 40 seconds for the Honeyd and Suricata programs to finish starting
(based on pilot-studies, Honeyd takes 10-15 seconds and Suricata takes 30
seconds).
(c) Record the transmitted (tx packets) and received packet (rx packets) count
and start time of the attacker machine before executing the test.
(d) Execute the next test run in the execution array and wait for completion.
(e) Record the the transmitted (tx packets) and received packet (rx packets)
count for the attacker’s interface and end time after executing the test.
Subtract the end counts from the start counts to get the total packet
counts sent and the elapsed time of the test.
(f) Send UDP “RESET” command to all Honeyd Machines and Suricata over
command and control port 9830, three times.
(g) Wait 45 seconds for all the PCAPs and Suricata results to be transferred
to the C2 server (based on pilot-studies, sending all PCAPs takes 20-30
seconds and sending Suricata results take 3-5.
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(h) Send the “SNORT” command to the C2 server over TCP port 9830 to
signal it to parse all received PCAPs.
(i) Wait 90 seconds for Snort to finish (Snort takes 30-50 seconds to complete,
based on pilot studies).
(j) Send the “RESET” command to the C2 server over TCP port 9830 to
signal for the C2 Server to send results over the socket and then clear all
data. runExperiment.py waits until the results are received.
(k) Write the results received from the C2 server, attacker machine packet
count and experiment elapsed time to the corresponding test result file in
csv format (nmap.csv).
(l) Remove completed experiment from the experiment.txt file (first line).
(m) Send UDP “REBOOT” command to all Honeyd Machines and Suricata
over command and control port 9830, three times (Honeyd Machines set
to ignore command).
(n) Send the “REBOOT” command to the C2 server over TCP port 9830 to
signal it to reboot the machine.
(o) Wait 45 seconds for all machines to finish rebooting (Windows takes 20-30
seconds, Ubuntu 15-20 seconds, Raspberry Pi 20-25 seconds).
(p) Ensure the C2 Server has booted by continuously trying to connect to it
until successful.
4.6 Results
The results from this experiment are saved in Comma-Separated Values (CSV)
format in the file nmap.csv. This file / data is imported into Excel and used to create
bar graphs and tables to show the differences between the HoneyHive framework
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and that of a traditional NIDS (Suricata). Additionally, Anderson-Darling tests for
normality are run in Excel [72]. Finally, using the permutation test.py script in
Appendix F, Permutation tests are run for SAI versus SAM, SAI / SAM versus SuA,
STI versus STM, STM versus SuT, and % HHP versus % SuP.
The Anderson-Darling test is used to determine how well a set of data fits a
specified distribution. In the analysis of results for this experiment this is used to
test whether the given data is normal. This is done across all combinations of factors
and is important to do because some statistical tests, such as t-tests, assume normal
distribution. Suffice it to say that if the p-value from the Anderson-Darling test is
less than 0.05 then the data does not follow a normal distribution.
Permutation tests do not require a normal distribution to perform statistical anal-
ysis and are used to determine what the probability is of obtaining results that exceed
those in two competing data sets, given their initial means and difference. To per-
form a Permutation test, first the arithmetic mean for each of the two data sets is
computed and then the difference between their arithmetic means is recorded as the
“test statistic”. After that, the data from both sets is combined and shuffled into
two new random subsets. The difference between the newly formed sets’ means is
calculated and compared to the test statistic. This is repeated 900,000 times in this
experiment, and then number of permutations whose absolute value exceeds that of
the test statistic is divided by the total number of permutations performed to calcu-
late the p-value. If this p-value is less than the chosen significance value, 10% in this
experiment, then there is a statistical significance between the two data sets [73] [74]
[75]. The code developed to perform Permutation tests on this experiment’s results
is found in Appendix F.
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4.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter outlined the research goals and questions this experiment seeks to
answer. The experiment itself was broken down into the SUT, all system parameters,
factors, and metrics, the step by step procedure of executing the experiment, and
finally how the results of the experiment will be analyzed and presented.
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V. Results and Analysis
5.1 Overview
This chapter provides an analysis of experiment results which can be found in
Appendix E. Results are presented first with an overall picture and then grouped
by each factor to distinguish patterns and the effect of each factor. Results are also
grouped by all combinations of factors (scan type with number of honeypots). First
tables and graphs present a comparison of each different metric. The Control Group
Scan and 0 Honeypot levels are not included in the means of other factors as they
create skewed results. This is followed by a table with the results of the Anderson-
Darling test for normality with a significance level (α) of 5%. Both metrics that are
being compared against one another are required to be normally distributed in order
to perform a t-test. While there are a handful of individual metrics that accept the
null hypothesis of normal distribution, only the Aggressive scan with 9 honeypots
accepted the null hypothesis for SAI and SAM to be compared against one another.
Because only one test set out of eighty is normally distributed, a Permutation test
is selected for testing whether results are statistically significant with a significance
level of 10% . 900,000 permutations are performed for each test. For number of alerts,
SAI and SAM are tested against one another as well as the SAI/SAM (whichever
has the higher average mean) against SuA. It appears that Snort consolidates some
alerts when PCAPs are analyzed together which is why SAI is often the more fair
test against SuA. However, it appears that Snort is able to detect and create more
alerts when analyzing packets together for the NIDS Avoidance Scans and when only
3 honeypots are active. When this happens, SAM is compared against SuA. For
the number of distinct alerts, STI is compared against STM, and STM is compared
against SuT. Snort created more distinct alerts on average when analyzing PCAPs
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merged together which is why STM was used over STI. Finally, % HHP is compared
against % SuP to compare the percentage of captured packets.
5.1.1 Number of Alerts Overview
In Table 3 and Figure 18, the mean number of alerts across all groupings and
combination of factors is shown. Suricata generated more alerts in all factor groupings
except for when 9 honeypots were active in an Aggressive scan. Additionally, in the
TCP Connect scan Snort and Suricata created a similar amount of alerts when 9
honeypots were active. However, Suricata created a significant number more alerts
on average in the NIDS Avoidance scan when 9 honeypots were active. Table 4
displays the Anderson-Darling test for normality results conducted on the experiment
results. Only the Aggressive Scan with 9 honeypots was normal for both SAI and
SAM. Additionally, SAI was normal for the TCP Connect scan with 6 honeypots.
In Table 5 the Permutation test results are shown. In the SAI versus SUA column,
cells italicized and denoted with a “*” indicate that SAM was used for comparison
instead because it had a higher mean for alerts than SAI. SAI and SAM were not
statistically significant in test. However, Snort versus SuA was significantly different
in all tests except the TCP Connect Scan with 9 honeypots and 9 honeypots overall.
This indicates that the null hypothesis (Snort and Suricata create the same number of
alerts) is rejected. This suggests Suricata outperforms Snort in all alert tests where its
mean is higher and statistically significant. This is true for all but the Aggressive Scan
with 9 honeypots, where Snort outperforms Suricata and is statistically significant.
While HoneyHive created alerts in the majority of runs, there were 3/270 runs
(runs 270, 291, and 465) that it did not create alerts (HHI) when it should have. Ad-
ditionally, HoneyHive is currently using Snort for a higher level of signature matching
and alert creation. However, Snort did not create alerts for 32/270 runs that it should
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have. This means roughly 10% of intrusions did not have successful signature match-
ing performed on packet captures. This is either from Snort crashing, not finishing in
a timely manner, simply not creating alerts, or an error in the HoneyHive framework.
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HHI SAI SAM SuA
Control Group 0 0 0 0
CG 0 0 0 0 0
CG 3 0 0 0 0
CG 6 0 0 0 0
CG 9 0 0 0 0
TCP Connect 5.933333333 24.14444444 22.07777778 33.95555556
TCP 0 0 0 0 24.2
TCP 3 2.8 12.86666667 14.03333333 23
TCP 6 6 23.53333333 22.5 39.2
TCP 9 9 36.03333333 29.7 39.66666667
Aggressive 5.255555556 82.68888889 77.14444444 112.4
Agg 0 0 0 0 112.5
Agg 3 2.833333333 40.56666667 42.63333333 103.5333333
Agg 6 5 74.06666667 71.83333333 126.5666667
Agg 9 7.933333333 133.4333333 116.9666667 107.1
NIDS Avoidance 5.966666667 22.92222222 27.45555556 49.36666667
NIDS 0 0 0 0 26.96666667
NIDS 3 3 13.86666667 17.23333333 28
NIDS 6 6 22.6 25.83333333 58.16666667
NIDS 9 8.9 32.3 39.3 61.93333333
0 Honeypots 0 0 0 54.55555556
3 Honeypots 2.877777778 22.43333333 24.63333333 51.51111111
6 Honeypots 5.666666667 40.06666667 40.05555556 74.64444444
9 Honeypots 8.611111111 67.25555556 61.98888889 69.56666667
Overall 5.718518519 43.25185185 42.22592593 65.24074074
Table 3. Overview - Mean Alerts by Level
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Figure 18. Overview - Mean Number of Alerts
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SAI SAM SuA
TCP Connect 8.4179E-10 2.10219E-06 8.45677E-05
TCP 3 1.86436E-09 1.80995E-09 0.001764216
TCP 6 0.07823086 0.018595137 3.75442E-05
TCP 9 0.003989696 0.04930214 0.001424823
Aggressive 0.00231741 0.009967393 4.53772E-10
Agg 3 0.001050125 0.000460888 4.02293E-10
Agg 6 0.01229756 0.045563122 0.000516952
Agg 9 0.118392405 0.136474624 0.002484829
NIDS Avoidance 0 7.24625E-25 4.65401E-19
NIDS 3 1.03809E-09 1.02987E-07 4.93212E-11
NIDS 6 9.41431E-15 4.06702E-13 3.23667E-12
NIDS 9 1.18093E-13 4.58503E-11 5.75098E-11
3 Honeypots 1.90455E-12 1.2306E-10 7.56855E-23
6 Honeypots 1.14242E-13 3.13753E-13 7.32928E-21
9 Honeypots 3.86714E-12 1.15597E-11 1.65326E-15
Overall 0 0 0
Table 4. Anderson-Darling Test - Number of Alerts
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SAI v. SAM SAI v. SuA
TCP Connect 0.489953333 0.00048
TCP 3 0.74778 0.0034967 *
TCP 6 0.762092222 0.0001189
TCP 9 0.339487778 0.49631
Aggressive 0.497806667 0.0006667 *
Agg 3 0.76365 0
Agg 6 0.817308889 0.0016511
Agg 9 0.275418889 0.0702367
NIDS Avoidance 0.310293333 0 *
NIDS 3 0.462257778 0.0015556 *
NIDS 6 0.687624444 3.33E-06 *
NIDS 9 0.453642222 0.0007711 *
3 Honeypots 0.532037778 0 *
6 Honeypots 0.996777778 3.33E-06
9 Honeypots 0.555283333 0.7710211
Overall 0.795945556 0
Table 5. Permutation Test - Number of Alerts
5.1.2 Number of Distinct Types of Alerts Overview
Table 6 and Figure 19 show the mean number of distinct alerts across all tests.
Suricata created more distinct number of alerts (SuT) on average than Snort. PCAPs
merged together and then analyzed by Snort (STM) created more distinct alerts on
average as compared with each packet being parsed individually by Snort (STI).
Furthermore, not only did the average number of distinct alerts grow for STM and
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STI as the number of honeypots increased but the average difference in the number of
distinct alerts between STM and STI grew as well. In addition, the difference between
STM and SuT shrank. This supports that distributed data / PCAP aggregation
exhibits merit for NIDS. Table 7 shows the results of the Anderson-Darling test. No
data sets fit the normal distribution. Table 8 displays the results of Permutation
tests for STI compared with STM and STM compared with SuT. STI versus STM
was statistically significant in all tests except the TCP Connect Scan and NIDS
Avoidance Scan each with 3 honeypots. These tests were both very close to 10% but
did not meet the required significance level. Because STM created more distinct alerts
on average for each test over STI this means that it performed better for all tests
except the two aforementioned. This supports the hypothesis that the HoneyHive
framework can detect intrusions that traditional NIDS cannot through distributed
sensors and packet aggregation. However, Suricata created more distinct alerts on
average than SAM in all categories and was statistically significant in all tests except
the Aggressive Scan with 9 Honeypots. This indicates there was not an advantage of
combining packets over that of just listening on a SPAN port.
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STI STM SuT
Control Group 0 0 0
CG 0 0 0 0
CG 3 0 0 0
CG 6 0 0 0
CG 9 0 0 0
TCP Connect 4.477777778 5.544444444 7.411111111
TCP 0 0 0 7.166666667
TCP 3 4.333333333 5.033333333 6.733333333
TCP 6 4.633333333 5.866666667 7.5
TCP 9 4.466666667 5.733333333 8
Aggressive 6.3 7.822222222 10.13333333
Agg 0 0 0 12
Agg 3 5.7 7.1 11.36666667
Agg 6 6.233333333 7.733333333 9.6
Agg 9 6.966666667 8.633333333 9.433333333
NIDS Avoidance 3.633333333 4.911111111 7.233333333
NIDS 0 0 0 6
NIDS 3 3.333333333 4.233333333 5.8
NIDS 6 3.7 4.466666667 7.966666667
NIDS 9 3.866666667 6.033333333 7.933333333
0 Honeypots 0 0 8.388888889
3 Honeypots 4.455555556 5.455555556 7.966666667
6 Honeypots 4.855555556 6.022222222 8.355555556
9 Honeypots 5.1 6.8 8.455555556
Overall 4.803703704 6.092592593 8.259259259
Table 6. Overview - Mean Number of Distinct Alerts by Level
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Figure 19. Overview - Mean Number of Distinct Alerts
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STI STM SuT
TCP Connect 1.42E-30 2.26E-18 0
TCP 3 2.26E-10 1.04E-06 3.82E-08
TCP 6 4.44E-12 2.19E-13 3.78E-16
TCP 9 1.47E-10 2.38E-08 3.96E-15
Aggressive 0 0 1.1E-12
Agg 3 9.08E-12 3.92E-14 5.21E-20
Agg 6 2.25E-14 2.56E-16 0.005961
Agg 9 4.67E-08 6.4E-13 7.33E-05
NIDS Avoidance 9.44E-29 1.93E-20 0
NIDS 3 6.37E-09 2.95E-10 2.66E-08
NIDS 6 1.61E-08 9.65E-12 8.99E-24
NIDS 9 4.02E-13 1.5E-13 2.28E-27
3 Honeypots 2.01E-10 4.23E-11 2.33E-09
6 Honeypots 2.16E-10 1.93E-10 1.72E-20
9 Honeypots 1.34E-08 7.63E-15 4.72E-22
Overall 3.26E-27 1.58E-28 0
Table 7. Anderson-Darling Test - Number of Distinct Alerts
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STI v. STM STM v. SuT
TCP Connect 0.00062 0
TCP 3 0.1014511 0.0011956
TCP 6 0.0273578 0.0015211
TCP 9 0.0310778 0
Aggressive 0.0003433 0
Agg 3 0.0726156 0
Agg 6 0.0417956 0.0032133
Agg 9 0.0042444 0.1583944
NIDS Avoidance 0 0
NIDS 3 0.1012789 0.0982622
NIDS 6 0.0897022 0
NIDS 9 1.22E-05 0
3 Honeypots 0.0084811 0
6 Honeypots 0.0026778 0
9 Honeypots 1.00E-05 0
Overall 0 0
Table 8. Permutation Test - Number of Distinct Alerts
5.1.3 Packet Capture Percentage Overview
The percentages of scanned devices that are monitored for each level of honeypots
in the test network for the HoneyHive framework and Suricata, are shown in Table
9. As the number of honeypots increases, the total number of active devices on the
network that are scanned also increases. HoneyHive’s percentage of monitored devices
increses as the number of honeypots increases. However, the percentage of monitored
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devices for Suricata decreases from 0 to 3 honeypots, increase from 3 to 6 honeypots,
and then decreases from 6 to 9 honeypots. This is because the honeypots activated
for 6 honeypots reside on Suricata’s switch (the DMZ switch).
The percentage of packets captured by the HoneyHive framework versus Suri-
cata is shown in Table 10 and Figure 20. Overall, HoneyHive and Suricata captured
roughly the same average percentage of packets. However, when 9 honeypots are
active the HoneyHive framework significantly outperforms Suricata in all categories
except the NIDS Scan. At the level of three honeypots, packets captured are within
several percentage points of another which is to be expected as Suricata does not have
active honeypots on its switch. Similarly, at 6 honeypots HoneyHive and Suricata
stayed within a couple percentage points of one another since they both increase by
three honeypots. The one category this does not hold for is the NIDS Avoidance scan
in which Suricata captures significantly more traffic than HoneyHive. Part of the
reason for this could be how packets are counted in Snort versus Suricata. Capinfos
counts all the packets in the PCAP and could be combining the fragmented parts
together, reducing the actual number. Suricata reports by using Scapy to increment
its packet for every packet sent or received with the attacker’s IP address. Table 11
shows the Anderson-Darling normality test for the percentage of packets captured but
only % HPP for the TCP Connect Scan with 6 honeypots and % SuP for the Aggres-
sive Scan with 9 honeypots are normal. Table 12 shows the Permutation test results
for percentage of packets captured. All but TCP Connect overall, TCP Connect Scan
HoneyHive Suricata
0 0 / 6 = 0.00% 2 / 6 = 33.33%
3 3 / 9 = 33.33% 2 / 9 = 22.22%
6 6 / 12 = 50.00% 5 / 12 = 41.67%
9 9 / 15 = 60.00% 5 / 15 = 33.33%
Table 9. Percentage of Scanned Devices Monitored in Test Network
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with 3 and 6 Honeypots (although very close), Aggressive Scan with 6 honeypots, and
overall results are statistically significant. % HHP performed significantly better than
% SuP in the Aggressive Scan overall and all tests with 9 honeypots, minus the NIDS
Avoidance Scan. % SuP performed significantly better in all NIDS Avoidance Scans,
Aggressive Scan with 3 honeypots, and 3 and 6 Honeypots overall. Even though the
HoneyHive framework does not at this moment create more alerts or more distinct
alerts than Suricata, the fact that it significantly outperforms Suricata in capturing
network traffic when all 9 honeypots are active supports it will be able to detect more
than a traditional NIDS could. Also of note, Suricata did not significantly outperform
the HoneyHive framework in any of the TCP Connect scans.
Figure 21 shows the trend of an increase in mean capture packet percentage (%
HHP) for the HoneyHive framework as the ratio of honeypots to devices scanned on
a network also increases. In the TCP Connect scan each addition of 3 honeypots
increases % HHP by 9%. For the Aggressive scan there is a 36% increase for % HHP
from 3 to 6 honeypots and then a 39% increase from 6 to 9 honeypots. The NIDS
Avoidance scan only has a 5% increase from 3 to 6 honeypots and an 8% increase
from 6 to 9 honeypots. Finally, % HHP for each level of honeypot overall increase
17% from 3 to 6 and 18% from 6 to 9. Assuming this trendline continues, at 12 and
15 honeypots % HHP would be 62.5% and 80% respectively. This well exceeds %
SuP which would continue to decrease with the addition of honeypots not connected
to the switch it monitors.
95
% HHP % SuP
Control Group 0% 21%
CG 0 0% 5%
CG 3 0% 6%
CG 6 0% 7%
CG 9 0% 49%
TCP Connect 22% 19%
TCP 0 0% 19%
TCP 3 13% 10%
TCP 6 22% 28%
TCP 9 31% 21%
Aggressive 39% 27%
Agg 0 0% 4%
Agg 3 2% 4%
Agg 6 38% 35%
Agg 9 77% 41%
NIDS Avoidance 21% 32%
NIDS 0 0% 32%
NIDS 3 15% 23%
NIDS 6 20% 40%
NIDS 9 28% 34%
0 Honeypots 0% 18%
3 Honeypots 10% 12%
6 Honeypots 27% 34%
9 Honeypots 45% 32%
Overall 27% 26%
Table 10. Overview - Mean Packet Capture Percentage
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Figure 20. Overview - Mean Packet Capture Percentage
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Figure 21. HoneyHive Framework Mean Packet Capture Percentage (% HHP) by Level
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% HHP % SuP
TCP Connect 2.4739E-05 1.18E-08
TCP 3 1.7612E-08 0.001415
TCP 6 0.08450075 7.71E-10
TCP 9 0.00013778 0.013687
Aggressive 1.2062E-18 2.86E-14
Agg 3 1.2349E-07 3.13E-08
Agg 6 6.8951E-05 2.95E-05
Agg 9 5.1989E-06 0.474596
NIDS Avoidance 0.00022313 1.95E-05
NIDS 3 9.268E-09 1.77E-08
NIDS 6 3.2239E-06 1.11E-10
NIDS 9 2.6557E-08 0.00294
3 Honeypots 2.018E-08 2.23E-13
6 Honeypots 1.2178E-15 3.65E-05
9 Honeypots 8.2817E-10 4.19E-05
Overall 0 9.39E-07
Table 11. Anderson-Darling Test - Packet Capture Percentage
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Table 12. Permutation Test - Packet Capture Percentage
5.2 Scan Type
This section groups experiment results by each of the different scan types for




For the control group, where no scan was performed, no alerts were generated for
any of the metrics (HHI, SAI, SAM, and SuA). Similarly, without any alerts there
were also no distinct types of alerts (STI, STM, and SuT). This supports that the
HoneyHive framework operates correctly without any malicious traffic and does not
create false positives. The packets captured by the HoneyHive framework were zero
for all different levels of honeypots as is expected since no packets were sent to the
honeypots. However, Suricata still captured traffic as shown in Figure 22. Although
no malicious traffic was sent by the attacker, routine network traffic still takes place
and this is the traffic that is captured by Suricata. One interesting aspect about
the data is the sharp jump in percentage when 9 honeypots are active as compared
to the other levels of honeypots. Roughly seven times the traffic captured in other
levels is captured in this level. This is indicative that more traffic traverses the switch
Suricata is on. Upon further investigation, one trial had a massive outlier of 1247%
captured. When removing this outlier and reanalyzing, the mean falls in line with
the other honeypot levels. Because Suricata’s packet count only contains traffic to or
from the attacker and the percentage was much higher than what the attacker sent,
some device must have been sending traffic to the attacker’s IP. It is speculated that
this is attributed to Honeyd expiring all scan connections made by the attacker in
the previous trial (234) aggressive scan.
101
Figure 22. Control Group - Mean Percentage of Packets Captured
102
5.2.2 TCP Connect
In Figure 23 Suricata generates more alerts on average in all levels of honeypots for
the TCP Connect scan. When 9 honeypots are active, SAI is only a few alerts away
from SuA. One aspect of note is that after 3 honeypots, SAI becomes and remains
higher than SAM. It is speculated that this is partially due to Snort aggregating some
alerts it sees relatively close to one another to reduce the number to parse through.
Additionally, by parsing combined packets, it appears that Snort is able to create
more alerts at levels of honeypots with a lower amount of traffic.
In Figure 24, STM significantly outperforms STI in honeypot levels 6, 9, and
overall. However, Suricata significantly outperforms STM in all TCP connect tests.
One interesting aspect to note is that the average at 6 honeypots is higher than that of
9 for STI and STM. Upon looking at the individual data, there were four runs where
Snort reports 0 for the number of alerts and the distinct number of alerts in the 9
honeypot level and three runs for the 6 honeypot level. Upon removing these, the
new averages are STI:5.15, STM: 6.62 for 9 honeypots and STI:5.15, STM: 6.52, for 6
honeypots, supporting the trend of more honeypots creating more distinct alerts with
diminishing returns. The 0 runs are most likely from Snort crashing or not finishing
before results were collected.
Figure 25 shows the average percentage of packets captured by the HoneyHive
framework compared to that of Suricata. The HoneyHive framework begins with a
higher capture percentage at the 3 honeypots level but then Suricata captures more
at 6 honeypots. This is interesting because the number of honeypots increases equally
for the HoneyHive framework and Suricata. However, at 9 honeypots and for TCP
Connect scan overall the HoneyHive framework captures more traffic on average than
Suricata. The capture percentage of HoneyHive at 9 honeypots is statistically higher
than that of Suricata. No other levels were statistically significant. Another trend
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expected to repeat is a drop in Suricata packet capture percentage from 6 to 9 due
to an increase in attacker traffic that the SPAN port does not receive.
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Figure 23. TCP Connect - Mean Number of Alerts
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Figure 24. TCP Connect - Mean Number of Distinct Alerts
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Figure 25. TCP Connect - Mean Packet Capture Percentage
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5.2.3 Aggressive
In Figure 26 the trend holds for SAM creating more alerts than SAI at 3 honeypots
and then SAI creating more alerts than SAM at 6 and 9 honeypots. Suricata performs
significantly better overall and when 3 or 6 honeypots are active. SAI performs
significantly better than SuA when 9 honeypots are active, supporting the hypothesis
that distributed sensors can detect intrusions that traditional NIDS cannot. This is
the only test in which the HoneyHive framework creates more alerts than Suricata
although at 9 honeypots in the TCP connect scan, it is also very close to that of
Suricata.
Figure 27 also follows the trend of the corrected data in the TCP connect scan, an
increase in distinct number of alerts in STI and STM with STM being significantly
greater than STI. SuT is significantly greater overall and for 3 and 6 honeypots.
Even though it is larger, it is not significantly greater than STM at 9 honeypots. One
interesting trend is that the number of distinct alerts for SuT actually decreases as
the number of honeypots increases. This could be caused by the increased time spent
scanning each host as more honeypots are activated and not tripping rules that are
triggered by consecutive scanning in a certain amount of time.
The average packet percentage for each honeypot level in the Aggressive Scan
is shown in Figure 28. The HoneyHive framework captures a higher percentage on
average overall and for 6 honeypots and significantly more for 9 honeypots. Even
though Suricata does not drop in packet percentage captured as it did in the TCP
Connect scan, it does not increase nearly as much as it did from 3 to 6 honeypots.
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Figure 26. Aggressive - Mean Number of Alerts
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Figure 27. Aggressive - Mean Number of Distinct Alerts
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Figure 28. Aggressive - Mean Packet Capture Percentage
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5.2.4 NIDS Avoidance
The average number of alerts for the NIDS Avoidance Scan with each level of
honeypot is shown in Figure 29. While not statistically significant, SAM performs
better than STI in all levels of honeypots. This is most likely due to the packet
fragmentation and scan delay not tripping as many Snort alerts, although more alerts
are created as more honeypots are active and more packets are aggregated. Because
SAM creates more alerts on average over SAI, it is compared against SuA. Unlike the
TCP Connect scan with 9 honeypots and Aggressive scan with 9 honeypots, Suricata
significantly outperforms Snort in the 9 honeypots level and all other tests.
Figure 30 shows the average distinct number of alerts for the NIDS Avoidance
scan, broken down by each honeypot level and overall. All metrics increase as the
number of honeypots they monitor increase as well. STM outperforms STI in all tests
and is statistically significant in all tests except with 3 honeypots (just over 10%).
SuT is statistically superior in performance in all tests for the NIDS Avoidance scan.
The trend of the percentage of packets captured by Suricata declining from 6
to 9 honeypots holds and is shown in Figure 31. However, in the NIDS Avoidance
Scan % SuP significantly outperforms % HHP in all tests, even when 9 honeypots
are active. % HHP still increases with each honeypot level though. As mentioned in
the overview, the packet count may be different if Capinfos is combining fragmented
packets together, resulting in a reduced packet count.
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Figure 29. NIDS Avoidance - Mean Number of Alerts
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Figure 30. NIDS Avoidance - Mean Number of Distinct Alerts
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Figure 31. NIDS Avoidance - Mean Packet Capture Percentage
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5.3 Number of Honeypots
This section groups experiment results by each of the different levels of honeypots
for analysis. These levels are 0, 3, 6, and 9.
5.3.1 0 Honeypots
Without any active honeypots, no alerts should be created and no packets cap-
tured. This section is useful in understanding the baseline performance of Suricata
across different scan types. The average number of alerts is shown in Figure 32. Suri-
cata creates alerts in all scan types with the most in the Aggressive scan, followed
by the NIDS Avoidance scan and then the TCP Connect scan. The number of alerts
increases as the number of honeypots increases for TCP Connect and NIDS but ac-
tually decreases for all honeypots not monitored by it (all but 6). This is most likely
due to a decrease in alerts being triggered as hosts being scanned in sequence takes
longer since each scan takes longer. Suricata performed correctly by not creating any
alerts when no scan was performed.
Figure 30 displays the average number of distinct alerts created by Suricata for
each different type of scan. The Aggressive scan creates the most number of distinct
alerts followed by TCP Connect scan and then the NIDS Avoidance scan. The distinct
number of alerts actually decreases for the Avoidance scan as each honeypot level
increases. The TCP Connect scan decreases for the 3 honeypots but then increases
for 6 and 9 honeypots. The NIDS Avoidance scan similarly decreases for 3 honeypots,
increases for 6, but then decreases slightly again for 9 honeypots.
The average percentage of packets captured by Suricata for each test is shown
in Figure 34. The NIDS Avoidance scan captured the largest percentage of packets
on average, followed by the TCP Connect scan, the Control Group, and then the
Aggressive Scan. The NIDS Avoidance scan capture percentage being so high with
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0 honeypots supports that it is being skewed in other tests. The TCP Connect scan
results are within the expected amount for only one monitored device out of three.
With the attacker sending no scan packets in the control group, one might wonder
why packets are being captured. These packets are command and control packets for
running tests. It is surprising that the Aggressive scan packet capture percentage was
so low. This could be because the actual IoT devices cannot keep up with the scan
so ones not on this switch generate lots of re-transmissions that are not captured or
Nmap quickly dismisses the IoT device on the switch and moves on.
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Figure 32. 0 Honeypots - Mean Number of Alerts
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Figure 33. 0 Honeypots - Mean Number of Distinct Alerts
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Figure 34. 0 Honeypots - Mean Packet Capture Percentage
120
5.3.2 3 Honeypots
Figure 35 shows the average number of alerts with 3 honeypots active grouped by
different scan types. All three metrics create more alerts in the Aggressive scan than
the other scan types. This is followed by the NIDS Avoidance Scan, and the TCP
Connect scan. Suricata creates the most alerts in all tests followed by SAM and then
SAI. Even though the NIDS Avoidance scan was designed to trigger the least number
of alerts, it appears that the NIDS have the most difficulty in creating alerts for the
TCP Connect scan. This is probably because the TCP Connect scan is difficult to
distinguish from normal connections while the NIDS Avoidance scan sends fragmented
packets, which might be treated as suspicious. The NIDS clearly have no trouble
detecting Aggressive Scans which makes sense because the scan generates much more
traffic by requesting OS and service information, giving it a very identifiable signature.
Figure 36 displays the number of distinct alerts for each scan with 3 honeypots
active. Based on the sheer number of alerts generated by the Aggressive scan, it
makes sense that the distinct number would also be higher than the other scan types.
However, even though the NIDS Avoidance scan generated more alerts than the TCP
Connect scan, the TCP Connect scan had a larger number of distinct alerts than that
of the NIDS Avoidance scan for STI, STM, and SuT. This suggest that the NIDS
Avoidance scan is repeatedly generating the same alerts while TCP connect has a
broader spectrum.
In Figure 37, % SuP captures more traffic than % HHP in all scans except the TCP
Connect scan. The NIDS Avoidance scan has the highest percentage of captured for
both % SuP and % HHP followed by the TCP Connect and then the Aggressive Scan
(although the Control Group is higher for % SuP). Because packets are fragmented
and sent at a much slower rate, it appears that Suricata and HoneyHive are able to
better capture them in the NIDS Avoidance scan with three honeypots active. With
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0 honeypots active on its switch, it would appear that a single IoT device scanned
creates more traffic than three scanned honeypots. In the TCP Connect scan, % HHP
exceeds % SuP suggesting that IoT devices handle normal connections better than
ones with long delays and fragmented packets. The aggressive scan being the lowest
makes sense with the large amount of traffic that is generated and with only a small
fraction of the devices being scanned being active honeypots.
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Figure 35. 3 Honeypots - Mean Number of Alerts
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Figure 36. 3 Honeypots - Mean Number of Distinct Alerts
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Figure 37. 3 Honeypots - Mean Packet Capture Percentage
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5.3.3 6 Honeypots
The same pattern for average number of alerts holds for Figure 38 for 6 honeypots
as it did with 3. The main differences are more alerts are generated in each scan and
now SAI create more alerts than SAM in the TCP Connect and Aggressive scans.
SAM still creates more alerts than SAI in the NIDS Avoidance scan.
With 6 honeypots the trend for the average number of distinct alerts is mostly the
same as 3 honeypots and is shown in Figure 39. SuT is still the highest in all scan
types but the average distinct number decreases in the Aggressive Scan. Also of note,
SuT creates more alerts in the NIDS Avoidance scan instead of the TCP Connect
scan, this was the opposite with 3 honeypots. STM remains higher than STI in all
scan tests, and averages for both increase. Additionally, the difference between STM
and SuT for the average number of distinct alerts decreases in all scans except the
NIDS Avoidance scan.
Unlike scans with 3 honeypots, % HHP is the largest in the Aggressive scan and
the least in the NIDS Avoidance scan, as shown in Figure 40. % SuP is still largest
in the NIDS Avoidance scan but the Aggressive scan captures a higher pecentage
than the TCP Connect scan. % SuP also remains higher than % HHP in the NIDS
Avoidance scan, surpasses %HHP in the TCP Connect scan, and falls below % HHP
in the Aggressive scan.
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Figure 38. 6 Honeypots - Mean Number of Alerts
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Figure 39. 6 Honeypots - Mean Number of Distinct Alerts
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Figure 40. 6 Honeypots - Mean Packet Capture Percentage
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5.3.4 9 Honeypots
With 9 honeypots active SAI approached SuA in the TCP Connect scan and
significantly surpassed SuA in the Aggressive scan, shown in Figure 41. SuT remained
on top and STM remained higher than the STI in the NIDS avoidance scan. SuT
actually decreased in the number alerts generated from 6 honeypots to 9 honeypots
in the Aggressive scan.
Figure 42 shows the average number of distinct alerts across different scans with 9
honeypots active. Noticeable changes are STM closing in on SuT and there no longer
being a significant difference between the two, STM being higher in the NIDS Avoid-
ance scan than the TCP Connect scan, and SuT being approximately the same in the
TCP Connect and NIDS Avoidance scans, although TCP Connect is now higher. In
fact, the average number of alerts actually decreases for SuT in the Aggressive and
NIDS Avoidance scans.
In Figure 43, % HHP now surpasses % SuP in all scans except the NIDS Avoidance
scan. Another noticeable difference is % SuP is now higher in the Agressive scan
compared with the NIDS Avoidance scan. The percentage of packets captured by %
SuP actually decreases for both the TCP Connect and NIDS Avoidance scans.
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Figure 41. 9 Honeypots - Mean Number of Alerts
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Figure 42. 9 Honeypots - Mean Number of Distinct Alerts
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Figure 43. 9 Honeypots - Mean Packet Capture Percentage
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5.4 Summary
This chapter presents and analyzes results from the experiment in Chapter 4.
Results are explored with different grouping of factors to distinguish patterns and
analyze the effects each factor has on the experiment. Explanations for observed
patterns were also explored. Anderson-Darling tests for normality are completed on
all grouping of factors to determine if a t-test was suitable for statistical testing.
Because only one set was normal, a Permutation test is used to compare statistical
significance with a significance level of 10%. SuA is statistically superior in all tests
except for 9 honeypots overall and the TCP Connect and Aggressive scans with
9 honeypots. SAI is statistically superior to SuA in the Aggressive scan with 9
honeypots. STM is statistically superior to STI in all tests except the TCP Connect
and NIDS Avoidance scans with 3 honeypots active. SuT statistically outperforms
STM in all tests except the Aggressive scan with 9 honeypots active. Finally, % HHP
is statistically significant in comparison to % SuP in the Aggressive Scan overall and
all tests with 9 honeypots, except the NIDS Avoidance Scan. % SuP is statically
significant in all NIDS Avoidance scans, the Aggressive scan with 3 honeypots, and
3 and 6 honeypots overall. Assuming the trendline continues, % HHP would perform




In this chapter the conclusions drawn from the experimental results are discussed
in Section 6.2 for each category of metrics, which includes the number of alerts, the
number of distinct alerts, and the percentage of packets captured. The significance
of this research is discussed in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 describes the limitations
of this research. In Section 6.5, this thesis concludes with potential future work
in the research field of honeypots, network intrusion detection, and the HoneyHive
framework.
6.2 Research Conclusions
This research successfully creates a framework of distributed network intrusion
detection IoT honeypot sensors that capture traffic, create alerts, and beacon back
to a central C2 server. The first hypothesis from Chapter 1 is mostly supported with
experiment results while the second is only partially supported by the trendline of
experiment results:
1. The HoneyHive framework operates correctly by not alerting on routine network
traffic and alerting on non-routine network traffic.
2. The HoneyHive framework detects intrusions that traditional NIDSs cannot
through the use of distributed IoT honeypot sensors and packet capture aggre-
gation.
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6.2.1 Number of Alerts
The first hypothesis is a two part question, but both parts are supported by the
experiment results. When No Scan is performed (the Control Group), no false positive
alerts are created by HoneyHive across all runs and varying levels of honeypots.
Therefore, HoneyHive operates correctly with routine network traffic.
The next part of the question requires delving into experimental results. While
HoneyHive performed admirably in the majority of runs, there were 3/270 runs (runs
270, 291, and 465) that it did not create alerts (HHI) when it should have. Addition-
ally, HoneyHive is currently using Snort for a higher level of signature matching and
alert creation. However, Snort did not create alerts for 32/270 runs that it should
have. This means roughly 10% of intrusions did not have successful signature match-
ing performed on packet captures. This is either from Snort crashing, not finishing
in a timely manner, simply not creating alerts, or an error in the HoneyHive frame-
work. Although Snort is only an augmentation for the HoneyHive framework, it is
used extensively in this research for generating alerts. Because of this, the HoneyHive
framework, in its current configuration, alerts on non-routine traffic only around 90%
of the time. For network intrusions, it is ideal for this to be as close to 100% as
possible.
The second hypothesis is supported only partially by metrics and partially by
trendlines. To start, the average number of alerts steadily increased as the number of
honeypots increased. Even though the number of alerts in the HoneyHive framework
only statistically exceeded Suricata in the Aggressive scan with 9 honeypots it was
very close to Suricata in the TCP Connect scan with 9 honeypots. If this trend con-
tinued with the additions of honeypots, then it is expected that at 12 or 15 honeypots
HoneyHive would surpass Suricata. Furthermore, if the experiment was modified to
match an internal network scan that did not scan the DMZ, then Suricata would
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not receive any non-routine traffic. This was not done in this experiment because
then there would not have been any data to run statistical tests against. All this
supports the hypothesis that distributed IoT honeypot sensors can detect intrusions
that traditional NIDS cannot through packet capture aggregation.
6.2.2 Number of Distinct Types of Alerts
The second hypothesis is also supported by the number of distinct types of alerts
from the experiment. While, HoneyHive did not ever exceed Suricata in the number of
distinct alerts, Suricata was no longer statistically significant for the Aggressive scan
with 9 honeypots. This once again suggests that with more honeypots HoneyHive
could outperform Suricata. What is supportive though is that Snort PCAPs merged
together (STM) created a larger number of distinct alerts with statistical significance
for almost all tests compared with that of PCAPs parsed individually by Snort (STI).
This supports the hypothesis because alerts that were not generated by analyzing each
PCAP individually were generated when the PCAPs were merged and analyzed as
one with statistical significance.
6.2.3 Percentage of Packets Captured
Finally, the percentage of packets captured to and from the attacker increased in
all tests for the HoneyHive framework as the number of honeypots increased. The
HoneyHive framework was statistically superior to Suricata with 9 honeypots active
in all tests except the NIDS Avoidance scan. Assuming the trendline holds with %
HHP, with more honeypots active, a higher percentage of attacker packets can be
captured. Additionally, if areas of a network are scanned without a NIDS then a
traditional NIDS will not see this traffic and not create alerts. Because HoneyHive
is a distributed system, it can capture this traffic that a traditional NIDS cannot by
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placing IoT honeypots in different enclaves throughout the network. This supports
the second hypothesis that HoneyHive can detect intrusions that traditional NIDS
cannot through the use of distributed IoT honeypots.
6.3 Research Significance
While there currently exist many NIDSs, none of the existing research explored
in Chapter 2 is tailored to IoT honeypots. In addition, not all NIDSs alert in real
time nor offer a complete view of the network with C2 capabilities. Furthermore, few
offer automated distributed packet aggregation for intrusion analysis. The HoneyHive
framework addresses all these shortcomings. The HoneyB Agent is also deployable to
more than just IoT honeypots. It is deployable to any host with Python 2.7 installed.
This makes it very versatile and offers immediate monitoring for the host with very
little setup.
The HoneyHive framework offers benefits that allow the Air Force in defending
the Air Force Network (AFNet) and the DoD to protect the DoD Information Net-
work (DODIN). It can also be used for integration in CIKR-based networks since IoT
devices share some similarities with ICS. Moreover, any company that works in the
realm of network security could integrate HoneyHive into their existing network secu-
rity. The impact of this framework is a cross-platform, standalone, NIDS / Network
Monitoring solution capable of improving the rate at which network intrusions are
detected. While HoneyHive will not be the solution for every network, it is another
viable tool for increasing network security through intrusion detection.
6.4 Research Limitations
While the HoneyHive framework is a great success, there are several limitations
in its current configuration. The IoT honeypots from Stafira used in this research
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are low-interaction, web-based honeypots. Furthermore, they rely on Honeyd 1.5c
and Python 2.7, both of which are at the end of their life [76]. Honeyd 1.5c was
last updated in 2007 [10] and the current version, Honeyd 1.6d was last updated in
2013, but Stafira reported stability issues with Honeyd 1.6d [6][11]. The IoT devices
that Stafira’s IoT honeypots emulate are also not the most up to date or popular IoT
devices in the United States [6]. Furthermore, not enough honeypots were used in
this experiment and only Nmap scans were performed against them.
The HoneyB Agent script is also written in Python 2.7. To ensure future usability,
it would need to be rewritten in Python 3.x or node.js. While this would not be too
challenging, it could take several days or weeks to ensure correct functionality after
the upgrade.
Currently the HoneyHive framework relies on a NIDS (Snort) and its community
of rules to perform a higher level of signature detection as opposed to simply alerting
based on interactions with honeypots. If the HoneyHive framework possessed its own
self-contained, sophisticated combination of heuristics and signature matching then
it would perform even more effectively and be easier to deploy to networks. Despite
these limitations, the HoneyHive framework has great potential as a tool for network
intrusion detection. In this experiment, Snort should have been used for both the
HoneyHive framework and the DMZ NIDS listening on the SPAN port as it appears
that Snort and Suricata do not create the same alerts given the same rule-set and
network traffic.
The test network scans were performed on was of limited size whereas enterprise
networks have hundreds if not thousands of devices. Additionally, all Honeypots
were on the same network but enterprise networks often have different sub-networks
comprising their internal network.
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6.5 Future Work
One area of future work that would benefit the research of honeypots, network
intrusion detection, and the HoneyHive framework is developing high-interaction hon-
eypots in Docker (with secure configurations). Doing so would create more realistic
honeypots and extend the capabilities of the HoneyHive framework. Memory dumps
of an attacker’s interaction with honeypots could be performed to capture TTPs and
help identify them based on their tradecraft. In addition, more modern and popular
versions of IoT devices could be developed as honeypots. This would allow HoneyHive
to blend into more networks and not be as identifiable. The DB currently stores alert
information, captured traffic, and is designed to store captured passwords, binaries,
and memory dumps in the event that future work in HoneyHive is able to capture
these.
A major component of future work for the HoneyHive framework includes the
development of GUI to help network operators quickly identify and respond to in-
trusions. The proposed GUI design is shown in Figure 44 and can display alerts and
honeypot interactions to network operators. The left side of the GUI displays the
health status of the monitored honeypots, green representing no alerts, yellow scan
alerts, red exploit detected, and black meaning unreachable. Honeypots are nested
under their Honeyd controller, and the Honeyd controller takes on the most severe
status of the honeypots under it.
The center displays a network map with the same status indicators shown on the
left side. Notice that the device 192.168.45.42 is not a monitored honeypot, yet it
is still flagged red. This is because an internal scan originating from the device has
been detected, so the device itself is inferred to be compromised.
Individual alerts are viewable on the right side, and the actual packet capture is
available for download by clicking the green down arrow. The two alerts currently
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displayed show the TITAThink and ezOutlet2 honeypots being scanned internally
by 192.168.45.42, which matches the color coding of what is shown by the honeypot
status (left), and the network map (middle).
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Figure 44. Proposed HoneyHive GUI
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Other future work includes hashing and distributing signatures across a multi-
server HoneyHive framework for faster detection of binaries, exploits, and TTPs.
The HoneyB Agent script could also be improved to be a sophisticated and self-
contained alert engine. In addition, the HoneyHive framework currently does not
implement encryption of network traffic and device authentication, as it was not
required for testing, but must before deployment. All traffic sent must be encrypted
before network deployment to thwart sniffing. Symmetric encryption is the proposed
implementation method of encryption, as opposed to asymmetric encryption, because
distributing a single shared passphrase is easier than setting up a Certificate Authority
(CA), generating two keys per device, and then registering all keys with the CA.
Device authentication is also important to ensure the authenticity of traffic, security
of the framework, and prevent erroneous alerts from overloading network operators.
If all these areas of future work are implemented then HoneyHive could be used
for more than just intrusion detection. It could be used for cyber deception much like
Cymmetria’s MazeRunner framework [29].
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Appendix A. HoneyHive Framework
main.js (C2 Sever)
1 var cyan = ’\x1b [36m%s\x1b[0m’;
2 var green = ’\x1b [32m%s\x1b[0m’;
3 var blue = ’\x1b [34m%s\x1b[0m’;
4 var yellow = ’\x1b [33m%s\x1b[0m’;
5 var red = ’\x1b [31m%s\x1b[0m’;
6 var magenta = ’\x1b [35m%s\x1b[0m’;
7
8 var net = require(’net’);
9
10 var fs = require(’fs’);
11 var buffer = require(’buffer ’);
12 var path = require("path");
13 var fork = require(’child_process ’).fork;
14 const sqlite3 = require(’sqlite3 ’).verbose ();
15 var exec = require(’child_process ’).exec;
16
17 var encrypt_decrypt = require(’./ encrypt_decrypt.js’);
18 var crypto = require(’crypto ’);
19 var password = ’honeyhive ’;
20 var algorithm = ’aes -256-cbc’;
21
22 var HOST = ’0.0.0.0 ’;
23 var PORT = 9830;
24 var resetCounter = 0;
25 var honeydIP = [];
26 var honeyPots = [];
27 var completeTransfers = [];
28 var alerts = [];
29 var srcIPs = {};
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30 var dstIPs = {};
31 var srcPrts = {};
32 var dstPrts = {};
33 var percentage = 0.35;
34
35 var numInteractions = 0
36 var numSnortAlerts = 0;
37 var numPackets = 0;
38 var numSuricataAlerts = 0;
39 var numSuricataTypes = 0;
40 var suricataPackets = 0;
41 var numSnortAlerts_Merged = 0;
42 var numSnortTypes = 0;
43 var numSnortTypesMerged = 0;
44 var snortICount = 0;
45 var snortMCount = 0;
46
47 // Check for DB and create it if it doesn’t exists
48 // spawns a child process to check / create DB
49 const database_creator = path.resolve("database_creator.js");
50
51 console.log(green , ’Checking Database FIle\n’);
52
53 const params = [];
54 const options = {
55 stdio: [ ’pipe’, ’pipe’, ’pipe’, ’ipc’ ]
56 };
57
58 const database_child = fork(database_creator , params , options);
59
60 database_child.on(’message ’, message =>{






66 function execute(command , callback){






72 numPackets += parseInt(output.split(’Number of packets:’)[1].
trim())
73 console.log(green , "Num Packets: " + numPackets);
74 }
75
76 // Assumptions: Honeypots are not emitting malicious traffic / haven’
t been compromised
77 function alertAnalyzer ()
78 {
79 // threshold for number of honeypots that can be interacted with
before an alert is generated
80 var hpThreshold = (Object.keys(dstIPs).length / (honeyPots.length)
);
81
82 if(hpThreshold > percentage)
83 {














97 "C:\ Program Files\Wireshark\capinfos.exe" -c C:\Snort\log
\192.168.1.152 _2019 -10 -14 _0939 \192.168.1.152 _2019 -10 -14 _0939.pcap
98 File name: C:\ Snort\log \192.168.1.152 _2019 -10 -14 _0939
\192.168.1.152 _2019 -10 -14 _0939.pcap
99 Number of packets: 1894
100 */
101 var cmd = ’"C:\\ Program Files\\ Wireshark \\ capinfos.exe" -c "C:\\
Snort \\log\\’ + filename






108 console.log(’Starting Snort Parser on Merged File\n’);
109 const snort_parser_merge = path.resolve("snort_parser.js");
110
111 const paramsMerge = [resetCounter , 0];
112 const optionsMerge = {
113 stdio: [ ’pipe’, ’pipe’, ’pipe’, ’ipc’ ]
114 };
115




118 snort_child_merge.on(’message ’, message =>{




123 if(alert.Count != undefined)
124 {






131 snort_child_merge.on(’exit’, (code) => {
132 snortMCount +=1;





138 // looks at interfaces to automatically grab and bind on an IP
139 var os = require(’os’);
140 var ifaces = os.networkInterfaces ();
141 var serverIP;
142
143 Object.keys(ifaces).forEach(function (ifname) {
144 var alias = 0;
145
146 ifaces[ifname ]. forEach(function (iface) {
147 if (’IPv4’ !== iface.family || iface.internal !== false ||
ifname.includes(’VMware ’)) {
148




152 if (alias >= 1) {
153 // this single interface has multiple ipv4 addresses
154 console.log(ifname + ’:’ + alias , iface.address);
155 } else {
156 // this interface has only one ipv4 adress
157 console.log(ifname , iface.address);





163 console.log(cyan , "Sever IP: " +serverIP);
164
165
166 // Create a server instance , and chain the listen function to it
167 // The function passed to net.createServer () becomes the event
handler for the ’connection ’ event
168 // The sock object the callback function receives UNIQUE for each
connection
169 var server = net.createServer(function(sock) {
170
171 // Add a ’data’ event handler to this instance of socket
172 sock.on(’data’, function(data) {
173 var JSONData = JSON.parse(data);
174
175 /*
176 header = {" Honeyd ": honeydIP ,
177 "Honeypots ": honeypots
149
178 "MSG": ’AUTHENTICATE ’}
179 */















195 console.log(green , "Connected Honeypots");
196 console.log(green , honeyPots);
197 }
198
199 // receive suricata alert count
200 else if(JSONData.MSG == ’SURICATA ’)
201 {
202 numSuricataAlerts += JSONData.NumAlerts;
203 numSuricataTypes += JSONData.NumTypes;
204 suricataPackets = JSONData.NumPackets;
205 console.log(green , ’Suricata Alerts Received: ’ +





208 // reboot machine for fresh stable state
209 // C2 server should be relaunched automatically at startup
210 else if(JSONData.MSG == ’REBOOT ’)
211 {
212 // deletes all snort log files and then
213 // reboots when the cmd is finished
214 execute("del C:\\ Snort\\log \\* /S /F /Q",
215 function(output){




220 else if(JSONData.MSG == ’SNORT’)
221 {
222 console.log("SNORT Command received , parsing PCAPS\n");
223 // parse unscanned PCAPS




227 // mergecap -w outfile.pcapng dhcp -capture.pcapng imap -1.
pcapng
228 // have to add all their dirs in front of the filename
too
229 // then run through Snort
230 var cmd = ’"C:\\ Program Files\\ Wireshark \\ mergecap" -F








237 console.log(’Starting Snort Parser individually\n’);
238 const snort_parser = path.resolve("snort_parser.js");
239
240 const params = [resetCounter , 1];
241 const options = {
242 stdio: [ ’pipe’, ’pipe’, ’pipe’, ’ipc’ ]
243 };
244
245 const snort_child = fork(snort_parser , params , options);
246
247 snort_child.on(’message ’, message =>{




251 if(alert.Count != undefined)
252 {






259 snort_child.on(’exit’, (code) => {
260 snortICount +=1;
261 console.log("Snort I Child Exited");
262 });
263
264 if(completeTransfers.length > 1)
265 {
266 // function noop(){}
152





272 else if(JSONData.MSG == ’RESET’)
273 {
274 // need to add a wait for all the snort processes to end
275 sock.write(JSON.stringify ({ Interactions: numInteractions ,
SnortICount: snortICount , Snort: numSnortAlerts , SnortTypes:
numSnortTypes , SnortMCount: snortMCount , SnortMerged:
numSnortAlerts_Merged , SnortTypesMerged:numSnortTypesMerged ,
Packets: numPackets , Suricata: numSuricataAlerts , SuricataTypes:
numSuricataTypes , suricataPackets: suricataPackets , numHoneypots:
honeyPots.length , numPCAPs: completeTransfers.length }));
276
277 honeydIP = [];
278 honeyPots = [];
279 completeTransfers = [];
280 alerts = [];
281 srcIPs = {};
282 dstIPs = {};
283 srcPrts = {};
284 dstPrts = {};
285
286 snortICount = 0;
287 snortMCount = 0;
288 numInteractions = 0
289 numSnortAlerts = 0;
290 numPackets = 0;
291 numSuricataAlerts = 0;
292 numSuricataTypes = 0;
153
293 suricataPackets = 0;
294 numSnortAlerts_Merged =0;




299 fs.writeFile("C:\\ Snort\\log\\ pcaps.txt", ’’, function (){
console.log(’Snort PCAP File cleared\n’)});




304 header = {"Time": time.strftime ("%Y-%m-%d_%H%M"),
305 "Honeyd ": honeydIP ,
306 "IP": ’192.168.72.150 ’ ,
307 "MSG": ’HEARTBEAT ’}
308 */
309 else if(JSONData.MSG == ’HEARTBEAT ’)
310 {
311 console.log(green , "Honeypot Heartbeat - Time: " + JSONData






316 header = {"Time": time.strftime ("%Y-%m-%d_%H%M"),
317 "TransLayer ": transLayer ,
318 "IP_SRC ": pckt_src ,
319 "IP_DST ": pckt_dst ,
320 "SPORT ": sport ,
321 "DPORT ": dport ,
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322 "MSG": ’ALERT ’}
323 */
324 else if(JSONData.MSG == ’ALERT’)
325 {
326 numInteractions +=1;
327 console.log(yellow , "Honeypot interaction detected \n\tTime
: "+JSONData.Time+
328 "\n\tTransport Protocol: "+JSONData.TransLayer+
329 "\n\tIP SRC: "+JSONData.IP_SRC+
330 "\n\tSRC Port: "+JSONData.SPORT+
331 "\n\tIP DST: "+JSONData.IP_DST+
332 "\n\tDST Port: "+JSONData.DPORT);
333





































370 dstPrts[JSONData.DPORT] = 1;
371 }
372
373 alerts.push({Time: JSONData.Time , Protocol: JSONData.
TransLayer , SrcIP: JSONData.IP_SRC , SrcPort:JSONData.SPORT , DstIP
:JSONData.IP_DST , DstPort:JSONData.DPORT });
374 alertAnalyzer ();
375
376 // spawns a child process to check / create DB
377 const database_inserter = path.resolve("database_inserter.
js");
378
379 console.log(green , ’Adding to Database\n’);
380
381 // would need to re -JSON -ify JSONData , so just sending the
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382 // original data
383 const params = [data];
384 const options = {
385 stdio: [ ’pipe’, ’pipe’, ’pipe’, ’ipc’ ]
386 };
387
388 const inserter_child = fork(database_inserter , params ,
options);
389
390 inserter_child.on(’message ’, message =>{







397 // client is sending PCAP , open a new port for transfer state
398 // open a server / port for the file transfer to keep command
399 // data and binary data separate
400 else if(JSONData.MSG == ’PCAP’)
401 {
402 // console.log(green , JSONData.Filename + "\n" + JSONData.
File_Size + "\n" + JSONData.MD5);
403 //var callbackPort = JSONData.listenPort
404 const transfer_server = path.resolve("transfer_server.js");
405 const params = [JSONData.Filename , JSONData.File_Size ,
JSONData.MD5 , JSONData.Port];
406
407 const options = {




411 const transferChild = fork(transfer_server , params , options)
;
412
413 transferChild.on(’message ’, message =>{
414 console.log(green , ’message from transfer child:’,
message + ’\n’);
415 if(message == ’Download Complete ’)
416 {
417 fs.appendFile("C:\\ Snort\\log\\ pcaps.txt", "C:\\ Snort\\
log\\"+JSONData.Filename+’\n’, function (err) {
418 if (err) throw err;







426 // end of PCAP
427
428 // end of on data
429 });
430
431 // Add a ’close’ event handler to this instance of socket
432 sock.on(’close ’, function(data) {





437 server.once(’error’, function(err) {
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438 if (err.code === ’EADDRINUSE ’) {





444 server.listen(PORT , HOST);
445
446 console.log(cyan , ’Server bound on ’ + HOST +’:’+ PORT);
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transfer server.js (Transfer Server)
1 const crypto = require (’crypto ’);
2 const downloadMD5 = crypto.createHash(’md5’);
3 var net = require(’net’);
4 var fs = require(’fs’);
5 var buffer = require(’buffer ’);
6
7 var HOST = ’0.0.0.0 ’;
8
9 var params = process.argv;
10 var fileName = String(params.slice(2, 3));
11 var dir = "C:\\ Snort\\log"; //\\" + fileName.split(’.pcap ’)[0];
12 var file_size = params.slice(3, 4);
13 var md5 = params.slice(4, 5);
14 var PORT = parseInt(params.slice(5, 6));
15 var downloadedBytes = 0;
16
17
18 // test that args were being received correctly
19 // process.send(" arguments: " + params.slice(2, 3) + "\n" + params.
slice(3, 4) + "\n" + params.slice(4, 5));
20 // process.send(" filename: " + params.slice(2, 3));
21
22 var fileStream = fs.createWriteStream(dir + ’\\’+ fileName);
23
24
25 var server = net.createServer(function(sock) {
26
27 process.send(’Downloading PCAP: \n’);
28 downloadedBytes = sock.on(’data’, function(data) {
29
30 //fs.access(file , fs.constants.W_OK , (err) => {
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31 // process.send(‘${file} ${err ? ’is not writable ’ : ’is
writable ’}‘);
32 //});




37 sock.on(’close’, function(data) {
38 process.send(’Download Complete ’);
39 // process.send(" Downloaded: "+ downloadedBytes + " bytes");
40 server.close();





46 server.once(’error’, function(err) {
47 if (err.code === ’EADDRINUSE ’) {





53 server.listen(PORT , HOST);
54 process.send(’Transfer Server bound on ’ + HOST +’:’+ PORT);
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snort parser.js (Snort Log Parser)
1 // Run Snort on a PCAP
2
3 // Parse Snort alert log , combine like alerts ,
4 // and other metada in JSON format (src IP , dst IP , port range)
5 // keep count of occurances
6 // dstIP should be the same since the pcaps are transfered as
individually for each IP
7 //
8
9 // Send back results to main.js for compilation and monitoring
10 // which will have some threshold for alerting if so much traffic is
seen
11 // sent to one host , or a smaller amount of traffic sent to multiple
hosts
12
13 // Snort Alert Example
14 /*
15 [**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP Scan [**]
16 [Priority: 0]
17 10/01 -16:22:13.304233 192.168.1.11:61273 -> 192.168.1.150:80
18 TCP TTL :128 TOS:0x0 ID :28818 IpLen :20 DgmLen :52 DF
19 ******S* Seq: 0x5F62CB19 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0xFAF0 TcpLen: 32
20 TCP Options (6) => MSS: 1460 NOP WS: 8 NOP NOP SackOK
21 */
22
23 // Snort Alert Example
24 /*
25 [**] [1:2009582:3] ET SCAN NMAP -sS window 1024 [**]
26 [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]
27 10/30 -14:41:29.472407 192.168.1.230:43923 -> 192.168.1.150:111
28 TCP TTL :56 TOS:0x0 ID :13589 IpLen :20 DgmLen :44
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29 ******S* Seq: 0x15754519 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x400 TcpLen: 24
30 TCP Options (1) => MSS: 1460
31 [Xref => http ://doc.emergingthreats.net /2009582]
32 */
33
34 var fs = require(’fs’);
35 const readline = require(’readline ’);
36 var exec = require(’child_process ’).exec;
37 var params = process.argv;
38
39 var iteration = parseInt(params.slice(2, 3));
40 var dir = "C:\\ Snort\\log\\";
41 var individually = parseInt(params.slice(3, 4));
42
43 var lineCounter = 0;
44 const numLinesSnortAlert = 8;
45 var snortLogResults = [];
46 var found = false;
47 var indx = 0;
48 var lastAlert = "";
49
50 if (!fs.existsSync(dir + ’individually ’ + iteration))
51 {
52 fs.mkdirSync(dir + ’individually ’ + iteration);
53 fs.mkdirSync(dir + ’merged ’ + iteration);
54 }
55
56 function execute(command , callback){














70 async function processLineByLine () {
71 const fileStream = fs.createReadStream(dir+’\\alert.ids’);
72
73 const rl = readline.createInterface ({
74 input: fileStream ,
75 crlfDelay: Infinity
76 });
77 // Note: we use the crlfDelay option to recognize all instances of
CR LF
78 // (’\r\n’) in input.txt as a single line break.
79
80 for await (const line of rl) {
81 try{
82 // Type of Alert :[**] [1:10000005:2] NMAP TCP Scan [**]
83 if (lineCounter%numLinesSnortAlert == 0)
84 {
85 var regex = /[\] ]([ 0-9A-z])+[ \[]/g;
86 var alert = line.match(regex);
87 var alertType = alert [1]. replace(’]’, ’ ’);
88 alertType = alertType.replace(’[’, ’ ’);
89 alertType = alertType.trim();
90
91 // checks to see if alert is same as prev , so we can skip
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searching






98 found = false;
99 for(var i = 0; i < snortLogResults.length; i++)
100 {
101 if (snortLogResults[i].Type == alertType)
102 {
103 found = true;






110 if (found == false) {
111 snortLogResults.push({Type: alertType , Count: 1,
StartDate: "", EndDate: "", StartTime: "", EndTime: "", Src: [],
Dst :[]});
112 found = true;
113 indx = snortLogResults.length -1;





119 // Priority :[ Priority: 0]
120 //else if (lineCounter%numLinesSnortAlert == 1)
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121 //{
122 // Each line in input.txt will be successively available
here as ‘line ‘.
123 // process.send(‘Line from file: ${line}‘);
124 //}
125
126 // Timestamp and Src -> Dst ’10/01 -16:22:13.304233
192.168.1.11:61273 -> 192.168.1.150:80 ’
127 else if (lineCounter%numLinesSnortAlert == 2)
128 {
129 var dateSrcDst = line.split(’ ’);
130 var dateTime = dateSrcDst [0]. split(’-’);
131 var date = dateTime [0];
132 var time = dateTime [1]. split(’.’)[0];
133
134 var src = dateSrcDst [1];
135 var srcSplit = src.split(’:’);
136 var srcIP = srcSplit [0];
137 var srcPrt = parseInt(srcSplit [1], 10);
138
139
140 var dst = dateSrcDst [3];
141 var dstSplit = dst.split(’:’);
142 var dstIP = dstSplit [0];
143 var dstPrt = parseInt(dstSplit [1], 10);
144
145 // first entry
146 if(snortLogResults[indx]. StartDate == "")
147 {
148 snortLogResults[indx]. StartDate = date;





153 snortLogResults[indx]. EndDate = date;















169 // TCP TTL :128 TOS:0x0 ID :28818 IpLen :20 DgmLen :52 DF
170 //else if (lineCounter%numLinesSnortAlert == 3)
171 //{
172 // Each line in input.txt will be successively available
here as ‘line ‘.
173 // process.send(‘Line from file: ${line}‘);
174 //}
175
176 // ******S* Seq: 0x5F62CB19 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0xFAF0 TcpLen: 32
177 //else if (lineCounter%numLinesSnortAlert == 4)
178 //{
179 // Each line in input.txt will be successively available
here as ‘line ‘.




183 // TCP Options (6) => MSS: 1460 NOP WS: 8 NOP NOP SackOK
184 else if (lineCounter%numLinesSnortAlert == 5)
185 {
186 // has 5 lines for alert instead of 6 or 7
187 // modify by 2 to catch up






194 else if (lineCounter%numLinesSnortAlert == 6)
195 {
196 // has 6 lines for alert instead of 7







204 // blank line between alerts
















220 var cmd = ’"C:\\ Snort\\bin\\ snort.exe" -c "C:\\ Snort\\etc\\ snort.
conf" ’;
221 if (individually == 1)
222 {
223 dir = dir + ’individually ’ + iteration;




227 dir = dir + ’merged ’ + iteration;





232 execute(cmd , processLineByLine);
169








8 from datetime import datetime , date , time , timedelta
9
10 from scapy.all import *
11
12 # color honey yellow is #a98307
13 port = 9830
14 transferPort = 9831
15 honeyHiveIP = ’192.168.1.233 ’
16 honeydIP = ’192.168.1.154 ’
17 honeypots = ["192.168.1.150", "192.168.1.151", "192.168.1.152"]
18 connections = {}
19 timeOutSeconds = 9000
20 sessionTimeout = timedelta(seconds=timeOutSeconds)
21 autoTransferTimeout = timedelta(seconds=timeOutSeconds)
22 connections_Lock = thread.allocate_lock ()
23 honeyd = None
24 devnull = open(os.devnull , ’wb’)





30 pcap_monitor_id = thread.start_new_thread(pcapMonitor , ())
31 #heartbeat_id = thread.start_new_thread(heartbeat , ())
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32
33 # I want this in my main console output
34 # once run , it casues blocking
35 print "Scapy Packet Sniffer Engaged"
36 sniff(iface="eth0", prn=processPacket , store =0)
37
38 def pcapMonitor ():
39 while True:
40 connections_Lock.acquire ()
41 uct = datetime.utcnow ()
42 remove = []
43 for ip in connections:
44 if (uct - connections[ip].get("time") >=
autoTransferTimeout):
45 transferFile(ip , connections[ip].get(’filename ’))
46 remove.append(ip)
47 print "Automatic Transfer"
48 for i in remove:
49 connections.pop(i)
50 connections_Lock.release ()
51 floatSeconds = timeOutSeconds *1.0
52 time.sleep(floatSeconds)
53
54 # method called when a packet is received
55 # parses the packet to identify the dest ip, port , ect.
56 # will implement scan recognition and attacker pivoting
57 def processPacket(packet):
58
59 #automatically named files based on ip, date , and time
60 now = datetime.now()
61 uct = datetime.utcnow ()
62
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63 # ignore traffic not to honeypots
64 if packet.haslayer(IP) and (not packet[IP].dst in honeypots) and
(not packet[IP].src in honeypots) and (not packet[IP].dst ==
honeydIP) and (not packet[IP].src == honeydIP):
65 None
66
67 # ignore 9830 and 9831 because they are packets we are sending
68 elif packet.haslayer(TCP) and (packet[TCP]. dport == port or
packet[TCP]. dport == transferPort or packet[TCP]. sport == port or
packet[TCP]. sport == transferPort):
69 None
70
71 # ignores some Ubuntu traffic that is not being filtered out my /
etc/hosts
72 elif packet.haslayer(UDP) and (packet[UDP]. sport == 68 or packet[
UDP]. dport == 68 or packet[UDP]. dport == 5353 or packet[UDP].
dport == 53 or packet[UDP].sport == 53):
73 None
74
75 elif packet.haslayer(UDP) and (packet[UDP]. dport == 9830):




80 # ensures this packet has an IP
81 # log non 9830 and 9831 traffic from c2 server1









89 # if the honeypot doesnt already have an ongoing pcap log file
90 # and the time since last packet is less than 5 minutes
91 connections_Lock.acquire ()
92
93 if any(x in connections for x in[pckt_dst , pckt_src ]):
94 ip = ""
95 filename = ""
96
97 # determine which ip was in the connections list
98 if pckt_dst in connections:
99 ip = pckt_dst
100
101 else:
102 ip = pckt_src
103
104 # time difference is less than than session timeout
105 # therefore , keep logging to file
106 # and update its timestamp to the new time
107 # new time - oldtime < allowed time
108 if(uct - connections[ip].get("time") < sessionTimeout):
109 filename = connections[ip].get("filename")
110 connections[ip]. update ({"time": uct})
111
112 # else there was a timeout so need a new file
113 # there was a connection at one point so the ip
114 # is in our honeypot list , no need to check again
115 # update time of connection to now
116 else:
117 print "Transfering PCAP"
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118 #if packet.haslayer(TCP):
119 # print "Packet: Source IP %s, Port %s\n Dest IP %s,
Port %s" % (pckt_src , packet[TCP].sport , pckt_dst , packet[TCP].
dport)
120 #else:
121 # print "Packet: Source IP %s\n Dest IP %s" % (
pckt_src , pckt_dst)
122 transferFile(ip , connections[ip].get(’filename ’))
123
124 # create the new pcap file
125 filename = ip + "_" + now.strftime("%Y-%m-%d_%H%M") +".
pcap"
126 #print "New filename: " + filename
127 #print connections[ip]
128 connections[ip]. update ({"time": uct})
129 connections[ip]. update ({"filename": filename })
130 #print connections[ip]
131 alert(packet , now)
132
133 #appends packet to output file
134 wrpcap(filename , packet , append=True)
135
136
137 # ips not in connected list , but this may be first interaction
138 # with the honeypots. Want to assume first captured packet
will
139 # be sent to honeypot , but compromised hp could beacon out if
140 # hardware or software make it
141 elif any(x in honeypots for x in[pckt_dst , pckt_src ]):
142 ip = ""
143
144 # determine which ip was in the connections list
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145 if pckt_dst in honeypots:
146 ip = pckt_dst
147 else:
148 ip = pckt_src
149
150 # create the new pcap file
151 filename = ip + "_" + now.strftime("%Y-%m-%d_%H%M") +".pcap
"
152 #print "filename: " + filename
153 connections[ip] = {"filename": filename , "time": uct}
154 alert(packet , now)
155
156 #appends packet to output file












169 # transfer all current pcaps
170 if(msg == "TRANSFER"):
171 connections_Lock.acquire ()
172 for ip in connections:
173 transferFile(ip , connections[ip].get(’filename ’))
174 # return all values to 0




178 elif(msg == "RESET"):
179 # transfer all current pcaps
180 connections_Lock.acquire ()
181 for ip in connections:
182 transferFile(ip , connections[ip].get(’filename ’))
183 # return all values to 0
184 connections = {}
185 connections_Lock.release ()
186
187 # kill all honeyd
188 if(honeyd != None):
189 subprocess.Popen (["sudo killall honeyd"], stdin=None ,
stdout=devnull , stderr=devnull , shell=True)
190
191 honeyd = None
192 alertMode = False
193
194 # stops program completely
195 elif(msg == "KILL"):
196 # kill all honeyd
197 if(honeyd != None):
198 subprocess.Popen (["sudo killall honeyd"], stdin=None ,
stdout=devnull , stderr=devnull , shell=True)
199
200 # kill this script
201 subprocess.Popen (["sudo killall python"], stdin=None , stdout=
devnull , stderr=devnull , shell=True)
202
203 # starts just honeyd
204 elif(msg == "START"):
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205 # relaunch honeyd
206 if(honeyd == None):
207 honeyd = subprocess.Popen(["sudo /home/edge/Desktop/
honeyhive/scripts/startHoney.sh"], stdin=None , stdout=devnull ,
stderr=devnull , shell=True)





213 # stops just honeyd
214 elif(msg == "STOP"):
215 # kill all honeyd
216 if(honeyd != None):
217 subprocess.Popen (["sudo killall honeyd"], stdin=None ,
stdout=devnull , stderr=devnull , shell=True)
218 honeyd = None
219 alertMode = False
220
221 elif(msg == "REBOOT"):
222 subprocess.call(["sudo", "reboot"])
223
224 def heartbeat ():
225 # header information to send server
226 # python dictonary
227 header = {"Time": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%d_%H%M"),
228 "Honeyd": honeydIP ,
229 "IP": ’192.168.72.150 ’,
230 "MSG": ’HEARTBEAT ’}
231
232 # converts dictionary to json format




236 # attempts to connect to the server and tell it to open a
transfer port
237 sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_STREAM)





243 except socket.error , e:
244 print "Error creating Heartbeat socket: %s" %e
245




250 def authenticate ():
251
252 # header information to send server
253 # python dictonary
254 header = {"Honeyd": honeydIP ,
255 "Honeypots": honeypots ,
256 "MSG": ’AUTHENTICATE ’}
257
258 # converts dictionary to json format
259 jsonHeader = json.dumps(header)
260
261 try:
262 # attempts to connect to the server and tell it to open a
transfer port
263 sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_STREAM)
178





269 except socket.error , e:
270 print "Error creating Authenticate socket: %s" %e
271





277 def alert(packet , time):
278 sport = 0
279 dport = 0








288 transLayer = ’UDP’
289
290 elif packet.haslayer(ICMP):
291 transLayer = ’ICMP’
292
293 else:







300 # header information to send server
301 # python dictonary
302 header = {"Time": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%d_%H%M"),
303 "TransLayer": transLayer ,
304 "IP_SRC": pckt_src ,
305 "IP_DST": pckt_dst ,
306 "SPORT": sport ,
307 "DPORT": dport ,
308 "MSG": ’ALERT ’}
309
310 # converts dictionary to json format
311 jsonHeader = json.dumps(header)
312
313 try:
314 # attempts to connect to the server and tell it to open a
transfer port
315 sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_STREAM)





321 except socket.error , e:
322 print "Error creating Alert socket: %s" %e
323






329 #sends transfer file command to the server
330 def transferFile(ip , filename):
331
332 # run command and return output
333 hashPcap = subprocess.check_output (["md5sum", filename ])
334 # header information to send server
335 # python dictonary
336 header = {"Honeyd": honeydIP ,
337 "IP": ip,
338 "Filename": filename ,
339 "File_Size": os.path.getsize(filename),




344 # converts dictionary to json format
345 jsonHeader = json.dumps(header)
346
347 try:
348 # attempts to connect to the server and tell it to open a
transfer port
349 sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_STREAM)





355 except socket.error , e:
356 print "Error creating Transfer Server socket: %s" %e
357
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362 # allows time for the C2 server to receive and start the transfer
server




367 transSock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_STREAM)
368 transfer_address = (honeyHiveIP , transferPort)
369 transSock.connect(transfer_address)
370
371 # reads and sends the file to the server
372 f = open (filename , "rb")
373 l = f.read (1024)
374
375 while (l):
376 # encrypt data before sending
377 transSock.send(l)
378 l = f.read (1024)
379
380 f.close()
381 subprocess.call([’rm’, ’-f’, filename ])
382
383 except socket.error , e:
384 print "Error creating Transfer File socket: %s" %e
385







Appendix B. Honeyd Configuration File
iotHoneyd.conf
1 create default
2 set default default tcp action block
3 set default default udp action block
4 set default default icmp action block
5
6 create titacamera
7 set titacamera personality "Linux 2.3.28 -33"
8 set titacamera default tcp action reset
9 add titacamera tcp port 80 "TitaCamera/camera_web.sh"
10 add titacamera tcp port 554 open
11 add titacamera tcp port 49152 open
12 add titacamera udp port 443 filtered
13 add titacamera udp port 990 filtered
14 add titacamera udp port 1900 filtered
15 add titacamera udp port 1901 filtered
16 add titacamera udp port 3702 open
17 add titacamera udp port 16896 filtered
18 add titacamera udp port 18676 filtered
19 add titacamera udp port 19956 filtered
20 add titacamera udp port 22986 filtered
21 add titacamera udp port 30697 filtered
22 add titacamera udp port 32772 filtered
23 add titacamera udp port 32777 filtered
24
25 create proliphixthermostat
26 set proliphixthermostat personality "D-Link Print Server"
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27 set proliphixthermostat default tcp action reset
28 #Regular Thermostat Interface when Internet is available
29 #add proliphixthermostat tcp port 80
"ProliphixThermostat/thermostat_web.sh"
30 #Thermostat Interface when no internet is available




34 set ezoutlet personality "IBM OS/2 Warp 4.0"
35 set ezoutlet default tcp action reset
36 add ezoutlet tcp port 80 "ezOutlet/outlet_web.sh"
37
38 set titacamera ethernet "7C:DD:90:B0 :22:82"
39 bind 192.168.45.150 titacamera
40 #dhcp titacamera on eth0
41 set proliphixthermostat ethernet "00:11:49:00:62:46"
42 bind 192.168.45.151 proliphixthermostat
43 #dhcp proliphixthermostat on eth0
44 set ezoutlet ethernet "00:03: EA:0E:11:67"
45 bind 192.168.45.152 ezoutlet










7 from scapy.all import *
8
9 # color honey yellow is #a98307
10 port = 9830
11 honeyHiveIP = ’192.168.1.233 ’
12 suricataIP = ’192.168.1.231 ’
13 attacker = ’192.168.1.230 ’
14 suricataRunning = False
15 packetRXStart = 0
16 packetTXStart = 0
17 totalPackets = 0
18 devnull = open(os.devnull , ’wb’)
19
20 def main():
21 print "Scapy Packet Sniffer Engaged"




26 if packet.haslayer(IP) and (packet[IP].src == attacker or packet[
IP].dst == attacker):
27 totalPackets += 1
28 #running on mirrored port so make sure it’s for this IP
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29 if packet.haslayer(UDP) and packet[UDP]. dport == 9830 and packet[
IP].dst == suricataIP:
30 print "Command Received"
31 runCommand(packet[UDP].load.strip(’\n’))
32
33 # receive and execute commands
34 def runCommand(msg):
35 global suricataRunning
36 global packetRXStart , packetTXStart
37 global totalPackets
38
39 logGrep = subprocess.Popen([’sudo’, ’grep’, ’-i’, ’scan’, ’/var/
log/suricata/fast.log’], stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
40
41 wc = subprocess.Popen([’wc’, ’-l’], stdin=logGrep.stdout , stdout=
subprocess.PIPE)
42 out , err = wc.communicate ()
43 numAlerts = int(out)
44
45 typeCountGrep = subprocess.Popen ([’sudo’, ’grep’, ’-i’, ’scan’, ’
/var/log/suricata/fast.log’], stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
46
47 cutRuleSig = subprocess.Popen ([’cut’, ’-f’, ’4’, ’-d’, " "],
stdin=typeCountGrep.stdout , stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
48 sort = subprocess.Popen([’sort’], stdin=cutRuleSig.stdout , stdout
=subprocess.PIPE)
49 uniq = subprocess.Popen([’uniq’], stdin=sort.stdout , stdout=
subprocess.PIPE)
50 wcTypes = subprocess.Popen([’wc’, ’-l’], stdin=uniq.stdout ,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
51 out2 , err2 = wcTypes.communicate ()





56 # transfer current scan alert count and clear the log
57 if(msg == "TRANSFER"):
58 # packets sent and received after run complete
59 countRXEnd = subprocess.Popen ([’cat’, ’/sys/class/net/eth0/
statistics/rx_packets ’], stdout=subprocess.PIPE , close_fds=True)
60 packetRXEnd , err = countRXEnd.communicate ()
61 countTXEnd = subprocess.Popen ([’cat’, ’/sys/class/net/eth0/
statistics/tx_packets ’], stdout=subprocess.PIPE , close_fds=True)
62 packetTXEnd , err = countTXEnd.communicate ()
63
64 packetCount = int(packetRXEnd) + int(packetTXEnd) - int(
packetRXStart) - int(packetTXStart)
65
66 # send alert count
67 suricata(numAlerts , numAlertTypes , totalPackets)
68
69 print "Alerts: "+ str(numAlerts) + str(numAlertTypes) + str(
packetCount)
70
71 # clear log file
72 os.system("sudo rm /var/log/suricata/fast.log")
73 subprocess.call([’sudo’, ’touch ’, ’/var/log/suricata/fast.log’
])
74
75 elif(msg == "RESET"):
76 # packets sent and received after run complete
77 countRXEnd = subprocess.Popen ([’cat’, ’/sys/class/net/eth0/
statistics/rx_packets ’], stdout=subprocess.PIPE , close_fds=True)
78 packetRXEnd , err = countRXEnd.communicate ()
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79 countTXEnd = subprocess.Popen ([’cat’, ’/sys/class/net/eth0/
statistics/tx_packets ’], stdout=subprocess.PIPE , close_fds=True)
80 packetTXEnd , err = countTXEnd.communicate ()
81 packetCount = int(packetRXEnd) + int(packetTXEnd) - int(
packetRXStart) - int(packetTXStart)
82
83 # send alert count
84 suricata(numAlerts , numAlertTypes , totalPackets)
85
86 print "Alerts: "+ str(numAlerts) + str(numAlertTypes) + str(
packetCount)
87 # finds and kills suricata based on PID
88 if(suricataRunning):
89 subprocess.Popen ([’sudo ./ killSuricata.sh’], stdout=
subprocess.PIPE , shell=True)
90 suricataRunning = False
91
92 # clear log file
93 os.system("sudo rm /var/log/suricata/fast.log")
94 subprocess.call([’sudo’, ’touch ’, ’/var/log/suricata/fast.log’
])
95
96 # stops program completely
97 elif(msg == "KILL"):
98 if(suricataRunning):
99 subprocess.Popen ([’sudo ./ killSuricata.sh’], stdout=
subprocess.PIPE , shell=True)
100
101 # kill this script
102 subprocess.Popen (["sudo killall python"], stdin=None , stdout=
devnull , stderr=devnull , shell=True)
103
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104 # starts just suricata
105 elif(msg == "START"):
106 countRXStart = subprocess.Popen([’cat’, ’/sys/class/net/eth0/
statistics/rx_packets ’], stdout=subprocess.PIPE , close_fds=True)
107 packetRXStart , err = countRXStart.communicate ()
108 countTXStart = subprocess.Popen([’cat’, ’/sys/class/net/eth0/
statistics/tx_packets ’], stdout=subprocess.PIPE , close_fds=True)
109 packetTXStart , err = countTXStart.communicate ()
110
111 # launch suricata
112 # sudo suricata -c /etc/suricata/suricata.yaml -i eth0
113 if(not suricataRunning):
114 #subprocess.Popen ([" sudo "], stdin=None , stdout=devnull ,
stderr=devnull , shell=True)
115 subprocess.Popen (["sudo suricata -c /etc/suricata/suricata.
yaml -i eth0"], stdin=None , stdout=devnull , stderr=devnull , shell
=True)
116 suricataRunning = True
117
118 # stops just suricata
119 elif(msg == "STOP"):
120 # kill suricata
121 # sudo kill $(ps aux | grep ’[s]udo suricata -c /etc/suricata/
suricata.yaml -i eth0’ | awk ’{print $2}’)
122 if(suricataRunning):
123 subprocess.Popen ([’sudo ./ killSuricata.sh’], stdout=
subprocess.PIPE , shell=True)
124 suricataRunning = False
125




129 def suricata(numAlerts , numTypes , numPackets):
130 # header information to send server
131 # python dictonary
132 header = {"NumAlerts": numAlerts ,
133 "NumTypes": numTypes ,
134 "NumPackets": numPackets ,
135 "MSG": ’SURICATA ’}
136
137 # converts dictionary to json format
138 jsonHeader = json.dumps(header)
139
140 try:
141 sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_STREAM)
142
143 # creates a socket for the connection to the server
144 server_address = (honeyHiveIP , port)
145




150 except socket.error , e:
151 print "Error creating Suricata socket: %s" %e
152
153 finally:











5 import time as t
6 import random
7 import os
8 from datetime import datetime , date , time , timedelta
9
10 devnull = open(os.devnull , ’wb’)
11
12 rasPi = ’192.168.1.231 ’
13
14 honeyd1 = ’192.168.1.154 ’
15 honeyd2 = ’192.168.1.164 ’
16 honeyd3 = ’192.168.1.174 ’
17 honeyd4 = ’192.168.1.184 ’
18
19 port = 9830
20 honeyHiveIP = ’192.168.1.233 ’
21 network = ’192.168.1.150 -192 ’
22
23 camera = [’192.168.1.190 ’, ’192.168.1.150 ’, ’192.168.1.170 ’, ’
192.168.1.160 ’]
24 thermostat = [’192.168.1.191 ’, ’192.168.1.151 ’, ’192.168.1.171 ’, ’
192.168.1.161 ’]




27 order = []
28 experimentFile = ’experiment.txt’
29 expRunNum = 0





35 # checks to see if a file with the run order exists and makes
sure it’s not empty
36 if os.path.exists(experimentFile) and os.path.getsize(
experimentFile) > 0:
37 f = open(experimentFile , ’r’)
38 for line in f:
39 value = line.split ()
40 lambdaFunc = None
41 print value
42 # address of the functions can change between runs
43 # better to just check the name than store the address
value
44 if value [0] == ’nmapScan ’:
45 lambdaFunc = nmapScan
46 elif value [0] == ’baseline ’:
47 lambdaFunc = baseline
48 elif value [0] == ’wget’:
49 lambdaFunc = wget
50
51 # appends all experiments in the file to be run
52 order.append ({"Lambda": lambdaFunc , "Name": value [0], "




55 for i in range(numRuns):
56 #runExperiment(i+1)
57 #order = []
58 randomizeOrder ()
59 random.shuffle(order)
60 f = open(experimentFile , ’a’)
61 for run in order:




65 # removes very last newline ’\n’ so that there isn’t a blank
line at the end of the file









75 for run in order:
76 # starts the specified number of honeypots , and suricata





82 # allows enough time for everything to reach a stable state





86 # packets sent and received before run
87 # cat /sys/class/net/enp2s0/statistics/rx_packets
88 # RX number of packets received
89 # TX number of packets transmitted
90 # need to cat both for full picture
91 countRXStart = subprocess.Popen([’cat’, ’/sys/class/net/
enp2s0/statistics/rx_packets ’], stdout=subprocess.PIPE , close_fds
=True)
92 packetRXStart , err = countRXStart.communicate ()
93 countTXStart = subprocess.Popen([’cat’, ’/sys/class/net/
enp2s0/statistics/tx_packets ’], stdout=subprocess.PIPE , close_fds
=True)




98 start = datetime.now()
99 print "Start Time:" + start.strftime("%Y-%m-%d_%H%M")
100 print "nmapScan" + " Level: " + str(run["Level"]) + ’
Honeypots: ’ + str(run["HoneyPots"])
101
102 # runs the specified test with corresponding level
103 run["Lambda"](run["Level"], run["HoneyPots"])
104
105 # packets sent and received after run complete
106 countRXEnd = subprocess.Popen ([’cat’, ’/sys/class/net/enp2s0
/statistics/rx_packets ’], stdout=subprocess.PIPE , close_fds=True)
107 packetRXEnd , err = countRXEnd.communicate ()
108 countTXEnd = subprocess.Popen ([’cat’, ’/sys/class/net/enp2s0
/statistics/tx_packets ’], stdout=subprocess.PIPE , close_fds=True)
195
109 packetTXEnd , err = countTXEnd.communicate ()
110
111 #print packetCountEnd
112 packetCount = int(packetRXEnd) + int(packetTXEnd) - int(
packetRXStart) - int(packetTXStart)
113 print ’Packets Sent and Received: ’+ str(packetCount)
114
115 end = datetime.now()
116 print "End Time:" + end.strftime("%Y-%m-%d_%H%M")
117 elapsedTime = (end - start).total_seconds ()
118 print "Elapsed Time:" + str(elapsedTime)
119
120 print "Sending Honeypot Resets"
121












132 # allows time for Snort to parse PCAP files
133 t.sleep (90.0)
134
135 # tells the C2 server to reset and send gathered stats to
this script
136 res = sendReset ()
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137
138 # write gathered results to corresponding csv file
139 writeResults(run , res , packetCount , elapsedTime)
140
141 #removes run from experimentFile since it successfully completed
142 lines = open(experimentFile).readlines ()




147 # Reboots all machines for a clean stable start state







155 # allows plenty of time for all devices to reboot
156 # and startup scripts before proceeding to next iteration
157 # win 10 VM takes longest (30 seconds for reboot , another 15
for c2 server startup - 45s total)
158 # sometimes can take longer and crash script ....
159 t.sleep (45.0)
160
161 # makes sure c2 servere is up and running berfore starting
next iteration
162 sendStart ()
163 expRunNum += 1
164
165
166 # randomizes the order in which all 36 tests are run
197
167 def randomizeOrder ():
168 # inital testing
169 #test = [{" Lambda ": wget , "Name": ’wget ’}]
170
171 test = [{"Lambda": nmapScan , "Name": ’nmapScan ’}] #, {" Lambda ":
baseline , "Name": ’baseline ’}] #, {" Lambda ": wget , "Name": ’wget
’}]
172 for i in range (4):
173 numHps = i;
174 for testType in test:
175 for level in range (4):
176 order.append ({"Lambda": testType["Lambda"], "Name":




180 # tests to see if alerts are generated for different kinds of scans
181 # Levels are the different scan types:
182 # nmap 192.168.1.0/24 -sT
183 # nmap 192.168.1.0/24 -A
184 # sudo nmap 192.168.1.0/24 --max -hostgroup 1 --randomize -hosts -
f 8
185 def nmapScan(scanType , numHps):
186 global expRunNum
187 if (scanType == 0):
188 print "Control Group: sleep (1341)"
189 t.sleep (1341)
190 elif (scanType == 1):
191 print "nmap ipLst.txt -sT -Pn"
192 subprocess.call([’nmap’, ’-iL’, ’ipLst.txt’, ’-sT’, ’-Pn’, ’
-oX’, ’run’+str(expRunNum)+’.xml’], stdin=None , stdout=None ,
stderr=None , shell=False)
198
193 elif (scanType == 2):
194 print "nmap ipLst.txt -A -Pn"
195 subprocess.call([’nmap’, ’-iL’, ’ipLst.txt’, ’-A’, ’-Pn’, ’-
oX’, ’run’+str(expRunNum)+’.xml’], stdin=None , stdout=None ,
stderr=None , shell=False)
196 elif (scanType == 3):
197 print "sudo nmap ipLst.txt --scan -delay 1075ms --randomize -
hosts -f 8 -Pn"
198 subprocess.call([’sudo’, ’nmap’, ’-iL’, ’ipLst.txt’, ’--scan
-delay ’, ’1075ms’, ’--randomize -hosts ’, ’-f’, ’8’, ’-Pn’, ’-oX’,
’run’+str(expRunNum)+’.xml’],




203 # tests to see if an alert is generated for malicious wgets that
modify IoT device
204 # Levels are the different typse of devices:
205 # TITAThink Camera 192.168.1.1[5 -8]0
206 # Prolophix Thermostat 192.168.1.1[5 -8]1
207 # ez -Outlet 2 Power Outlet 192.168.1.1[5 -8]2
208 def wget(iotDevice , numHps):
209 if (iotDevice == 0):
210 print "Control Group: sleep (30)"
211 t.sleep (30)
212 elif (iotDevice == 1):
213 for ip in range (numHps + 1):
214 subprocess.call([’wget’, ’--user’, ’admin ’, ’--password ’
, ’admin ’, ’--tries’, ’1’, ’--timeout ’, ’1’, ’http ://’+camera[ip
]+’/form/deleteStorageAllApply?lang=en’],
215 stdin=None , stdout=None , stderr=None , shell=False)
216 print "wget TITAThink Cameras"
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217 elif (iotDevice == 2):
218 print "wget Prolophix Thermostats"
219 for ip in range (numHps + 1):
220 subprocess.call([’wget’, ’--user’, ’admin ’, ’--password ’,
’admin’, ’--tries’, ’1’, ’--timeout ’, ’1’, ’http ://’+thermostat[
ip]+’/index.shtml ’],
221 stdin=None , stdout=None , stderr=None , shell=False)
222 elif (iotDevice == 3):
223 print "wget ez-Outlets"
224 for ip in range(numHps + 1):
225 subprocess.call([’wget’, ’--tries ’, ’1’, ’--timeout ’, ’1’
, ’http ://’+outlet[ip]+’/invert.cgi’],
226 stdin=None , stdout=None , stderr=None , shell=False)
227
228
229 # tests to see if alerts are genereated with no alert traffic
230 # levels: 20s, 660s, 6000s - to match length of each scan (from
pilot studies)
231 def baseline(runTime , numHps):
232 if (runTime == 1):
233 print "Baseline 30s"
234 t.sleep (30.0)
235 elif (runTime == 2):
236 print "Baseline 660s"
237 t.sleep (660.0)
238 else:




243 def sendCmd(numHPs , cmd):
244 # 1 non -mirrored
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245 if (numHPs == 1):
246 hp1 = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
247 hp1.sendto(cmd , (honeyd1 , port))
248 hp1.close()
249
250 # 1 non -mirrored , 1 mirrored
251 elif (numHPs == 2):
252 hp1 = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
253 hp1.sendto(cmd , (honeyd1 , port))
254 hp1.close()
255
256 hp3 = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
257 hp3.sendto(cmd , (honeyd3 , port))
258 hp3.close()
259
260 # 2 non -mirrored , 1 mirroed
261 elif (numHPs == 3):
262 hp1 = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
263 hp1.sendto(cmd , (honeyd1 , port))
264 hp1.close()
265
266 hp2 = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
267 hp2.sendto(cmd , (honeyd2 , port))
268 hp2.close()
269
270 hp3 = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
271 hp3.sendto(cmd , (honeyd3 , port))
272 hp3.close()
273
274 # 2 non -mirrored , 2 mirrored
275 elif (numHPs == 4):
276 hp1 = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
201
277 hp1.sendto(cmd , (honeyd1 , port))
278 hp1.close()
279
280 hp2 = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
281 hp2.sendto(cmd , (honeyd2 , port))
282 hp2.close()
283
284 hp3 = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
285 hp3.sendto(cmd , (honeyd3 , port))
286 hp3.close()
287
288 hp4 = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
289 hp4.sendto(cmd , (honeyd4 , port))
290 hp4.close()
291
292 # starts suricata on raspberry pi
293 ras = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_DGRAM)




298 def sendStart ():
299 print "START sent to C2 Server"
300 while True:
301 try:
302 sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_STREAM)
303
304 # creates a socket for the connection to the server
305 server_address = (honeyHiveIP , port)
306




310 # header information to send server
311 # python dictonary
312 header = {"MSG": ’START’}
313
314 # converts dictionary to json format
315 jsonHeader = json.dumps(header)
316
317 # sends all data
318 sock.sendall(jsonHeader)
319
320 except socket.error , e:






327 def sendSnort ():
328 print "SNORT sent to C2 Server"
329 while True:
330 try:
331 sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_STREAM)
332
333 # creates a socket for the connection to the server
334 server_address = (honeyHiveIP , port)
335
336 # attempts to connect to the server
337 sock.connect(server_address)
338
339 # header information to send server
340 # python dictonary
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341 header = {"MSG": ’SNORT’}
342
343 # converts dictionary to json format
344 jsonHeader = json.dumps(header)
345
346 # sends all data
347 sock.sendall(jsonHeader)
348
349 except socket.error , e:





355 def sendReboot ():
356 print "REBOOT Sent to C2 Server"
357 while True:
358 try:
359 sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_STREAM)
360
361 # creates a socket for the connection to the server
362 server_address = (honeyHiveIP , port)
363
364 # attempts to connect to the server
365 sock.connect(server_address)
366
367 # header information to send server
368 # python dictonary
369 header = {"MSG": ’REBOOT ’}
370
371 # converts dictionary to json format
372 jsonHeader = json.dumps(header)
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373
374 # sends all data
375 sock.sendall(jsonHeader)
376
377 except socket.error , e:






384 def sendReset ():
385 print "RESET sent to C2 Server"
386 while True:
387 try:
388 sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_STREAM)
389
390 # creates a socket for the connection to the server
391 server_address = (honeyHiveIP , port)
392
393 # attempts to connect to the server
394 sock.connect(server_address)
395
396 # header information to send server
397 # python dictonary
398 header = {"MSG": ’RESET’}
399
400 # converts dictionary to json format
401 jsonHeader = json.dumps(header)
402
403 # sends all data
404 sock.sendall(jsonHeader)
205
405 #{Interactions: numInteractions , Snort: numSnortAlerts ,
Packets: numPackets}
406 res = sock.recv (4096)
407
408 except socket.error , e:







416 def writeResults(runInfo , results , packetCount , elapsedTime):
417
418 print "Writing Results"
419 # add suricata packet count and suricata num types of alerts
count
420 output = str(runInfo[’Level’]) + ’,’ + str(runInfo[’HoneyPots ’])
+ ’,’ + str(results[’numHoneypots ’]) + ’,’ + str(results[’
Interactions ’]) + ’,’ + str(results[’numPCAPs ’]) + ’,’ + str(
results[’SnortICount ’]) + ’,’ + str(results[’SnortMCount ’]) + ’,
’ + str(results[’Snort’]) + ’,’ + str(results[’SnortTypes ’]) + ’
,’ + str(results[’SnortMerged ’]) + ’,’ + str(results[’
SnortTypesMerged ’]) + ’,’ + str(results[’Suricata ’]) + ’,’ + str
(results[’SuricataTypes ’]) + ’,’ + str(packetCount) + ’,’ + str(
results[’Packets ’]) + ’,’ + str(results[’suricataPackets ’]) + ’,’
+ str(elapsedTime) + ’\n’
421 print "Output: " + output
422
423 #nmap
424 if (runInfo[’Name’] == ’nmapScan ’):






430 elif (runInfo[’Name’] == ’baseline ’):












Appendix E. Experiment Results
Table 13. Experiment Results
Trial ST HP HHI SAI STI SAM STM SuA SuT HHP SuP % HHP % SuP AP ET
1 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 8 0 18104 0% 32% 56978 2365
2 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 0% 7% 1436 1341
3 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 6 0 15447 0% 27% 57756 2365
4 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 8 0 3892 0% 12% 31239 312
5 TCP Connect 6 6 35 5 33 7 40 8 10706 9110 33% 28% 32030 129
6 Aggressive 3 3 0 0 0 0 105 12 13508 31709 2% 4% 893271 1093
7 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 125 12 0 32153 0% 4% 842658 679
8 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 0% 7% 1218 1341
9 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 115 14 0 31803 0% 4% 857500 1086
10 Aggressive 6 5 0 0 0 0 124 12 13456 19050 7% 11% 181337 1829
11 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 0 0 0 0 28 5 7942 13030 10% 16% 79264 6459
12 TCP Connect 6 6 27 5 25 7 30 6 8490 5569 28% 18% 30590 35
13 Aggressive 3 3 61 7 69 9 107 11 11647 31299 2% 5% 673715 1163
14 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 112 12 0 32658 0% 4% 727012 1593
15 TCP Connect 6 6 32 5 33 8 44 8 10434 9281 33% 29% 31725 139
16 TCP Connect 6 6 33 5 28 7 38 8 10209 7751 33% 25% 30671 37
17 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 33 7 63 8 32051 36139 32% 36% 100940 2367
18 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95 0% 7% 1437 1341
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19 Aggressive 6 5 93 8 87 10 54 9 18912 12077 7% 5% 267195 1089
20 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 16 5 62 8 19988 36159 23% 41% 87887 2365
21 Aggressive 9 8 67 6 62 8 53 7 16992 12077 52% 37% 32767 1096
22 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 112 12 0 31907 0% 5% 702602 698
23 Aggressive 3 3 55 7 55 9 111 12 14269 31707 2% 4% 712468 838
24 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 117 12 0 32710 0% 5% 699017 622
25 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 0 0 0 0 29 6 13444 18133 19% 26% 69043 2366
26 TCP Connect 3 3 21 5 21 7 31 8 2413 2120 6% 6% 37184 404
27 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 0 0 0 0 65 8 19797 36120 23% 41% 87561 2367
28 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 173 0% 17% 1045 1341
29 Aggressive 3 3 0 0 0 0 109 12 13053 31143 2% 4% 721156 742
30 TCP Connect 9 9 13 5 16 5 45 10 5732 9613 15% 24% 39352 288
31 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 0% 8% 1164 1341
32 TCP Connect 3 3 8 5 9 5 31 8 2381 3588 9% 14% 25923 79
33 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 17 5 19 7 66 8 21364 36139 21% 35% 101819 2523
34 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0% 7% 1096 1341
35 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 0% 6% 1035 1341
36 Aggressive 9 8 126 8 118 8 77 9 22445 12080 60% 32% 37418 1108
37 TCP Connect 3 3 6 4 8 5 28 8 2607 2516 7% 7% 35691 398
38 TCP Connect 3 3 8 5 8 5 20 6 2319 1802 9% 7% 24792 47
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39 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 0% 9% 1051 1341
40 TCP Connect 6 6 0 0 0 0 43 8 0 12008 0% 29% 41541 1325
41 Aggressive 9 6 220 9 204 9 67 7 30154 12663 83% 35% 36358 1346
42 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 98 0% 8% 1173 1341
43 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 35 7 65 8 32047 36187 32% 36% 100513 2364
44 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 113 12 0 32960 0% 3% 1001189 1149
45 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 0% 5% 1630 1341
46 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97 0% 8% 1200 1341
47 TCP Connect 3 3 9 5 9 5 23 8 2665 3932 10% 14% 27946 180
48 TCP Connect 9 9 0 0 0 0 40 8 17267 7562 47% 21% 36457 25
49 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 115 11 0 32110 0% 3% 990706 950
50 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 33 7 68 8 32056 36234 32% 36% 100504 2365
51 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 8 0 6685 0% 24% 28329 321
52 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 6 0 18122 0% 32% 57333 2367
53 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 0% 5% 1281 1341
54 Aggressive 9 8 174 7 155 9 54 7 37572 12096 97% 31% 38909 1111
55 TCP Connect 3 3 7 5 8 5 26 6 2457 4213 8% 14% 30038 252
56 TCP Connect 9 9 54 5 42 7 35 8 16239 6219 45% 17% 36342 23
57 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 90 0% 6% 1591 1341
58 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 6 0 18200 0% 31% 58469 2367
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59 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 8 0 4873 0% 16% 30904 366
60 Aggressive 6 5 69 7 66 9 36 9 11084 22560 3% 6% 385004 1828
61 TCP Connect 3 3 0 0 0 0 21 7 10031 7352 19% 14% 51586 2677
62 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95 0% 9% 1117 1341
63 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 8 0 6123 0% 26% 23572 247
64 Aggressive 9 8 78 7 74 9 132 10 9304 18645 21% 42% 44115 1817
65 TCP Connect 6 6 27 5 24 7 34 8 8321 6698 27% 21% 31299 46
66 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0% 6% 1261 1341
67 TCP Connect 9 9 55 5 42 7 37 8 16691 8561 46% 24% 36386 32
68 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 5 0 4564 0% 15% 31116 409
69 TCP Connect 3 3 7 5 8 5 16 6 2369 2076 7% 6% 34185 330
70 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95 0% 8% 1188 1341
71 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95 0% 8% 1211 1341
72 TCP Connect 9 9 0 0 0 0 12 6 16174 6893 44% 19% 36607 22
73 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 109 0% 10% 1123 1341
74 Aggressive 6 5 103 7 99 9 119 10 24344 17919 6% 5% 382701 1826
75 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 0% 7% 1216 1341
76 Aggressive 9 8 0 0 0 0 125 11 14966 18280 36% 44% 41339 1806
77 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 110 0% 8% 1460 1341
78 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 17 5 62 8 19992 36290 23% 41% 88185 2366
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79 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 8 0 5310 0% 18% 29927 321
80 Aggressive 6 5 129 9 123 9 26 9 18030 17390 4% 3% 514449 1089
81 TCP Connect 6 6 3 1 3 1 42 8 577 10136 2% 32% 32128 154
82 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 108 6 112 7 67 8 19822 36111 23% 41% 87978 2365
83 TCP Connect 3 3 7 4 9 6 29 8 2634 2217 7% 6% 36804 471
84 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 90 0% 8% 1114 1341
85 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 0% 7% 1057 1341
86 TCP Connect 3 3 36 5 35 5 26 8 2523 2045 7% 6% 35480 382
87 Aggressive 9 8 137 8 122 10 124 12 37932 17753 96% 45% 39660 1802
88 Aggressive 9 8 156 9 137 10 120 10 29815 18369 70% 43% 42311 1806
89 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 74 0% 7% 1026 1341
90 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 196 0% 20% 1001 1341
91 TCP Connect 9 9 61 5 39 7 35 8 15533 6876 43% 19% 36470 20
92 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 18 5 63 8 19817 36112 23% 41% 87659 2367
93 Aggressive 6 5 104 7 104 9 118 10 23544 17856 5% 4% 507274 1829
94 TCP Connect 3 3 8 5 9 5 31 8 2608 4324 9% 14% 30338 295
95 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 33 7 59 8 32071 36129 32% 36% 100046 2365
96 Aggressive 3 3 43 7 46 9 107 12 12392 31865 1% 3% 1120935 932
97 Aggressive 6 5 58 7 59 9 92 8 13785 48851 41% 147% 33270 408
98 Aggressive 3 3 47 7 48 9 103 12 11984 31445 1% 3% 1121648 953
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99 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 16 5 30 6 13457 18121 19% 26% 69068 2367
100 TCP Connect 3 3 9 5 11 7 33 8 2642 2661 8% 8% 35200 375
101 Aggressive 9 8 206 10 178 11 123 10 35124 16630 108% 51% 32566 1870
102 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 16 5 69 8 19816 36170 22% 41% 88593 2363
103 TCP Connect 6 6 26 5 25 7 41 8 8405 8325 26% 26% 32046 179
104 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 14 5 31 8 11941 17841 17% 25% 70457 2367
105 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 91 0% 6% 1551 1341
106 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 91 0% 5% 1688 1341
107 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 15 5 23 8 19817 36292 22% 41% 88230 2367
108 TCP Connect 6 6 23 5 20 7 39 8 6603 7154 20% 22% 32983 146
109 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 121 4 124 5 64 8 19821 36117 23% 41% 87948 2366
110 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 17 5 32 8 13458 18123 19% 26% 69950 2366
111 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 21267 0% 63% 33801 547
112 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85 0% 6% 1384 1341
113 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 174 0% 10% 1710 1341
114 TCP Connect 6 6 10 5 10 5 32 6 2387 7857 8% 25% 31182 101
115 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 32 7 63 8 32064 36118 32% 36% 100385 2367
116 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 0% 7% 1071 1341
117 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 0% 6% 1466 1341
118 TCP Connect 9 9 13 5 16 7 48 10 5785 7542 15% 19% 39194 280
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119 Aggressive 6 5 108 7 108 9 234 10 22964 15869 7% 5% 324561 555
120 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 0% 6% 1210 1341
121 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 0 0 0 0 68 8 19998 36136 23% 41% 87976 2366
122 TCP Connect 6 6 24 5 22 7 45 8 6286 9568 19% 29% 33472 203
123 Aggressive 6 5 50 7 47 9 269 12 8637 35068 2% 8% 413867 439
124 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 34 7 61 8 32091 36125 32% 36% 100790 2367
125 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 116 12 0 31918 0% 3% 1095314 718
126 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 0% 7% 1107 1341
127 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 8 0 6440 0% 25% 25899 252
128 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 92 0% 7% 1360 1341
129 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 0% 8% 1200 1341
130 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 118 12 0 32203 0% 3% 1000779 721
131 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94 0% 8% 1185 1341
132 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 34 7 64 8 31938 36658 31% 36% 102266 2368
133 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 0 0 0 0 67 8 31902 35737 31% 35% 101576 2364
134 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 8 0 4409 0% 15% 30325 336
135 Aggressive 6 5 108 7 110 9 229 12 24171 15611 67% 43% 36188 530
136 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 103 11 0 30912 0% 5% 626567 1019
137 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 5 0 17984 0% 31% 58084 2369
138 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 121 12 0 31342 0% 5% 617717 604
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139 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 0% 4% 2441 1341
140 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 8 0 4563 0% 19% 23664 221
141 TCP Connect 6 6 0 0 0 0 30 8 8454 5505 27% 18% 30797 51
142 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 98 0% 6% 1681 1341
143 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 6 0 18153 0% 31% 57711 2366
144 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 17 5 33 6 12073 18218 17% 26% 70010 2369
145 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 0% 5% 1641 1341
146 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 5 0 18218 0% 31% 57985 2366
147 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 32 5 36 5 66 8 19891 36207 22% 41% 89170 2367
148 TCP Connect 9 9 17 4 14 6 34 8 5507 6119 15% 17% 36474 21
149 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 6 0 18118 0% 31% 57733 2365
150 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 15 5 64 8 19808 36135 22% 41% 88909 2368
151 Aggressive 3 3 0 0 0 0 118 11 11018 30300 2% 5% 637042 666
152 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 8 0 5026 0% 19% 25994 245
153 Aggressive 6 5 101 7 100 9 121 10 24777 17704 83% 59% 29869 1795
154 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 129 6 140 7 66 8 32106 36144 32% 36% 101266 2365
155 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 8 2 10 3 62 8 13939 36494 14% 38% 96538 7855
156 TCP Connect 6 6 23 5 25 7 35 8 8337 5158 25% 16% 33002 188
157 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0% 5% 1703 1341
158 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 122 14 0 32463 0% 5% 629445 1035
215
Table 13 continued from previous page
Trial ST HP HHI SAI STI SAM STM SuA SuT HHP SuP % HHP % SuP AP ET
159 TCP Connect 9 9 55 5 40 7 38 8 17989 7239 49% 20% 36566 25
160 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 16 5 31 6 13178 18013 19% 26% 70151 2369
161 Aggressive 3 3 28 5 27 7 113 12 10649 31231 2% 5% 641598 1095
162 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 0% 4% 2128 1341
163 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 17 5 32 6 12056 18171 17% 26% 70605 2366
164 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94 0% 5% 1815 1341
165 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 0% 6% 2354 1341
166 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 0% 7% 1163 1341
167 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 66 0% 5% 1404 1341
168 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 0% 8% 1099 1341
169 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 77 0% 7% 1114 1341
170 Aggressive 3 3 47 7 47 9 42 11 10987 30930 2% 5% 640906 653
171 Aggressive 3 3 0 0 0 0 120 12 12157 32081 2% 5% 641763 655
172 Aggressive 9 8 146 7 121 9 123 12 38851 17979 95% 44% 40997 1810
173 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 6 0 18042 0% 31% 58041 2367
174 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 3 1 4 2 0 0 7461 18246 11% 26% 70969 4842
175 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 191 0% 14% 1348 1341
176 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 121 12 0 32360 0% 5% 643431 701
177 TCP Connect 3 3 8 4 10 5 23 6 4535 2192 14% 7% 32258 493
178 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 17 5 34 6 13252 18704 19% 26% 70878 2367
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179 Aggressive 9 8 176 7 149 10 124 10 30504 18477 69% 42% 44339 1809
180 TCP Connect 9 9 21 5 17 7 36 8 5538 6557 15% 18% 36719 21
181 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 122 12 0 32033 0% 5% 643158 593
182 Aggressive 6 5 0 0 0 0 53 7 23947 12114 97% 49% 24802 1854
183 TCP Connect 9 9 57 5 42 7 40 8 16630 7488 45% 20% 36608 26
184 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 6 0 18170 0% 29% 63306 3548
185 Aggressive 3 3 23 5 23 7 122 12 7402 32247 1% 5% 634299 1902
186 Aggressive 9 8 219 7 176 9 184 12 30316 18705 68% 42% 44587 1819
187 TCP Connect 9 9 65 5 44 7 38 8 19160 7960 52% 21% 37108 34
188 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 0% 6% 1639 1341
189 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 0% 4% 1630 1341
190 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 14 5 62 8 19824 36130 22% 41% 88777 2366
191 Aggressive 6 5 47 6 50 8 55 7 12240 11964 54% 53% 22766 942
192 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 73 0% 4% 1680 1341
193 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94 0% 6% 1686 1341
194 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2 0 18268 0% 32% 57911 2365
195 TCP Connect 9 9 94 7 88 7 62 8 24616 13503 54% 29% 45843 1747
196 TCP Connect 9 9 28 5 25 7 30 8 8641 6581 24% 18% 36486 27
197 Aggressive 6 5 0 0 0 0 222 10 0 15258 0% 45% 34217 577
198 Aggressive 3 1 126 9 120 9 105 12 8073 31319 1% 6% 552845 910
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199 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 667 0% 20% 3260 1341
200 TCP Connect 6 6 22 5 25 7 45 8 8132 10500 25% 33% 32216 169
201 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 108 6 114 7 65 8 19828 36232 22% 41% 89449 2369
202 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 99 0% 5% 1876 1341
203 TCP Connect 3 3 9 4 9 4 31 8 2490 2312 7% 6% 36686 386
204 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 8 0 4125 0% 12% 33202 467
205 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 0 0 0 0 71 8 18208 36181 18% 36% 100925 8985
206 Aggressive 9 8 184 7 157 9 65 7 36488 12802 97% 34% 37611 1106
207 Aggressive 6 5 104 8 95 8 88 9 17461 11975 72% 49% 24233 953
208 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 0% 5% 1750 1341
209 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 30 5 39 8 61 8 31890 36047 31% 36% 101483 2369
210 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 10 0 5200 0% 18% 29611 350
211 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 14 5 67 8 19935 35877 22% 40% 89865 2368
212 Aggressive 9 8 157 7 128 9 62 7 33662 12771 95% 36% 35500 1116
213 Aggressive 3 3 24 5 25 7 121 11 7981 31656 1% 5% 640899 1198
214 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 8 0 4763 0% 15% 31533 369
215 TCP Connect 9 9 10 5 10 5 36 8 2376 7241 6% 20% 36809 22
216 Aggressive 3 3 43 7 44 9 112 12 12380 31724 2% 5% 626577 1156
217 Aggressive 3 3 39 7 42 9 108 12 11487 31105 2% 5% 635276 790
218 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 66 0% 4% 1784 1341
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219 Aggressive 3 3 91 7 89 9 43 11 11601 30455 2% 5% 635512 1226
220 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 45 5 56 7 67 8 31991 35993 31% 35% 102228 2396
221 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 0% 3% 2763 1341
222 Aggressive 6 5 119 7 121 9 241 12 24515 16528 72% 48% 34137 520
223 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 8 0 4164 0% 15% 27524 232
224 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 3 13 4 56 9 11827 29122 12% 30% 95912 7710
225 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 6 0 18251 0% 31% 58184 2367
226 Aggressive 9 8 110 9 84 9 127 10 30828 17955 89% 52% 34637 1803
227 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 415 0% 13% 3174 1341
228 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 6 0 18100 0% 31% 58233 2365
229 Aggressive 9 8 131 7 113 10 123 10 32154 16534 96% 49% 33417 1066
230 TCP Connect 9 9 14 5 12 5 41 8 2890 6663 8% 18% 36512 22
231 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 8 0 2524 0% 7% 34101 547
232 Aggressive 3 3 41 6 46 9 107 12 11240 31468 2% 5% 631313 843
233 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 6 0 4072 0% 13% 30692 361
234 Aggressive 3 3 42 7 48 9 113 12 11541 32069 2% 5% 634563 1833
235 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32345 0% 1247% 2593 1341
236 TCP Connect 6 6 33 5 35 7 37 8 10589 8003 33% 25% 32002 137
237 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 77 0% 5% 1668 1341
238 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 88 0% 5% 1670 1341
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239 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 77 0% 4% 1714 1341
240 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 189 0% 10% 1882 1341
241 TCP Connect 3 3 4 2 5 3 33 8 1985 2635 6% 8% 33381 331
242 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 6 0 18125 0% 31% 57950 2368
243 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 119 12 0 31340 0% 5% 595363 657
244 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 73 0% 4% 1856 1341
245 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 0% 4% 1721 1341
246 Aggressive 9 8 93 7 88 9 26 7 21261 12184 63% 36% 33586 1102
247 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 113 12 0 32255 0% 5% 612987 556
248 Aggressive 9 8 134 8 123 11 129 11 23659 18491 65% 50% 36619 1803
249 Aggressive 3 3 44 7 50 9 118 12 10722 33033 2% 5% 628083 969
250 TCP Connect 6 6 30 8 32 8 15 8 10666 44201 23% 94% 47052 4293
251 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 6 0 18157 0% 31% 58055 2367
252 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 4 0 36276 0% 62% 58487 2369
253 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 7 0 4096 0% 13% 30987 345
254 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 78 0% 3% 2343 1341
255 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 8 0 18145 0% 31% 58453 2369
256 TCP Connect 6 6 30 7 28 7 11 5 8162 22640 24% 67% 33560 126
257 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0% 4% 1838 1341
258 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 0% 4% 1919 1341
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259 Aggressive 9 8 153 7 134 9 125 10 38937 18166 93% 43% 42059 1815
260 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 8 0 4333 0% 12% 34864 710
261 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94 0% 5% 2027 1341
262 Aggressive 3 3 70 7 73 7 113 11 11198 31090 2% 5% 623431 647
263 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 16 5 31 6 13468 18135 17% 23% 77784 2367
264 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 8 0 3966 0% 14% 29352 403
265 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 0% 4% 1918 1341
266 Aggressive 3 3 0 0 0 0 100 12 10279 31317 2% 5% 641550 639
267 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 3 1 10 4 26 5 7091 18248 8% 21% 85346 6785
268 Aggressive 9 8 130 7 118 10 112 10 37829 17290 93% 42% 40685 1801
269 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 113 12 0 30741 0% 5% 634409 991
270 TCP Connect 9 9 9 4 9 4 41 8 3000 6372 8% 17% 38513 20
271 Aggressive 6 5 70 7 73 10 28 8 10369 8125 31% 24% 33185 3742
272 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 21 5 22 6 32 6 13465 18143 18% 24% 76634 2367
273 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 0% 5% 1831 1341
274 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 21 5 25 6 62 8 19986 36280 21% 38% 96653 2366
275 Aggressive 6 5 82 7 76 9 123 10 22437 17137 70% 53% 32080 1796
276 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 16 5 36 8 13375 18266 17% 24% 77461 2369
277 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 16 5 33 8 13344 18078 17% 24% 76664 2369
278 TCP Connect 9 9 35 5 30 7 42 8 10420 7431 27% 19% 38563 22
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279 Aggressive 3 0 60 7 64 9 101 12 13963 31282 2% 5% 635043 643
280 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 0% 5% 1624 1341
281 Aggressive 9 8 114 6 92 9 73 7 24621 12493 94% 48% 26233 938
282 Aggressive 9 8 231 7 202 9 189 10 40885 18035 93% 41% 43828 1820
283 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 0 0 0 0 57 8 21550 36430 21% 36% 100883 4659
284 TCP Connect 6 6 21 5 22 7 43 8 6104 9148 17% 26% 35026 203
285 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 66 0% 4% 1700 1341
286 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 6 0 3637 0% 12% 30859 508
287 TCP Connect 3 3 8 5 8 5 16 6 2414 1195 9% 4% 27226 60
288 TCP Connect 6 6 26 5 24 7 34 8 8376 6666 26% 20% 32762 39
289 Aggressive 3 3 40 7 46 9 103 12 11202 30472 2% 5% 639607 855
290 TCP Connect 3 3 0 0 0 0 28 8 0 3873 0% 12% 31268 315
291 TCP Connect 3 0 26 5 37 7 4 4 14062 10565 29% 22% 48180 2727
292 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 12 4 14 5 65 8 18087 36178 17% 34% 107584 2364
293 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 69 0% 4% 1663 1341
294 Aggressive 6 5 46 7 45 9 236 10 8961 15931 27% 48% 33465 406
295 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 33 7 60 8 32040 36261 30% 34% 107230 2368
296 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 655 0% 19% 3416 1341
297 TCP Connect 6 6 15 5 19 7 46 8 5862 8239 16% 22% 37122 431
298 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 8 0 3904 0% 15% 26627 293
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299 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 6 0 18051 0% 28% 63930 2367
300 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 0% 5% 1802 1341
301 Aggressive 3 3 40 7 43 7 105 12 11784 31123 2% 5% 622328 814
302 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95 0% 5% 2006 1341
303 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 6 0 18111 0% 28% 64609 2368
304 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 15 5 11 5 13374 36263 17% 47% 76766 2366
305 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 35 7 59 8 31378 36098 28% 32% 113753 5503
306 Aggressive 6 5 99 7 88 9 47 7 20432 12197 82% 49% 25016 1059
307 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 0% 4% 1759 1341
308 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85 0% 4% 1944 1341
309 TCP Connect 3 3 18 5 16 7 0 0 6146 3578 22% 13% 27547 65
310 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 112 12 0 31399 0% 5% 628763 614
311 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97 0% 5% 1895 1341
312 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 74 0% 4% 1889 1341
313 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 168 0% 9% 1826 1341
314 TCP Connect 3 3 8 5 8 5 22 6 2241 2545 8% 9% 26881 41
315 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 99 0% 5% 1925 1341
316 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 105 12 0 31669 0% 5% 614810 849
317 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 17 5 65 8 19993 36001 21% 38% 95888 2369
318 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 0% 4% 1888 1341
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319 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 90 6 96 7 34 8 13433 18197 18% 24% 76571 2367
320 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 34 7 66 8 32035 36181 29% 33% 108858 2368
321 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0% 4% 2039 1341
322 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 32 5 36 5 20 8 15965 36234 17% 38% 95469 2365
323 Aggressive 9 8 188 8 166 10 129 11 41038 17657 93% 40% 44184 1821
324 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 0% 4% 2394 1341
325 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 34 7 62 8 32021 36011 29% 33% 108974 2365
326 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 18 5 23 8 16006 72494 16% 75% 97299 2368
327 TCP Connect 9 9 19 5 16 7 39 8 5310 11010 12% 26% 42974 414
328 Aggressive 6 5 108 8 99 10 121 11 26021 17738 83% 57% 31384 1800
329 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 0% 5% 1726 1341
330 Aggressive 6 5 0 0 0 0 54 7 20217 12029 82% 49% 24647 1058
331 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 0 0 0 0 29 6 13495 18172 18% 24% 76744 2367
332 Aggressive 6 5 115 7 118 9 270 10 20471 37090 5% 9% 402106 435
333 TCP Connect 3 3 10 4 13 5 32 8 4387 3487 14% 11% 31504 290
334 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 10 0 34635 0% 6% 623664 608
335 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 17 5 59 8 20028 36223 21% 38% 95552 2368
336 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 20 4 29 7 27 6 8568 18721 10% 23% 82583 5964
337 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 103 0% 6% 1634 1341
338 Aggressive 9 8 194 9 175 9 83 9 34898 12110 96% 33% 36407 1099
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339 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 106 12 0 31205 0% 5% 634197 610
340 Aggressive 9 8 136 7 119 9 55 7 32316 12068 95% 35% 34152 1107
341 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 6 0 18122 0% 28% 63660 2365
342 Aggressive 3 3 43 9 48 9 100 12 10602 30874 2% 5% 636944 660
343 TCP Connect 6 6 37 5 30 7 37 8 10525 8991 32% 27% 33078 34
344 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 20 4 35 7 68 8 26008 36143 24% 34% 107648 2369
345 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 113 12 0 31063 0% 5% 627136 593
346 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 131 4 137 7 60 8 32048 36141 30% 34% 107316 2366
347 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 14 5 28 6 13447 18548 15% 21% 88230 2367
348 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 13 5 18 6 59 8 12304 36518 11% 33% 112233 11102
349 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 0 0 0 0 30 6 0 18614 0% 17% 112058 5860
350 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 195 0% 10% 1972 1341
351 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 0% 4% 2368 1341
352 TCP Connect 3 3 18 5 20 5 22 8 6054 3768 19% 12% 31188 335
353 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 19 5 24 5 27 5 9310 18073 11% 21% 86161 4077
354 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 83 0% 5% 1821 1341
355 TCP Connect 9 9 8 5 8 5 41 8 2053 7648 5% 20% 38907 20
356 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 116 12 0 31734 0% 5% 624185 616
357 TCP Connect 9 9 0 0 0 0 40 8 0 7076 0% 18% 38669 26
358 NIDS Avoidance 9 6 32 5 31 5 63 8 24826 35919 23% 33% 107681 2367
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359 TCP Connect 3 3 10 5 14 7 27 10 4436 3843 14% 12% 31436 291
360 Aggressive 6 5 96 7 94 9 60 7 20159 12622 8% 5% 244766 1133
361 TCP Connect 3 3 9 4 12 5 27 8 4394 2310 15% 8% 29712 220
362 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97 0% 5% 1793 1341
363 TCP Connect 9 9 40 5 42 7 37 6 16204 9634 37% 22% 43952 1133
364 TCP Connect 6 6 64 7 63 7 112 8 9671 12918 19% 26% 49775 4317
365 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 6 0 18100 0% 27% 66522 2367
366 TCP Connect 3 3 4 1 6 3 24 8 5880 4023 11% 7% 55036 3398
367 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 0% 4% 2185 1341
368 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 0% 5% 1660 1341
369 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 15 5 25 6 16003 36208 17% 38% 95336 2367
370 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 6 0 6548 0% 24% 27640 397
371 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 111 12 0 31316 0% 5% 628280 617
372 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 5 0 49444 0% 77% 64362 2367
373 Aggressive 3 3 41 7 47 9 101 11 10525 31215 2% 5% 633644 634
374 Aggressive 6 5 112 7 109 9 121 12 24876 17773 69% 49% 36026 1798
375 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 77 0% 5% 1680 1341
376 Aggressive 9 8 153 7 137 9 129 12 28284 18672 67% 44% 42108 1811
377 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 78 0% 3% 2959 1341
378 TCP Connect 9 9 69 7 61 8 48 8 22333 12944 44% 25% 51282 1197
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379 Aggressive 9 8 13 5 16 7 63 7 5135 12788 15% 36% 35075 1113
380 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 17 5 64 8 19975 36099 21% 38% 95653 2365
381 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 17 5 20 5 58 8 17417 36140 16% 33% 110377 2470
382 TCP Connect 9 9 67 5 68 8 52 8 21808 13154 41% 25% 52637 1289
383 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 0% 4% 2054 1341
384 TCP Connect 6 6 0 0 0 0 56 8 15843 13828 31% 27% 50786 2402
385 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 8 0 18069 0% 28% 64507 2365
386 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 0% 4% 1965 1341
387 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 16 4 19 5 63 8 14146 36176 13% 33% 110131 2368
388 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 0% 5% 1837 1341
389 TCP Connect 6 6 16 5 14 5 57 10 4065 9457 11% 25% 37141 389
390 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 111 12 0 31238 0% 2% 1269081 664
391 Aggressive 6 5 62 7 58 9 123 10 15636 17798 39% 45% 39801 1798
392 TCP Connect 6 6 43 7 35 7 37 8 12264 8118 37% 25% 33134 62
393 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 0% 3% 2202 1341
394 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6240 0% 25% 24754 261
395 TCP Connect 6 6 28 5 24 7 28 6 7907 5451 24% 16% 33117 63
396 Aggressive 3 3 42 7 44 9 0 0 10654 30983 1% 2% 1290814 697
397 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 29 6 32 7 32 6 12307 18299 16% 23% 78976 4020
398 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 7 0 4954 0% 15% 32433 853
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399 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 111 12 0 32373 0% 2% 1330966 791
400 Aggressive 3 3 41 7 46 7 101 12 10886 29789 1% 2% 1368807 784
401 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 6 0 4046 0% 17% 24177 243
402 Aggressive 6 5 41 7 41 7 117 13 9866 15540 7% 11% 139521 1850
403 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 392 0% 19% 2104 1341
404 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 0 0 0 0 30 6 13196 17701 18% 24% 74274 2367
405 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 16 4 19 5 60 8 19288 35979 20% 37% 97429 5004
406 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 6 0 17680 0% 29% 60017 2367
407 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 271 0% 15% 1852 1341
408 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 0% 3% 2257 1341
409 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 18 5 22 6 65 8 13949 35215 15% 38% 92160 2364
410 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 15 5 34 8 13443 17860 18% 25% 72896 2366
411 TCP Connect 9 9 78 7 47 8 45 10 16941 6340 43% 16% 39820 71
412 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 8 0 17714 0% 30% 59644 2364
413 Aggressive 6 5 82 7 78 9 126 10 22631 17099 4% 3% 617511 1827
414 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 33 5 41 8 66 8 32040 35917 30% 34% 106518 2361
415 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 8 0 3560 0% 15% 23808 249
416 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 0% 5% 1716 1341
417 TCP Connect 9 9 0 0 0 0 38 8 18274 11916 39% 26% 46571 1926
418 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0% 5% 1725 1341
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419 TCP Connect 3 3 33 5 22 5 30 5 6497 4413 21% 14% 30685 438
420 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 112 0% 8% 1442 1341
421 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 12 4 14 5 67 8 13982 35230 15% 39% 91372 2367
422 TCP Connect 6 6 7 4 7 4 47 8 2333 9318 7% 27% 34092 291
423 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 6 0 17868 0% 30% 60313 2363
424 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 0% 5% 1920 1341
425 Aggressive 9 8 0 0 0 0 127 12 40262 15467 95% 37% 42275 1815
426 Aggressive 9 8 132 9 115 10 46 7 31240 12512 96% 39% 32389 1099
427 Aggressive 6 5 65 6 58 8 51 7 17467 11541 80% 53% 21869 956
428 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 5 0 6302 0% 20% 30743 709
429 NIDS Avoidance 6 6 21 5 23 5 63 8 14513 35542 13% 32% 112434 4904
430 TCP Connect 9 9 60 5 40 7 35 8 18381 6910 47% 18% 38861 22
431 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 7 3 10 4 28 6 2128 17759 2% 17% 102732 12076
432 TCP Connect 3 3 10 5 11 5 20 6 4206 2022 14% 7% 31038 391
433 TCP Connect 6 6 28 5 30 7 45 8 7174 11116 22% 34% 32913 204
434 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0% 5% 1748 1341
435 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 131 4 137 7 62 8 32068 36130 30% 34% 106204 2361
436 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 16 5 0 0 13165 0 18% 0% 72645 2368
437 TCP Connect 9 9 9 3 12 4 40 6 4264 11456 9% 25% 45205 447
438 TCP Connect 9 9 64 5 50 7 40 8 19618 9842 43% 22% 45758 1173
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439 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 35 7 63 8 32070 35431 30% 33% 107572 2364
440 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 74 0% 4% 1764 1341
441 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 20 4 20 5 22 6 20031 35028 19% 33% 107602 2369
442 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0% 4% 2096 1341
443 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 66 0% 4% 1704 1341
444 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 7 0 5686 0% 21% 27613 363
445 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 5 0 17012 0% 27% 64172 2365
446 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 261 0% 14% 1837 1341
447 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 8 0 16999 0% 27% 63788 2369
448 TCP Connect 3 3 9 6 10 6 16 6 2360 1656 8% 5% 31020 267
449 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 407 0% 18% 2313 1341
450 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 77 0% 5% 1627 1341
451 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 114 12 0 29840 0% 5% 616091 608
452 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 0 0 0 0 62 8 32003 34564 30% 32% 107252 2363
453 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 33 7 62 8 32383 35168 30% 33% 107745 2366
454 Aggressive 6 5 51 9 49 9 239 10 9973 13414 35% 47% 28845 400
455 TCP Connect 9 9 66 7 61 9 45 8 19490 9039 39% 18% 49478 2956
456 Aggressive 9 8 45 7 46 9 244 12 8123 12856 19% 30% 42822 545
457 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 115 12 0 13926 0% 4% 328201 554
458 TCP Connect 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 8 0 5795 0% 27% 21736 51
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459 TCP Connect 6 6 30 5 28 7 33 8 8437 7180 26% 22% 32494 21
460 Aggressive 3 3 36 6 44 9 105 12 10791 8698 4% 3% 249548 576
461 TCP Connect 3 3 7 5 8 5 0 0 2757 2426 9% 8% 29896 206
462 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 16 5 30 5 13365 17607 17% 23% 77673 2369
463 TCP Connect 6 6 13 5 11 5 0 0 4178 0 13% 0% 32501 25
464 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 133 12 0 8757 0% 3% 250691 579
465 TCP Connect 3 0 69 7 77 9 20 8 20917 1962 66% 6% 31710 349
466 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 86 0% 5% 1777 1341
467 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 73 0% 4% 1805 1341
468 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 24 4 33 7 65 8 30137 36170 27% 33% 110085 2361
469 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 32 5 37 5 33 6 13309 18103 17% 24% 76477 2367
470 Control Group 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 0% 4% 1985 1341
471 Control Group 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 69 0% 5% 1435 1341
472 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95 0% 7% 1291 1341
473 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 6 0 18158 0% 29% 63496 2365
474 Control Group 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 0% 6% 1290 1341
475 Aggressive 3 3 50 7 45 9 193 12 12677 9238 4% 3% 322296 1622
476 NIDS Avoidance 9 9 0 0 0 0 62 8 32065 36238 30% 34% 106835 2361
477 NIDS Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 6 0 18168 0% 28% 65130 2364
478 Aggressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 112 12 0 9159 0% 1% 639420 606
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479 Control Group 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 83 0% 7% 1192 1341
480 NIDS Avoidance 3 3 12 4 15 5 29 5 13465 18132 18% 24% 75482 2365
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5 numPermutations = 900000
6 experimentFile = ’results.csv’
7
8 set1 = []
9 set2 = []
10 combined = []
11 mean1 = 0
12 mean2 = 0
13 difference = 0
14 numExceedDif = 0
15
16 # checks to see if a file with the run order exists and makes sure
it’s not empty
17 if os.path.exists(experimentFile) and os.path.getsize(experimentFile
) > 0:
18 f = open(experimentFile , ’r’)
19 for line in f:
20 value = line.split(’,’)
21 lambdaFunc = None
22
23 #print value [0]
24 set1.append(float(value [0]))
25 #print value [1]









34 mean1 = numpy.average(set1)
35 print ’Mean1: ’ + str(mean1)
36 mean2 = numpy.average(set2)
37 print ’Mean2: ’ + str(mean2)
38 difference = abs(mean1 - mean2)
39 print "Difference: " + str(difference)
40 combined = set1 + set2
41 #print combined
42
43 for x in range(numPermutations):
44 random.shuffle(combined)
45
46 sample1Avg = numpy.average(combined [:len(combined)//2])
47 sample2Avg = numpy.average(combined[len(combined)//2:])
48 if abs(sample1Avg - sample2Avg) > difference:
49 numExceedDif +=1




54 print "Error , file not found!"
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